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Abstract 
Background: The 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic was the first 
pandemic in the era of modern pandemic planning and preparedness. 
Although the mortality and morbidity caused by the pandemic was low 
compared with the previous pandemics, it gave the first opportunity for 
member states to implement an actual pandemic response reflecting on years 
of pandemic preparedness and planning. The objective of this study was to 
evaluate the usefulness of pandemic preparedness activities as well as to 
identify challenges and activities that require further improvement.  
Methods: The study was conducted in seven countries within the WHO 
regional office for Europe; six of them were identified through a stratified 
random sampling in order to get a representative sample across different 
levels of preparedness within the WHO European Region. These were 
Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark (pilot country for the study), 
Germany, Portugal, Switzerland and Uzbekistan. Research teams visited each 
country and interviewed six key stakeholder groups at different administrative 
levels. These were Ministry of Health (MOH), National Public Health 
Authority (NPHA), Civil Emergency Response (CER) representatives, Sub-
National Government Authority, and primary and secondary healthcare 
workers (HCWs). Focus group interviews were conducted using open-ended 
questions in semi-structured interview guides.  
Results: Six recurring themes were identified as essential aspects of 
pandemic planning activities. These were communication, coordination, 
 iii 
capacity building, mutual support, leadership, and flexibility. The following 
aspects of pandemic planning activities were found to be inadequate and 
should be improved in the future: risk communication with the public and 
healthcare workers, coordination of vaccine logistics, flexibility and 
adaptability of pandemic plans, and surveillance in the secondary healthcare 
setting.  
Conclusions: Stakeholders interviewed reported that the pandemic 
preparedness activities were worthwhile and appropriate for the response 
measures carried out during the pandemic influenza (H1N1) in 2009. 
However, the findings identified areas of under planning that were common 
to most of the participating countries. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This introductory chapter starts by describing the project rational and 
objectives. The chapter introduces how influenza A (H1N1) pandemic 
unfolded in 2009 and highlights the significance of pandemic preparedness 
and planning. It demonstrates how the researcher became interested in 
studying pandemic planning and preparedness. As a final point, it presents a 
brief overview of the eight chapters of this thesis. 
1.1 Project rationale and objectives 
 
WHO Regional Office for Europe decided to conduct a service evaluation of 
how pandemic preparedness activities aided the response to influenza A 
(H1N1) pandemic in 2009 in countries within the WHO European Region. 
Understanding how member statesÕ preparedness supported the pandemic 
response is critical to help identify useful lessons and guide future pandemic 
preparedness and planning activities. As many challenges and gaps in 
pandemic preparedness remain, this evaluation will address these issues and 
further inform WHO Regional Office for Europe activities and WHO 
guidance on how to best support countries in future pandemic preparedness 
planning. However, there is a current lack of certainty about which of these 
activities are relatively the most important; and which ones are less useful to 
member states for pandemic response, especially in the light of the 2009-2010 
pandemic which can act as a ÔyardstickÕ against which earlier pandemic 
planning activities can be judged. 
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The aim of this project is to evaluate how pandemic preparedness activities 
aided the response to the pandemic influenza A/H1N1 in 2009, and identify 
good practices for future pandemic planning and areas where continued 
improvement is required. The following specific objectives were targeted:   
a) To describe the process of countriesÕ pandemic preparedness at different 
administrative levels and how it aided the response during the pandemic in 
2009.  
b) To identify the extent to which the pandemic planning activities proved 
useful and to highlight areas of under planning where further improvement is 
needed. 
c) To determine how planning activities could have been performed 
differently in the pre-pandemic period. 
1.2 How did influenza A (H1N1) pandemic unfold in 2009? 
Mexican public health authorities began to observe a high number of 
influenza-like illness cases as well as the Mexican medical laboratories 
started reporting a high number of un-typeable influenza isolates. Around the 
same time, specialized centres in different cities in Mexico started to report 
cases of severe acute respiratory infection in healthy young adults. In line 
with international health regulations, Mexican health officials notified the Pan 
American Health Organization (PAHO) about the increase in the number of 
cases of respiratory illness (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2009a).  
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On April 12, Mexican public health authorities reported an outbreak of acute 
respiratory illness in the state of Veracruz to the Pan American Health 
Organization (PAHO). Two days later, the Ministry of Health in Mexico 
issued a notification to all healthcare workers in the community and hospital 
for enhanced surveillance in order to notify all cases with severe acute 
respiratory illness to the public health authorities. Moreover, healthcare 
professional were asked to collect upper and lower respiratory tract samples 
from those patients. Subsequently, respiratory samples with un-typeable 
influenza were sent to laboratories in the USA and Canada for further testing. 
A novel influenza strain of swine-origin was determined to be the causative 
agent of the increase number of cases. Based on the clinical features, 
epidemiology, and laboratory results, a case definition was developed 
(Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009a). 
A suspect case was defined based on the basis of clinical severity to have 
fever, cough, and shortness of breath. While a probable case has the same 
case definition as a suspect case but with a laboratory confirmation of 
influenza A and if it is confirmed by real-time reverseÐtranscription 
polymerase chain reaction (rt-PCR) to be of swine-origin influenza A(H1N1) 
then this is a confirmed case (Crdova-Villalobos, et al., 2009). In March and 
April, there were 97 cases of laboratory confirmed influenza A/H1N1 cases in 
Mexico and most of the cases were hospitalized reflecting the importance of 
the hospital surveillance system (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2009a). 
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The national public health officials met with the Mexican President and 
decided to close schools in different parts of the country. International 
travellers were asked to report their illness in case they develop influenza like 
illness symptoms. As part of the national response to the pandemic, the 
Mexican health authorities started a public health campaign to increase public 
awareness regarding the importance of hand washing, self isolation when 
sick, respiratory hygiene. In addition, personal protective measures such as 
facemasks and alcohol sanitizers were made available. Health authorities 
recommended against mass gatherings in order to reduce the risk of 
transmission (Crdova-Villalobos, et al., 2009). 
In April 2009, the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention confirmed the 
first two cases of influenza H1N1 in human. The emerging strain was isolated 
and virologists stated that it is the result of re-assortment between swine flu 
and human strains. The two cases were found not to be epidemiologically 
linked and reported no contact with pigs. According to WHO nomenclature 
system to include the time and place of isolation, the virus was named 
A/California/7/2009.  More cases were reported in the following few days in 
different states. Public health professionals at the Centres for Disease Control 
and Prevention in Atlanta worked in collaboration with local stakeholders and 
conducted an intensive contact tracing process to try to identify the source 
and the index case as well as to detect secondary transmission in the 
community. The confirmed cases did not report contact with pigs and the 
assumption at that time was that an ongoing human-to human transmission 
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was occurring in the community (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
2009b).  
At the same time, Centres for Disease Control and Prevention tried to develop 
a candidate vaccine to protect the population against the novel virus. The first 
step in this process was to identify a virus that can be grown in eggs to 
produce mass amounts and then to be sent to manufacturers to start making 
the vaccine (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 2009b). 
Pandemic response measures were triggered by the emergence of this novel 
influenza virus, and many response activities started in late April 2009. These 
included enhanced influenza surveillance, vaccine production efforts, 
strengthening communication and coordination across different stakeholders. 
More cases were identified in different states in the following days that made 
the response to be on a national scale. Moreover, cases were identified in 
different countries and this gave the impression that a human-to-human 
transmission was ongoing all over the world (McMenamin and Nguyen-Van-
Tam, 2013).  
It is important to commend the role of Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention in communicating with the public and healthcare professional 
during the pandemic in 2009. The Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
organized a number of press conferences to inform and educate the public 
about the progress of the situation and provided important educational 
messages. Moreover, the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
published the virus genetic sequence to an online database that can be 
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accessed by virologist and scientists (Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2009b). 
Dr. Margaret Chan (The WHO Director General) upon the recommendations 
from the emergency committee of the IHR declared a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). According to the WHO 
phases, containment was not practical and WHO phase 4 was announced on 
April 27, 2009 (WHO, 2009a). Again, the alert was raised to phase 5 two 
days later when sustained human-to-human transmission was identified in 
two countries of the same WHO region (WHO, 2009b). As of May 2009, new 
cases of the novel influenza virus have been identified in Mexico, Canada, 
and other countries (WHO, 2009c). 
After thousands of cases were confirmed in more than 70 countries 
internationally, the WHO announced Phase 6 and urged international and 
national communities to finalize their preparedness activities (WHO, 2009d). 
Afterwards, the number of countries notifying the WHO with new cases 
continued to increase worldwide and by July 2009 all jurisdictions had 
experienced at least one infection (WHO, 2009e). By February of 2010, more 
than 200 counties documented confirmed cases of the novel virus with 
approximately 18,000 deaths worldwide (WHO, 2010a). WHO director 
general based on the recommendations by the IHR emergency committee 
declared the 2009 pandemic over on August 10, 2010. This meant that the 
world has entered the post-pandemic phase, and during this phase the 
countries are required to reflect on and revise their influenza preparedness 
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activities (WHO, 2010b). Despite the fact that WHO has declared a post- 
pandemic phase, northern hemisphere countries reported high influenza 
clinical activity during winter of 2010 (WHO, 2011a), 
 
1.3 Pandemic influenza preparedness  
 
Over the past 10 years, the national and international communities have 
invested considerably in pandemic planning and preparedness and this is 
mainly due to increase in the awareness of the need of coordinated response 
to international public health threats, including pandemic influenza (Brown 
and Hegermann-Lindencrone, 2013).  The fact that the UK government has a 
pandemic preparedness plan on its risk register is a good example (Cabinet 
Office, 2008). International and supranational organizations such as the 
World Health Organization (WHO), the European Commission, and the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) are considering 
pandemic planning activities a high priority and provide ongoing advice and 
technical assistance to achieve the highest status of preparedness. Over the 
past 10 years, these organizations issued a number of publications and 
recommendations for good practice in pandemic preparedness as well as 
organized a number of country assessments and workshops (Nicoll, 2010, 
WHO, 2009f, EU Commission, 2005). Pandemic preparedness activities aim 
to reduce transmission, mortality and morbidity, maintain business continuity, 
and reduce the social and economic disruption of a pandemic (WHO and EU 
Commission, 2005). The process of developing pandemic plans at different 
levels, testing them in exercises, and continuous revision are also part of these 
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activities. In addition, translating pandemic plans into actions is one of the 
most essential features of successful pandemic planning and this can be 
achieved by implementing these plans at national and local levels at all times 
(WHO, 2005a). Over the past 10 years, WHO regional office for Europe had 
provided leadership and supported countries to plan and prepare for pandemic 
influenza. The office provided advice and technical assistance to member 
states to prepare and respond to different emerging respiratory pathogen 
including the SARS outbreak in 2003 and emergence of avian influenza in 
1997 and 2003. This was mainly done through ongoing meetings, workshops, 
country assessments, and country visits.  
The WHO Regional office for Europe since 2005 had worked in collaboration 
with WHO headquarters in Geneva, European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control and the EU commission to support countriesÕ pandemic planning 
activities through more than 60 country activities (Brown, 2013). All these 
activities were in line with the implementation of the International Health 
Regulations (WHO, 2008). The outcomes of these activities were distributed 
to countries through publication on the WHO Regional Office for Europe 
Influenza website, on the EuroFlu website, and through peer-reviewed 
publications (WHO Europe official website, n.d, EuroFlu official website, 
n.d.). 
1.4 How did the researcher choose pandemic influenza preparedness to 
be his PhD research project? 
 
During influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in 2009, the researcher was actively 
involved in the emergency response to the pandemic in 2009. He was the 
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principle epidemiologist and data analyst for the UK influenza clinical 
information network project (FLU-CIN). The aim of this project was to 
establish a hospital surveillance network to identify risk factors for severe 
outcome (hospitalization and mortality) (Nguyen-Van-Tam et al., 2010a, 
Myles, 2012). This system was not in place before the pandemic in the UK, 
and the group (Health Protection and Influenza Research Group), the 
researcher was a member of this group, took the initiative to design and 
implement this project to help national authorities to make evidence-informed 
decisions during the response to pandemic. Despite years of pandemic 
preparedness and planning which made the UK as one of the best prepared 
countries in the world, establishing this vital system was overlooked.  
This brought to the researcher attention the importance of evaluating how 
countriesÕ pandemic planning before influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in 2009 
assisted the response. Late in 2009, the group (Health Protection Research 
Group at the University of Nottingham) led by the researcherÕs first 
supervisor Professor Jonathan Van-Tam was on its way to be recognised as a 
WHO collaborating centre for pandemic influenza and research. The team 
was asked to be involved in evaluating how countries planning and 
preparedness aided the response to influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in 2009.  
The researcher is a physician and holds a masterÕs degree in Public Health 
from the University of Nottingham and worked as an Epidemiologist and 
Biostatistician for the same University for almost a year before commencing 
his PhD studies. Influenza epidemiology was his area of research interest and 
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he was involved in several projects related to influenza vaccine effectiveness, 
systematic reviews and meta-analyses and teaching outbreak investigation 
skills. The researcher recognised this project to be a great opportunity to learn 
more on pandemic preparedness, and to conduct a proper academic training to 
develop his methodological and analytical skills. This includes qualitative 
data collection, interview skills, data transcription, coding schemes, data 
analysis, and reporting and communicating findings. 
Initially, the researcher visited the WHO Regional Office for Europe team in 
Copenhagen several times in the beginning of 2010 and they visited the 
University of Nottingham too. Both teams used to work in a collaborative 
way to write study protocol and interview guides.  
1.5 Thesis overview 
 
Following this introductory chapter there will be seven chapters: 
Chapter two, The basics of influenza, explains the clinical symptoms and 
signs of influenza and highlights the epidemiological features of both inter-
pandemic (seasonal) and pandemic influenza. It describes the virological 
aspects of influenza and how these facilitate the emergence of novel influenza 
viruses.  
Chapter three, Historical review, reviews major and most devastating 
infections throughout history and how human responses have evolved over 
time. It highlights the major influenza pandemics throughout history with a 
particular emphasis on the pandemics of the twentieth century.  
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Chapter four, Emergency planning and response, describes the main concepts 
of generic emergency planning and response management with a particular 
focus on organizational communication. 
Chapter five, Pandemic preparedness activities, describes the main elements 
and priorities of pandemic planning with a brief description of national and 
international planning activities.  
Chapter six, Methods, describes in details the qualitative and inductive 
methodology used to conduct this study. 
Chapter seven, Findings, describes the results of the study; the major themes 
emerged from interviews. What pandemic preparedness activities were useful 
and what is needed to be improved for the future. 
Chapter eight: Discussion of the findings, recommendations, and conclusion. 
1.6 Summary and conclusion 
 
This introductory chapter gives an overview of the study aims and objectives 
and highlights the significance of pandemic preparedness activities. It 
describes how the pandemic influenza A unfolded in 2009 as well as it 
highlights how the researcher became interested in the topic. The thesis 
structure were summarised too. 
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Chapter 2: The basics of influenza  
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the basic knowledge regarding influenza the disease 
and virus. It starts with a detailed description of seasonal and pandemic 
influenza. It highlights the major differences between seasonal and pandemic 
influenza as they represent a continuum of the same. Afterwards, a clear 
description of the clinical features of influenza infection with all possible 
complications was discussed. In addition, the clinical features of the three 
pandemics of the twentieth century as well as the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
were explained in details. Next, it describes the basic information about 
influenza virology and the associated phenomenon of antigenic variation and 
how they can cause outbreaks and pandemics. The chapter then states the 
fundamental concepts of seasonal influenza epidemiology and how these 
features can reverse during a pandemic.  
2.2 Inter-pandemic Influenza (seasonal influenza) vs. Pandemic 
Influenza  
 
Pandemic influenza is a rare and historic event while seasonal influenza 
occurs annually and causes outbreaks and morbidity on a regular basis. 
Therefore, it is crucial to study the clinical, epidemiologic, and virologic 
features of seasonal influenza in order to have an overall understanding of 
pandemic influenza (Nguyen-Van-Tam, and Hampson 2003). It is not 
sufficient to study pandemic influenza in isolation of seasonal influenza and 
this is because they represent a continuum of the same disease. The process 
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starts by the introduction of a novel pandemic influenza virus to the human 
population.  Subsequently, this strain circulates as a seasonal virus in the 
following years. This happened during the 1918 pandemic when the influenza 
A/H1N1 emerged as a novel pandemic strain and subsequently circulated as a 
seasonal strain from 1920 to 1956 (Zimmer and Burke, 2009). Seasonal 
influenza is recognised as a major public health concern because of the total 
annual mortality and morbidity surpasses those caused by pandemic influenza 
(Molinari et al., 2007). 
In comparison to seasonal influenza, pandemic influenza is a global outbreak 
that has a potential to infect a vast number of people on a wider geographic 
scale that can cause wider social disruption. It spreads in waves and can have 
a bigger health impact on the healthy adult population (Morens et al., 2009). 
Pandemic influenza can cause high morbidity and mortality in the healthy 
adult population as well as the other vulnerable groups. Therefore; pandemic 
preparedness and planning is essential to reduce the impact of pandemic 
influenza on the entire population (Simonsen, et al, 1998). 
Epidemiologists and scientists infer from the history of the previous 
pandemics that mortality and morbidity can be very severe as the first 
pandemic of the previous century caused around 20 million deaths in 1918 
(Nguyen-Van-Tam and Hampson, 2003). Other papers estimated total deaths 
of the 1918 pandemic to be approximately 40 million (Johnson and Mueller 
2002, Patterson and Pyle, 1991) or even as high as 100 million (Johnson and 
Muller, 2002). In comparison with subsequent pandemics in the twentieth 
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century, the death toll experienced in 1918 was overwhelming. During the 
Asian influenza pandemic, there were around 80,000 deaths in the USA and 
one million worldwide. Hong-Kong influenza pandemic in 1968Ð1969 
pandemic was of similar severity to the Asian pandemic influenza in terms of 
mortality and morbidity (Potter, 1998).  
2.3 Clinical features 
 
Influenza is an acute respiratory communicable disease mostly presented with 
fever, cough, and sore throat. Other constitutional symptoms include 
headache, coryza, fatigue, muscle pain, and chills. Less commonly, patients 
with an influenza infection can develop sputum, hoarseness, dizziness, chest 
pain, vomiting, diarrhoea, and abdominal discomfort. Influenza illness may 
last for few days but long-term complication such as fatigue can continue for 
few weeks (Nicholson et al., 1998). Almost half of influenza patients as 
confirmed by serology are asymptomatic (Knight, 1973). In healthy adults 
with no underlying chronic medical illness, influenza is mostly a mild and 
self-limiting; but it can sometimes result in a severe illness (Nicholson et al., 
1998). Secondary bacterial infection represents the most common 
complication after influenza infection. Bacterial pneumonia is considered the 
most important cause of death attributed to influenza infection. 
Pneumococcus is the most common pathogen to complicate influenza 
infection but this can change depending on the circulating bacteria in the 
environment in a given season (Nicholson, 1992).  
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Pandemic influenza virus is unpredictable in terms of virulence or clinical 
severity, since the three pandemics of the previous century revealed a 
different level of severity (Webster, 1997, Potter, 1998). However, it can be 
anticipated that a new virus strain might cause a more severe illness or longer 
duration compared with seasonal influenza and this is due to lack of 
immunity in the population affected (Webster, 1997). 
The clinical features of pandemic 1918 were similar to seasonal influenza and 
most of the infected cases experienced fever, cough, and myalgia. The most 
common complication was bacterial pneumonia. However, a subset of 
patients ended up having a quite sever haemorrhagic viral pneumonia, The 
case fatality rate was around 2.5% in the general population but it reached the 
4 % in the healthy young adult population. The high virulence of 1918 
pandemic virus strain is still an area of controversy and the exact factors are 
still unknown. Virologists started to believe that the virus was of an avian 
origin that underwent a genetic mutation and adaptation in the human. This 
genetic adaptability made the virus transmissible from human to human 
Taubenberger and Morens, 2010).   
The clinical feature of the Asian influenza pandemic was less severe when 
compared to the 1918 pandemic. Epidemiology was similar to seasonal 
influenza with high mortality among elderly and young children. In addition 
to those two groups, pregnant women experienced high mortality and 
morbidity. The clinical attack rate in elderly was low compared to other age 
groups and this relative sparing is probably due to prior infection with an 
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influenza strain of the similar antigenic component. A high rate secondary 
bacterial pneumonia due to Staphylococcus aureus increased the morbidity 
and mortality during the pandemic. A total of one million deaths was the 
result of the 1957 pandemic with a case fatality of 0.5%, which is far lower 
than the previous pandemic (Potter, 2001).  
The Hong Kong pandemic that hit the world in 1968 caused one to three 
million deaths worldwide with a similar case fatality rate when compared to 
the Asian pandemic (Kilbourne, 2006). We can conclude that the pandemics 
of the previous century varied in terms of clinical severity on the basis of case 
fatality rate. This difference in clinical severity can be due the variation in the 
virologic origin of the novel influenza virus. Therefore, it is not feasible to 
anticipate the impact of the next pandemic strain (Sellwood, 2009). 
Speaking of influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in 2009, most of the cases were 
mild and self-limiting with highest clinical attack rates documented in the 
younger age group with a relative sparing of the elderly population. The 
overall case fatality rate was between 0.0004% and 1.47% with an average 
rate of 0.5% (Bautista et al., 2010). For symptomatic illness, the case fatality 
rate varied across countries, it was 0.048% in the USA (Presanis et al, 2009) 
and 0.026% in the UK (Donaldson et al. 2009). Most of the severe 
hospitalizations and mortality due to the novel pandemic influenza virus have 
occurred among children and young adults (Louie et al, 2009).  
Clinical features of cases ranged from being vary mild to severe and fatal 
infections with up to one third of infections had mild symptoms without fever 
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(Cao et al, 2009). Symptoms were typical including fever, cough, and sore 
throat. Diarrhoea, vomiting, and nausea were documented in a higher rate 
compared to seasonal influenza. A number of clinical features were 
associated with a more severe outcome such as needing intensive care or 
death; these were shortness of breath, haemoptysis, productive cough, and 
fever for a long duration, and dehydration (Jain et al., 2009). 
2.4 Influenza virology 
 
Influenza virus is a negative-stranded RNA virus that belongs to the family 
Orthomyxoviridae and they are of three different serotypes, A, B and C. 
Influenza A is the most important one from the public health point of view as 
it has the ability to infect both human and non-humans hosts. Most clinical 
cases are caused by influenza A and B while C causes only mild illness 
(Gatherer, 2009). 
Influenza A subtypes can be differentiated based on the immunogenic 
component of the surface antigens, hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase 
(NA) which give each type a distinct structure that can be detected by 
serological tests. In the past, the classification was based only on HA 
component but recently NA was discovered and added more practicality in 
the classification of the influenza virus. There are now 16 HA and 9 NA for 
influenza A virus (Mueller et al., 2010). The WHO to name a give strain is 
using surface antigens along with the geographic location, the year of 
isolation, and strain number (Chanock et al., 1972).  
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Influenza virus as an RNA virus is genetically unstable and develops genetic 
errors during viral replication. This phenomenon is called antigenic drift and 
the drifted strains are the main reason behind seasonal influenza outbreaks 
and epidemics every year (Monto, 2000). These new-drifted strains are seen 
in the northern and southern hemispheres and this is why the WHO updates 
the influenza vaccine components twice a year, once per each hemisphere 
(Carrat and Falahault, 2007). 
Antigenic shift is a virologic phenomenon that occurs with influenza A 
viruses and can result in substantial changes to the genetic component of the 
virus and subsequently can produce a novel influenza virus (Cox and 
Subbaro, 2000). The process that can result in antigenic shift is called genetic 
reassortment that occurs when two subtypes of the influenza virus infect the 
same host and mixed genetically together to produce a new reassorted virus 
with mixed genetic segments from the original strains. If one of the original 
viruses is a strain to which human has no pre-existing immunity, this will 
result in a novel virus with a potential to cause pandemic (Taubenberger and 
Morens, 2010). 
There is a possibility that the Asian influenza pandemic and the Hong Kong 
influenza pandemic were a result of antigenic reassortment between two 
influenza strains that co-infected pigs at that time. Similarly, 2009 pandemic 
influenza A virus was a result of genetic reassormtent between a human virus 
of 1918 origins and an avian-origin virus (Garten et al, 2009). On the other 
hand, the 1918 pandemic virus was completely novel to human and was not 
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originated from the assortment of pre-existing influenza strains. The origin of 
this virus is believed to be of an avian source that infected the human and 
underwent a number of genetic mutations (Taubenberger and Morens, 2010).  
2.5 Influenza epidemiology and surveillance  
 
Influenza activity in the temperate regions increases considerably during the 
winter season and may last for several months (Simonsen, 1999). In tropical 
and subtropical regions, influenza activity occurs year-around (Simonsen, 
1999, Shek and Lee, 2003).  
The main function of influenza surveillance networks is to detect the onset of 
the influenza season by monitoring influenza like illness (ILI) consultation 
rates, emergency visits, hospitalizations, and deaths. In addition, laboratory 
surveillance is set up to identify the circulating strains and their sensitivity to 
antivirals. This is why the WHO created a global surveillance network that 
consists of the five main WHO collaborating centres in addition to 118 
national influenza centres around the world (Kitler et al, 2002)  
Most seasonal influenza cases are mild and mostly treated by general 
practitioners in the community. For this reason, national health authorities all 
over the world created sentinel surveillance systems to monitor influenza like 
illness activity and detect outbreaks. In the UK, the Royal College of GPs 
created a surveillance system that has the capacity to correlate influenza 
consultation rates with the laboratory confirmed cases. GPs who participate in 
those sentinel networks report ILI cases weekly as well as they submit nasal 
and throat swabs for a proportion of cases (Fleming, 1996).  
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Unfortunately, the influenza surveillance infrastructure is not well developed 
in many countries and this can have a negative impact on early identification 
of outbreaks and subsequently impair international health security (Briand et 
al, 2011). During influenza pandemic, the seasonal influenza networks need 
to be sustained but there will be an urgent need for real time data to inform 
decision making and immunisation policies (Nicoll , 2010).  
Surveillance systems monitor the increase in the clinical activity to detect any 
outbreaks as well as to start the annual influenza immunisation programmes. 
There are many assumptions to this high influenza activity during the winter 
season, including enhanced viral transmission, low host immunity, and people 
tend to be close to each other during cold weather (Lipsitch and Viboudb, 
2009). 
A number of factors can determine the impact of seasonal influenza in terms 
of mortality and morbidity. These can be divided into host factors, virulence 
of the circulating virus, and environmental factors. Age and pre-existing 
comorbidities are considered the most important host factors. The highest 
clinical attack rate of seasonal influenza is observed in the elderly population, 
very young children, and patients with co-morbidities. In terms of 
hospitalizations and deaths, the elderly and people with chronic illness are the 
most affected groups. Therefore, national influenza programmes target those 
groups annually to reduce the incidence of influenza infection among them 
(Nicoll et al., 2008). 
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This epidemiology can reverse during pandemic influenza as the elderly 
population might be spared while the younger and healthy adults can observe 
high mortality and morbidity. During the second wave of the 1918 pandemic, 
the highest mortality rate was observed among the healthy adult age group 
<40 while the elderly of 50 years and older experienced lower mortality and 
morbidity rates (Nguyen-Van-Tam and Hampson, 2003). Similar patterns 
were observed in 1957Ð1958, 1968Ð1969, and 2009-2010 pandemics, but to a 
far lesser extent. The relative rise in excess mortality was greater among 
healthy and young adults (Nguyen-Van-Tam and Hampson, 2003, Bautista et 
al., 2009). 
Countries in the southern hemisphere faced a single wave of the pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 that lasted for 18 weeks during the winter season from May to 
September 2009 (Bishop et al, 2009).  Countries in the northern hemisphere 
experienced two distinct waves of the 2009 pandemic. The first wave in the 
UK, for instance, peaked in mid-July and the second wave peaked in mid-
October 2009 after the summer holiday (Health Protection Agency, 2010).  
 
Although WHO declared the post-pandemic phase in August 2010; the UK 
and other countries experienced an increase in clinical activity of pandemic 
(H1N1) cases in mid-2010 and late 2010 respectively (Mytton et al, 2012). 
The first winter after the 2009 pandemic provided crucial information about 
the new circulating strain and countries in both hemispheres kept their 
surveillance system vigilant. Although the world has entered the post-
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pandemic phase after the WHO declared the pandemic over in August 2010, 
countries in the southern and northern hemispheres experienced high clinical 
attack rates in the winter of 2010-2011(Bandaranayake et al, 2011, Orsted et 
al,, 2013). Therefore, it is not possible to examine the post-pandemic seasonal 
outbreaks in isolation from the context of the pandemic itself.  
Laboratory confirmed influenza cases demonstrated that the highest clinical 
attack rates were among the young and healthy adults. This was the case in 
the UK and the highest attack rate was among children 14 years and younger 
(McLean et al, 2010). However, hospital surveillance data from the UK 
revealed that morbidity and mortality were highest in patients with underlying 
illness, pregnancy, and elderly (Nguyen-Van-Tam, et al., 2010a). An 
estimated figure of 7500 to 44100 deaths was attributed to influenza A 
(H1N1) virus for the period May to December in the USA (Viboud et al., 
2010). 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
Influenza is unpredictable in terms of timing, severity and geographical 
origin. It is of a major public health importance as outbreaks cause severe 
social and economic disruption together with excess mortality and morbidity. 
The most significant clinical features are cough, fever and the rapid onset 
range of other symptoms and complications. High attack rates can be 
recognised in elderly and too young children but the mortality rate is high 
among elderly and patients with chronic medical illness; therefore should be 
targeted by annual influenza vaccination programmes. However, this pattern 
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may reverse during pandemic as mortality and morbidity of the influenza 
virus is higher among the younger ager group and patients with comorbidities 
compared with the elderly population.   
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Chapter 3: Historical review 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Humans have tried to understand the natural course and risk factors affecting 
patterns of infection and death since the earliest time in the history. Theories 
have evolved as human knowledge started to try to understand the natural 
world. This understanding was not progressing in a steady pace; sometimes 
wrong theories or obscure knowledge has hindered it but good examples and 
achievements are still there. 
Studying the history of pandemic influenza is not possible without referring 
to the broader history of emerging infectious diseases and how the response 
to these diseases evolved throughout history; this chapter provides 
background information on the early history of emerging infectious diseases 
and the most dramatic events that influenced humanity throughout the past. 
The second section discusses the factors that facilitate disease emergence and 
transmission; these can be further classified into demographics and 
behaviours, environmental, and breakdowns in public health infrastructures. 
Additionally, the development and the evolution of the response to emerging 
infections were reviewed with highlighting the most important achievements 
in terms of diseases prevention and control. Towards the end of the chapter, a 
historical review particular to pandemic influenza was performed describing 
the major influenza pandemics and the progress of pandemic preparedness. 
 
 
 25 
3.2 Early History of Infectious diseases 
 
Communicable diseases have been described to cause outbreaks and 
pandemics since early history. Historians in Egypt and Greece had 
documented outbreaks of Black Death, tuberculosis, smallpox, and leprosy. 
The devastating impact caused by those infectious agents led to dramatic 
threats to society and civil order at that time (Watts, 1999).  
3.2.1 The plague of Athens 
 
This epidemic hit Athens in 430-427 BC and was a direct result of the 
Spartan wars at that time. The war made the people of Athens move inside the 
city walls in order to defend their city and this resulted in an overcrowded 
environment, which is thought to be the reason for high mortality and 
morbidity (Garrett, 1994). There is still an on-going controversy about the 
causative agent of the plague of Athens. Langmuir and colleagues support a 
two-agentsÕ theory; these are influenza and staphylococcus (Langmuir et al., 
1985). Others believe that Rift Valley Fever virus caused the outbreak 
(Morens and Chu, 1986). Other researchers think that the agent disappeared 
(Holladay, 1986). Knowing the particular cause is less relevant to this 
research than describing how society responded to it.  
In terms of the response to this epidemic, Athenian historians reported on the 
big impact and the social and political disruptions caused by the plague. 
People were panic and scared and healthy individuals stayed away from sick 
people and their relatives. Sick people tried to heal themselves by covering 
their bodies with water or even cutting part of their bodies. All attempts went 
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in vain and the number of sick people increased despite all the efforts (Nelson 
and Williams, 2007). We can infer from the history of the plague of Athens 
that there were no organized preparations and coordinated response and this 
was mainly due to the lack of understanding around the nature of outbreaks at 
that time.  
3.2.2 The Black Death 
 
Due to the lack of basic knowledge of communicable diseases, communities 
interpreted outbreaks and pandemics through religious explanations. It was 
thought to be sort of punishment by God to humans because of their sins and 
bad doings  (Nelson and Williams, 2007).  
The Black Death is considered the most damaging infectious disease ever. 
Since the start of recorded history, it has been recorded that many nations and 
communities were entirely destructed and disappeared because of the bubonic 
plague, which is the causative agent of the Black Death  (Lee, 2000, Fears, 
2004). It contributed to the collapse of the Roman Empire six years after the 
downfall of the Han Empire (Porter, 2006). In the twelfth century, the disease 
killed almost 90% of the European population (Lee, 2000). The disease 
invaded Europe again in the fourteenth century and claimed thousands of 
lives and then spread to other parts of the world. Commercial ships that used 
to carry infected mice and fleas mainly facilitated disease transmission. 
During the next few years, the disease caused more than 20 million deaths in 
Europe and 16 mission deaths in Asia (Rosen, 1993).  
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Though there was a lack of knowledge and understanding pertinent to 
communicable diseases prevention and control, authorities and individuals 
noticed that the best way to stay healthy was to isolate sick individuals and 
their families. This practice was the basis of quarantine, which is one of the 
most commonly, used public health counter measures nowadays. The first 
city to implement quarantine measures in Europe was Venice in 1374 
(Simpson, 2010). This was mainly because it was considered as a central 
commercial city in Europe receiving ships from different countries. Ships 
coming from areas infected with the Black Death were isolated for almost 40 
days. Authorities in Venice believed that the 40 days wait was enough to 
detect any infection associated with arriving ships (Tognotti, 2013). 
During the following two centuries, the Black Death invaded Europe several 
times and caused high morbidity and mortality. In 1486, political authorities 
in Italy created permanent public health authorities in charge of protecting the 
country against future plague outbreaks. The first measure was to isolate 
homeless and poor people when sick as they observed the association 
between the disease and poverty. In addition, designated hospitals were 
created in 1528 to provide healthcare for sick patients and were supported by 
taxation (Pullan, 1971).   
During the seventeenth century, more preventive measures were implemented 
to prevent and control the disease. These were isolation of houses with sick 
people for 22 days as well as quarantining individuals for 40 days. Moreover, 
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authorities introduced new rules to disinfect houses with perfume and burn all 
equipment and material used by the deceased individuals (Cipolla, 1973). 
3.2.3 Smallpox epidemic 
 
Historians date the first outbreak of smallpox to 1350 BC. Early outbreaks in 
Ancient Egyptian families were described in the books of history and mainly 
supported by the scars found on the bodies of mummies (Watts, 1999). 
Immigration and wars facilitated the spread of the disease across the world 
and the mortality rate ranged from 10-50 % (Lee, 2000). In the eighteenth 
century, smallpox caused high fatalities in Europe and quarantine measures 
were futile in controlling the disease. Two important facts were observed at 
that time. First, the disease transmitted by close contact to scars and wounds 
of sick people. Second, infected individuals with smallpox did not catch the 
infection again (Hopkins, 1983). These observations motivated people to start 
inoculating healthy individuals who had never been infected in the past with 
bits removed from smallpox lesion. However, inoculation similar quarantine 
practices did not succeed to stop the spread of smallpox in the eighteenth 
century (Nelson and Williams, 2007).  
Doctor Edward Jenner, an English physician, observed that the milkmaids 
during the process of getting milk from cows developed lesions on their 
palms and this resulted in life-long lasting immunity. Based on his 
observations, he recommended the used of cowpox particles to protect against 
smallpox. He was opposed and criticized for his revolutionary ideas and his 
work was refused many times because it was not based on scientific research. 
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Despite that, he kept working on his observations and tried his ideas on 
children including his own and finally in 1798 his work was accepted for 
publications (Riedel, 2005).  
3.2.4 Syphilis outbreak: ÒThe French poxÓ 
 
In the second half of the fifteenth century, several countries in Europe 
experienced syphilis outbreaks.  Syphilis is a highly contagious sexually 
transmitted diseases and it was observed in late 1494 when prostitutes from 
Italy infected the military personnel of the French army. In the following 
year, syphilis was diagnosed in France, Switzerland and Spain. It was 
believed that the French soldiers facilitated the transmission of syphilis across 
Europe (Morens et al., 2008a). 
In the sixteenth century, almost all countries in Europe had cases of syphilis. 
Syphilis got its name from the famous poem written by Fracastoro in 1546 
that listed the causes of the disease. The poet was telling the story of a 
shepherd called Syphilis who was punished by God Apollo because he 
committed adultery.  The association between syphilis and sexual activity 
helped people to recognise the concept of contagion at that time(Porter, 
2006). 
3.3 Factors in the emergence of infectious disease  
 
The emergence of infectious diseases occurs when an entirely new 
microorganism is introduced to human population. Re-emerging diseases are 
infections known to cause cases in humans but are considerably increasing in 
numbers. After the new infection is introduced to a new host, it causes 
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sustainable transmission and outbreaks in the new host group. Many factors 
can facilitate the emergence and re-emergence of infections and these factors 
can be categorized into environmental, population movement and human 
behaviours, and deficiencies in public health infrastructures (Morse, 1995). 
3.3.1 Environmental factors 
 
These factors are essential in facilitating disease emergence and subsequent 
outbreaks. They influence the relationship between microorganisms and 
human population. They bring people closer to the source of infection  
(natural reservoir or vector) and subsequently assist the emergence or re-
emergence of diseases (Morse, 1996, Morse, 1991). The vector of Lyme 
disease, for instance, is deer tick. Reforestation activities in North America 
and Europe made the population move closer to the vector areas (Barbour, 
1992). Agriculture is another important environmental factor. Crop mice are 
the natural reservoir of Hantavirus that is known to cause haemorrhagic fever. 
During rice harvest seasons, farmers get closer to the mice infected with the 
virus (Johnson, 1993). Water is another risk factor for emerging infections. 
Stagnant water serves as a favourable environment for reproduction of 
insects. Insects act as vectors that transmit diseases to the host population. 
Stagnant water is mainly found around dams, stored water and after flooding 
(Monath and Morse, 1993). 
Global warming caused by climate changes is another factor affecting disease 
transmission. High temperature affects vector activity, biology and 
reproduction cycles. For example, mosquitos tend to be more active at higher 
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temperature. The incidence of West Nile fever has increased over the past 
years in a number of countries in Europe; such as Italy and Romania. This is 
mainly due to climate changes and global warming in particular (Pradier et al, 
2012).  
3.3.2 Population movement and human behaviours  
 
Population movement played a major role in the emergence and transmission 
of diseases since the dawn of time as discussed earlier (Morse, 1995). People 
migration causes more people to move from rural areas to cities. In the 
beginning of the previous century, 15% of the population around the world 
lived in towns compared with 50% nowadays. The statistics project that 
almost two third of the human population will live in cities by 2030. The 
population density is going to increase considerably in cities and this will 
make people live in overcrowded housing conditions (Social Development, 
Population Division, 2002).  Immigration for war or trade purposes aided the 
introduction of new infections to new areas throughout history. A good 
example on that is the introduction of the Black Death through the silk route 
from Asia to Europe (Morse, 1995).  Also, yellow fever was brought from 
Africa to Europe through slave trade in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries (Hoeppli, 
1963). Cholera is another example of imported cases from India and the 
Middle East to Europe (Morse, 1995). 
We live in a globalized world today and this is mainly due to international 
travelling that made human movements smoother and faster (Morse, 1995). It 
was estimated that there were approximately 280 million passengers travelled 
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by air during the year of 1990. This number was almost doubled in the year of 
2000. This high volume of travellers facilitates the transmission of infections 
across countries (Louria, 2000). In addition to human movement, 
international trade of vegetables and fruits contribute to disease transmission 
and food-borne illness (Morse, 1995). It is important to highlight that 
international travelling is an essential factor to the spread of influenza and 
other respiratory pathogens.  Infected individuals can bring viruses to their 
home country, or their destination country in a matter of hours. Advances in 
technology and industry also contributed to disease transmission. Food 
production industry, for example, uses certain technology to increase food 
production, but on the expense of the increase in contamination (Morse, 
1995). Sexual activity and intravenous drug use are other examples of how 
human behaviours can contribute to the emergence of infections such as 
HIV/AIDS in the1980s (Morse, 1995). 
3.3.3 Deficiencies in public health infrastructures  
 
Access to safe drinking water and sanitation is an important public health 
function. Proper sanitation and infection control practices reduce the spread 
of infections. Therefore, any failure can lead to sever public health 
consequences and will give the opportunity for infectious diseases to cause 
outbreaks (Morse, 1995). Cholera is a standing example; its incidence can 
increase dramatically after any collapse in the public health infrastructure 
measures (Glass et al., 1992). These challenges are common for low-income 
countries as well as high-income countries. A problem with water treatment 
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in Wisconsin had resulted in a water-born outbreak of cryptosporidium with 
more than 400,000 cases (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 1994). 
3.4 Development in the understanding of infectious diseases  
 
The concept of contagion may have been recognised since early history as 
demonstrated by the reference of Hebrew leaders to leprosy in their writings. 
In the sixteenth century, the idea of contamination got more acceptance as 
demonstrated by Dr FracastroÕs work on syphilis. He reported three methods 
of disease transmission: direct contact, indirect contact and through air 
particles (Fracastorius, 1930). These observations were not widely accepted at 
that time, but light microscopy two centuries later proved FracastoroÕs 
hypotheses (Dobell, 1960).  
In the seventeenth century, an English physician, Thomas Sydenham 
supported the concept of specificity of disease. In his book ÒObservations of 
MedicineÓ he was able to describe and classify different febrile infections. He 
claimed in his book that each disease has a specific set of symptoms, risk 
factors and treatment. He documented and described smallpox, pneumonia 
and rheumatic fever in great details. Thomas Fuller, English physician, again 
supported the concept of specificity of infections as he argued that plague 
does not cause measles nor measles can cause smallpox (Spink, 1978).  
In the nineteenth century, contagion theories were accepted and proved by the 
two main scientists of that time Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch. The advances 
in chemistry, biology and pathology supported their studies. PasteurÕs work 
demonstrated that specific microorganisms cause specific fermentation and 
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fermentation can be stopped by heating. This is what is known as 
Pasteurization, which was used later to control infection (Spink, 1978). 
Similar to the previous scientists and pioneers, PasteurÕs work was not 
accepted for publication because it was thought to be unreliable as no one was 
able to repeat the experiments.  
Robert Koch, a German physician, is considered the father of modern 
bacteriology. He was able to isolate specific causative agents for anthrax, 
cholera, and tuberculosis. Moreover, he invented the sterilization technique 
by dry heat that is now used in infection control practices (Foster, 1970). Both 
contemporary scientists worked hard in their institutes in Paris and Berlin. 
They were able to identify specific causative agents for specific diseases.  
3.5 Progress in infectious disease planning and response 
 
At the end of the fourteenth century, political authorities in Italy recognised 
the importance of controlling peopleÕs anger and panic during outbreaks of 
plague. They implemented a number of actions to keep civil order. Their 
main concern was that less advantage groups in the community might 
revolute against them because they were unable to escape during times of 
plague. They attempted to tax rich people who wanted to flee during the 
outbreaks of the Black Death but this did not work. In the fifteenth century, 
the awareness of politicians increased and they realized the importance of 
planning and preparing for outbreaks as well as reducing social disruption.  
Florentine was the first city in Europe that granted its political magistracy the 
power to prepare for the next epidemic of plague (Porter, 1999). 
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Florentine set the first example of outbreak preparedness in Europe at that 
time. They created a national board to respond to plague epidemics in 1493. 
They were anticipating that the Black Death might reach their territory from 
Rome and for this reason they assigned a number of people to monitor and 
report any sick individual coming from Rome to their city. In addition, they 
banned public and mass gatherings during times of epidemics. These actions 
were the basis of public health measures implemented nowadays in the form 
of travel restrictions and social isolation in order to reduce or delay the 
transmission of outbreaks. These measures were successful in protecting 
Florentine and they were the basis for further work on outbreak planning and 
preparedness. Over the next centuries, other European cities followed the 
example of the Italian cities and established permanent health committees to 
manage emerging infections (Porter, 1999).  
Political authorities dominated the health boards and physicians were not 
allowed to be actively involved. Health board main job was to collect 
information about diseases in the neighbouring countries as well as to guard 
against imported cases. The power of health boards across Europe grew 
considerably and they were able to challenge the Church regarding banning 
religious gatherings to reduce disease transmission (Cipolla, 1973). National 
authorities supported the board of health whenever they disagreed with the 
religious authorities. This political commitment to prevent and control 
infections as well as to reduce the social and economic burden of epidemics 
was crucial to the work of the health officials at that time. In terms of 
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funding, health authorities were funded by emergency taxation, which was an 
area of controversy at that time (Porter, 1999).  
Health boards were also responsible for early detection and monitoring of 
outbreaks. In Florentine, health officials asked all physicians and surgeons to 
be careful and notify probable cases to the health board. It was believed that 
the information provided by physicians working in the community and the 
appointed guards outside cities was important for the health committee to 
prepare for potential outbreaks in advance (Porter, 1999). 
During the eighteenth century, the science of epidemiology was introduced to 
inform public health practice. Scientists described risk factors, methods of 
transmission, outbreaks and conducted epidemiologic studies (Nelson and 
Williams, 2007). John Snow, for instance, conducted an epidemiological 
study to find out the ways of transmission of cholera in mid-1850 in London 
(Snow, 1936). 
By the beginning of the twentieth century and before the First World War, 
political authorities supported national and local tiers in their efforts to 
prepare and mange disease outbreaks (Tomes, 2010). The pandemic influenza 
in 1918-1919 claimed millions of lives and in order to have a comprehensive 
understanding about what happened during that time, it is important to refer 
to the previous pandemic to examine the progress of communicable disease 
control. Pandemic influenza spread from Russia in 1889 and despite all the 
progress made in public health knowledge and practice, health authorities 
were confused about it as demonstrated in the media report by the New York 
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Times Ò the disease is undoubtedly due to some microorganism which floats 
in the air, and which infects the human system, but is generally killed in so 
doing, for influenza is but slightly if at all contagious.Ó (Anon., 1889).  
Despite the fact that national and local health officials were anticipating the 
pandemic to reach the states in few months, they did not do much 
preparedness and it was left for frontline healthcare workers to manage 
individual cases rather than applying prevention and control measures. 
Doctors educated sick people to isolate themselves and advised elderly with 
underlying illness not to mix with sick individuals (Tomes, 2010). 
In the following years, medical microbiology evolved in a steady pace and 
laboratory techniques were able to isolate causative agents repressible for 
specific infections, including cholera, syphilis, and anthrax. On the other 
hand, the science of virology during 1918 pandemic was exploring particles 
smaller than bacteria, but it was very early to isolate them. Public health 
officials responded to 1918 influenza pandemic with greater knowledge and 
understanding when compared to the previous pandemic. Specific messages 
were implemented such as public education about the importance of hand 
washing and self-isolation when sick. In addition, infection control measures 
were widely implemented at that time (Tomes, 1999). 
 
3.6 International efforts to control communicable and infectious diseases 
 
National governments and health authorities started preparing to respond to 
outbreaks in the fifteenth century when quarantine and public health measures 
were implemented in Italy. However, international efforts and coordination to 
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prevent and control communicable disease outbreaks did not start until a more 
comprehensive understanding and knowledge were acquired regarding the 
causative microorganisms and modes of disease transmission (Spink, 1978). 
Cholera epidemics in the nineteenth century stimulated the international and 
national authorities to work collectively to stop its spread. Several 
international meetings were organized by the French authorities to discuss 
measures and activities to prevent and control cholera outbreaks at that time. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, there were eleven 
international meetings attended by representatives from US and Europe. 
These meetings were held in Paris, Constantinople, Vienna, Washington DC, 
Rome, Dresden and Venice. Cholera was on the top of the Agenda in all of 
the conferences but other diseases were discussed too. Countries made great 
progress in terms of international public health until the start of the First 
World War Century. Only three international conferences were held in the 
first half of the twentieth century and all were in Paris (Spink, 1978).  
The first international regulation on public health was signed in the seventh 
conference in Venice 1892. One year before the eleventh international 
conference in 1902, American representatives met in Mexico and created the 
first Pan American health body and named it ÒInternational Sanitary BureauÓ 
and later it was called ÒPan American Sanitary BureauÓ. There was a 
consensus on the importance of establishing a permanent international health 
body at that time and subsequently The Office International d'Hygine 
Publique (OIHP) was created five years later in 1907. The last international 
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health meeting before the war was held in Paris in 1911.The first sanitary 
meeting after the war was in Paris fifteen years later. The next international 
conference in 1938 was important because of the achievements in the field of 
bacteriology and virology (Howard-Jones, 1975). 
OIHP worked closely with the Health Organization of the League of Nations 
and provided support to countries mainly during the war. The office provided 
advice to countries on a variety of health topics, including notification of 
infectious disease outbreaks sanitary concerns mainly related to air travel, and 
other public health issues (Spink, 1978). 
Towards the end of the Second World War, several countries signed an 
agreement in Washington DC to create the United Nation Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UN-RRA). The mandate of this new body was 
Òto provide for the liberated population aid and relief from their suffering, 
food, clothing, and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the 
recovery in the health of people, and for preparations and arrangements for 
the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes, and for assistance in the 
resumption of the urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and 
the restoration of essential servicesÓ (Goodman, 1971). In 1940s, there was a 
consensus in the international community on the need of an international 
health organization to extend the work of the League of Nations. The United 
Nations treaty was signed and the UN was established in 1945 but health 
issues were overlooked at that time. The delegates from China and Brazil 
spotted this gap and recommended a health department within the UN. Three 
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years later the World Health Organization was established on September 1, 
1948 (Goodman, 1971). 
WHO provides advice and technical assistance to both member and non-
member countries. This means that countries should put effort and expertise 
to fix problems before seeking WHO input. WHO provided countries with 
training opportunities, workshops, and country assessments. WHO supports 
member states during planning and response to pandemics and outbreaks via 
collecting data from the affected countries, analyse and communicate back to 
member states through technical guidelines and recommendations for good 
practice.  
Communicable disease prevention and control was one of the biggest areas 
for WHO since its establishment. WHO worked on a number of 
communicable disease including cholera, yellow fever, bubonic plague, and 
typhus but smallpox remained the most difficult disease to prevent and 
control at that time. Smallpox eradication was one of the most successful 
achievements by the WHO. In 1968, the disease was endemic in three regions 
including African countries to the south of the Sahara, Latin America, and a 
number of Asian countries. Immunisation and education campaigns continued 
until 1980 when the world was announced to be free of smallpox (Spink, 
1978).  
The European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention was created in 2005 
to enhance EuropeÕs capacity to plan and respond to outbreaks of infectious 
diseases. It works in collaboration with WHO Europe in areas of surveillance, 
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capacity building, communication and research. Moreover, it provides data 
and information to the EU commission, member states, and other agencies to 
help them make informed decisions in relation to communicable disease 
control and prevention. 
3.7 Pandemic influenza preparedness: Historical review  
 
Pandemic influenza is a historic event and analysing the history will help us 
understand the nature of this phenomenon as well as to take lessons for future 
pandemics. The recurrent pattern of influenza and our inability to predict its 
severity and epidemiology make reviewing influenza history a useful 
exercise. Most of the facts that we know about pandemics influenza are 
derived from history. We now know that pandemics can vary in severity, 
geographic origin, virologic strains, epidemiologic features, and finally 
pandemics tend to occur in waves. 
Laboratory confirmed influenza was diagnosed for the first time in 1932. The 
history of influenza before that time was mainly based on clinical features, 
disease distribution, and the high case fatality rate. Historians interested in 
pandemic influenza reviewed literature, recordings, and writings that are 
pertinent to this disease in order to get a better understanding (Potter, 1998).  
3.7.1 Pandemics before the eighteenth century 
 
Influenza was recognised in the history of infectious diseases as a different 
infection based on its distinct features of acute onset of fever, cough, 
headache and generalised fatigue as well on its epidemiologic feature as it 
caused a high number of cases within unexpected periods of times and wider 
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geographic areas (Morens et al, 2010). All authors agree that the first 
pandemic in history was that of 1580. It was originated in Asia and spread to 
the rest of the world. The whole of Europe got infected in few months and 
spread then to North America. Morbidity and mortality rates were high and 
8000 deaths were reported in Rome (Pyle, 1986).  
3.7.2 Pandemics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries  
 
The first pandemic of the eighteenth century started in 1729 in Russia. It 
spread to Europe in few months and reached the whole world in three years 
period. It spread in waves and caused a high number of deaths  (Pyle, 1986). 
The subsequent pandemic started in China 40 years later. It spread to Russia 
and Europe in 8 months. It caused high attack rate among young healthy 
adults and it was documented that two-thirds of Rome was infected and 
thousands of people got sick daily in Russia. The first pandemic of the 
nineteenth century had an attack rate identical to that of the pandemic of 
1918. Patterson reported that 20-25% of the global population got infected 
(Patterson, 1986). The advances in the field of epidemiology and public 
health in the nineteenth century enhanced the understanding of pandemic 
influenza. Epidemiologists were able to calculate clinical attack rates, case 
fatality rates age-specific incidence rates (Morens et al, 2010).  
3.7.3 History of pandemics of the twentieth century 
 
In the twentieth century population movement and international travel 
contributed to the global spread of communicable diseases, including 
pandemic influenza (Potter, 2001). 
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3.7.3.1 1918Ð1919 Spanish influenza A/H1N1 
The pandemic of the 1918 is considered the most devastating event in the 
previous century. There is no consensus among historians or scientists about 
its geographic origin. It began at the end of the First World War during the 
spring of 1918 and killed far more people than the war itself. The pandemic 
has been named the Spanish flu because influenza news and updates came 
mainly from Spain since it was neutral during the war compared to the other 
countries (Trilla et al, 2008). Influenza A (H1N1) pandemic produced more 
severe clinical symptoms and signs than the later pandemics of the same 
century for reasons that are not yet understood. The pandemic caused high 
morbidity and mortality in the healthy and young age group with a relative 
sparing of the elderly population (Sellwood, 2009). It is described in the 
books of history that pandemic spread from the US to Europe and Asia 
carried by the military crops after the First World War. It is believed that the 
virus originated in military camps in the USA (Morens and Fauci, 2007, 
Crosby, 2003). Oxford argued that the pandemic of 1918 circulated few years 
before 1918. He stated that the pandemic had caused several outbreaks in 
Europe in 1916 and 1917 (Oxford, 2000). The second wave of the pandemic 
happened in the fall of the same year and caused several outbreaks of severe 
influenza all over the world. This was followed by another wave in the 
northern hemisphere in 1919 (Potter, 2001). 
The response of the international community and national authorities was 
mainly based on measures that were used in the past to control other 
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communicable diseases. There was no coordinated or organized advance 
planning. Organizational communication and coordination between different 
stakeholders involved in response were not addressed before the pandemic.  
Public health countermeasures were used to control the spread of virus, 
including school closure, banning public and mass gatherings, and public 
education on hand washing (Tomes, 2010). 
Influenza vaccination is considered the most effective intervention to prevent 
and control influenza; especially when the influenza vaccine strain matches 
the circulating virus strain. It is worth mentioning that influenza 
immunisation became available in 1945 after the successful isolation of the 
virus in 1930s. Therefore, it was not possible to implement mass 
immunisation at that time. The Americans during the Second World War used 
inactivated influenza vaccine, but it did not succeed to reduce influenza 
outbreaks (Hollenbeck, 2009). 
The responsibility was given to physicians to deal with individual cases and 
treat them symptomatically using traditional preparations such as aspirin, 
camphor, or wet packs. Although these measures helped patients but it did 
harm sometimes. In the USA and UK, health authorities dealt with the high 
number of patients by social distancing, school closures, or banning mass 
gatherings It can be concluded that there was no coordinated and organized 
response at the national and local levels. The public did not receive evident 
information and was given some basic instructions such as rest, hand hygiene 
and self-isolation when sick (Hollenbeck, 2009). 
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3.7.3.2 1957Ð1958 Asian Influenza A/H2N2 
This pandemic started in southern China in 1957 and then spread to other 
Asian countries and to the whole world. A new virus strain H2N2 shifted the 
previous one that circulated since the previous pandemic. The first wave of 
the pandemic peaked in the UK and USA during the fall of 1957 and then was 
followed by a second wave of high clinical attack rate in the following year 
(Pyle, 1986).  
This pandemic was unique in that it was the first pandemic with available 
vaccine and diagnostic laboratory techniques. After virologists were able to 
isolate the virus, attempts to manufacture the first pandemic influenza vaccine 
started. Few years later, it was reported in an international conference that 
more vaccine was needed to elicit the immune response against the novel 
virus. It was concluded that two doses of the vaccine separated by one month 
produced higher immunity than a single dose (Henderson et al., 2009). 
3.7.3.3 1968 Hong Kong Influenza A/H3N2  
This pandemic emerged in Hong Kong in July 1968 and subsequently spread 
to Europe and the USA. In the USA, the virus caused high impact on 
healthcare facilities with excess death and hospitalization during the winter 
season. American soldiers returning home from Vietnam contributed to the 
importation of the disease to the USA. The estimated number of death ranged 
between one to three million deaths globally with an average case fatality rate 
of approximately 0.5% (Viboud et al., 2005). Hong Kong was the hub for 
international travel to Asia and this played a role in the global spread of the 
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disease in less than two years. Vaccination programmes during the pandemic 
of 1968 in the USA faced logistics and practical challenges in relation to 
procurement, production, distribution and delivery. In the USA, only 15 
million doses were available to distribution at the peak of the pandemic 
compared to 50 million doses during the previous pandemic in 1957 (Flahault 
and Zylberman, 2010). 
3.7.3.4 1976-1977 Influenza H1N1 Swine Flu pandemic 
A localized outbreak of Influenza A happened in a military base in New 
Jersey in 1976. It caused 230 infections and one death among the armed 
forces personnel. The causative virus was isolated and identified to be 
influenza (A/H1N1/NewJersey/76). This strain shifted the previous strain 
H3N2 that circulated since the previous pandemic. Therefore, the US health 
authorities expected this to cause the fourth pandemic in the twentieth 
century. A mass vaccination campaigns were implemented to contain the 
outbreak and more than 40 million people were vaccinated. The campaign 
was discontinued because of the concerns regarding vaccine safety with 
several reports of Guillain Barre Syndrome reported among vaccinees 
(Dowdle, 1997). The virus could not spread outside the military base and this 
was unprecedented behaviour of influenza outbreaks. It is either the US 
health authorities were successful in containing the outbreak at its source or 
the virus transmission could not be sustained outside the military camp. 
Surprisingly, influenza A/H1N1 strain did not replace the A/H3N2 and they 
co-circulated in the following seasons. This is why the trivalent influenza 
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vaccine nowadays contains both strains as well as influenza B strain (Sencer, 
2011). 
This brings to the attention to Òwhat is the real definition of a pandemicÓ; 
would it be considered pandemic if it caused a great panic and was too 
severe? Or we can call it pandemic when it spreads across wide geographic 
area. This controversy around the definition of a pandemic caused some 
confusion among stakeholders. WHO defined pandemic according to its 
global spread (phases) and ignored the issue of severity. This definition can 
have a profound impact on pandemic planning activities and how to use 
different set of scenarios to plan for future pandemic. 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
Emerging and re-emerging of infectious diseases are the greatest threat facing 
mankind.  They have shaped the course of human history and have caused 
considerable misery and death throughout history. The Black Death and the 
1918-1920 pandemic influenza were the most devastating events in the 
medical history; each of which killed 50 million people. Specific factors 
facilitating their emergence and spread can be demonstrated in almost all 
cases. In addition to these factors, the evolution of viral and microbial and 
selection for drug resistance suggests that infections will continue to emerge 
and highlight the importance for effective disease control and prevention 
strategies. Disease prevention and control strategies have evolved from very 
basic measures such as quarantine and inoculation to include more advance 
techniques such as surveillance and vaccination. Pandemic influenza remains 
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one of the most challenging emerging infectious diseases. The main problem 
with pandemic influenza is its unpredictability in terms of timing, severity 
and origin. Therefore, enormous efforts are required in regards to pandemic 
preparedness and planning.  
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Chapter 4: Emergency planning and response management  
4.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the literature pertinent to emergency 
planning and response management. It starts by describing the differences 
between emergency plans and emergency planning. Then it moves to 
highlight the two main objectives of emergency planning; risk assessment and 
risk reduction. Moreover, this chapter defines four guidelines relevant to 
emergency planning: flexibility, coordination, training, and dynamicity. 
Subsequently, the concepts of collaboration, cognition, coordination, and 
communications were explored in the context of emergency response 
management. 
In the second part of this chapter, a comprehensive review relevant to 
organizational communication was undertaken since communication was an 
essential pandemic planning action to our evaluation of how internal 
communication within the healthcare system helped the response to the 
influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in 2009. It describes the basics of 
organizational communication and their role in attaining a well-organized 
communication process. Finally, the directionality of communication and 
communication networks were described in details.  
4.2 Emergency planning  
 
Emergency planning is defined as the readiness of a governmental authority 
to respond effectively to natural and technical disasters in a way that 
mitigates their consequences. This state of readiness can be achieved through 
 50 
a dynamic planning process supported by the essential financial and human 
resources (Gillespie and Colignon, 1993). Written documents provide a 
comprehensive strategy on the different planning activities including plans 
development, revision, exercising and translating those activities into action. 
It is a common mistake among emergency planning officials to make 
emergency planning equivalent to written documents and consider having a 
written document is the final outcome of the emergency preparedness 
process. Written plans and guidelines are required to avoid chaos during 
response; planning is a dynamic process. A written plan does not mean a 
jurisdiction is well prepared because preparedness is dynamic and reliant 
upon on-going processes (Perry and Lindell, 2003). 
4.3 Emergency planning objectives  
 
No emergency planning effort can predict everything that will happen when 
emergency strikes, but good plans can at least assess major problems 
expected and attempt to devise solutions to reduce their impact. Future threats 
cannot be completely anticipated in terms of their timing, severity, and 
geographical spread. Thus, it is impossible to plan for every aspect of the 
response, and flexibility is an absolute necessity (Perry and Lindell, 2003). 
Preparedness starts from a process when an authority assesses its 
vulnerability to all possible technical and environmental threats, ascertains 
personnel together with financial resources available to respond and manage 
these emergencies, and plans the coordinated response by identifying the 
command and control structures. Since capacity, scientific information, and 
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organizational structures are not constant, emergency planning and 
preparedness activities should be an active process (Buckle et al., 2000). 
Emergency planning is driven by two main concepts; these are risk 
assessment and risk reduction.  Risk assessment entails the likelihood and 
impact of a potential emergency. Emergency planners revise hazards and 
threats that previously affected the population as well as identifying and 
detecting new potential threats. Collaboration among government 
departments at local and higher administrative levels can aid in identifying 
and monitoring these threats. Risk reduction involves activities essential to 
reduce the perceived degree of threat and to implement measures necessary 
for this particular purpose (Perry and Lindell, 2003).  
Expertise and financial resources are important to shape the level of 
emergency preparedness. These resources may differ significantly across 
countries. It is mainly the responsibility of the national authorities to 
distribute guidelines and recommendations to sub-national authorities to 
attain an equal degree of preparedness. It is worth mentioning that emergency 
planning can be an organised process with roles and responsibilities specified 
for all stakeholders involved in the planning stage, or it can be quite informal 
with poor organizational functions (Dynes, 2005). Similarly, the product of 
planning is either signed off documents or mostly unwritten procedures and 
tasks. Size, economy and development of a given country can affect the 
organization and complexity of the emergency preparedness process.  
Countries with more advanced planning activities tend to have inter-
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departmental organizational structure that is supported by financial and 
human resources. They often produce written and published guidelines and 
protocols. On the other hand, countries with less advanced emergency 
planning structure tend to produce less written official documents and depend 
mainly on informal communication among their stakeholders (Perry and 
Lindell, 2003).  
4.4 Guidelines for emergency planning 
4.4.1 Flexibility 
 
It is not possible to plan for every single aspect in relation to future 
emergency response since emergency can result in a rapidly changing 
environment (Frosdick, 1997). Response flexibility should be incorporated 
into the planning process and this will make the response more adaptable to 
the severity of the emergency. The planning process must come up with 
different scenarios to account for the dynamic and changing environment of 
the disaster. Each scenario may have the basic principles and activities 
without stressing on the small issues and operational details that can render 
the plan inflexible. These operational details can be attached as appendices in 
the actual plan or in the standard operating procedures of the organization 
(Perry and Lindell, 2003).  
4.4.2 Coordination 
 
Managing emergency response activities has become intra-organizational 
within the same department as well as inter-organizational with the other 
stakeholders involved in the planning process and has long been known as an 
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important factor for the success of emergency response operations (Perry, 
1991). To accomplish coordinated emergency response organisations need to 
be familiar with one anotherÕs responsibilities and structures, communication 
system, and the ways of allocation funds for the emergency planning and 
response (Shelton and Sifers, 1994). 
The most effective way to create a well-coordinated organization structure is 
the planning process itself. This can be achieved through two approaches to 
achieve this during the planning phase. These are careful review and critique 
of emergency plans and throughout exercises and tests at the different 
administrative levels (Shapiro, 1995). It is beneficial to get the written 
documents reviewed and assessed even before the actual exercises. 
Operational challenges and communication problems can be then identified 
during exercises. Repeated exercises will certainly help agencies and 
governments to plan effective coordination strategies. Exercises should be 
viewed as an opportunity to assess the operational parts of the plan, and 
stakeholder should be open to change the plan accordingly. Moreover, 
exercises can also create opportunities for responding organisations to meet 
and discuss with each other as well as to allow individual stakeholders to 
communicate with one another (Ford and Schmidt, 2000). 
4.4.3 Training and education 
 
Emergency planning process has various participants and different groups are 
engaged in implementing emergency plans. Therefore, the requirements of 
the plan need to be illustrated and clarified for administrators and personnel 
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of those departments. In addition, organizations responsible for emergency 
planning need to educate and update the public in regards to emergency 
preparedness in order to engage the public (Perry and Lindell, 2003). Thus, 
training and education aspects of emergency plans have at two target groups. 
First group is the stakeholders and officials with no prior role or experience in 
emergency preparedness and the process of sharing the plan and information 
with this group is called risk communication. The second group is already 
involved with emergency planning and such training is provided by 
specialists in this field and can be labelled as formal training and its main 
focus is on technical guidelines. In summary, training is a fundamental part of 
emergency planning that can aid to achieve a more comprehensive and 
successful response measures. Moreover, training can provide a feedback 
channel to ask questions and raise concerns in regards to the planning process 
itself (Perry and Lindell, 2003). 
4.4.4 Dynamicity 
 
Emergency planning is an on going activity that requires a steady effort to 
assess risk and enhance response measures. Dynamicity is an essential 
element in the emergency preparedness process. Planning is a dynamic cycle 
of developing, exercising, and revising emergency plans. It is essential to 
accommodate any changes in the organizational structure, scientific evidence, 
new technologies and communication systems. Previous emergency 
responses as well as training and exercising plans are believed to be the major 
derives for plan revision and improvement (Tierney et al., 2001). 
 55 
Inappropriately, this point is often not recognised by emergency planners. 
There is a misconception regarding emergency planning to be seen as written 
documents rather than a process (Wenger et al., 1985). Written guidelines are 
essential to document technical definitions, command structures, and risk 
assessment tools but emergency planning include features that are not 
possible to be written on papers. These consist of enhancing stakeholdersÕ 
understanding and knowledge on emergencies, improving their familiarity 
with government organizations and resources, and creating contacts across 
different agencies (Quarantelli, 1976). Moreover, changes in the 
characteristics of the threat and population at risk make updating the plan 
regularly an important requirement during the planning process. 
Emergency plan should clearly distinguish the difference between the 
function of the planning and preparedness on one hand and the response 
requirements on the other hand (Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985).  
4.5 Emergency response management 
4.5.1 Collaboration   
 
In the last decades, the concept of emergency management had changed from 
the authoritarian and rigid framework to adopt a leadership model focusing on 
open communication and broad collaboration. It has been acknowledged in 
the literature that emergency response and management is unique in the sense 
of being dynamic and multifaceted activity in comparison to the traditional 
approach when dealing with stable conditions (Axelrod and Cohen 1999). 
Emergency manager should be capable of communicating and coordinating 
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successfully with other stakeholders involved in the response process 
(Drabek, 1987). Organizations have different roles in dealing with emergency 
threats. It is an essential task to develop and keep the necessary partnerships 
when responding to disasters. Frequent meetings and information exchange 
during planning and training exercises can help to build that capacity. 
4.5.2 Cognition  
 
Creating a common knowledge among stakeholders involved in the response 
activities is fundamental for clear, accurate, and timely communication and 
coordination among stakeholders. This can be accomplished by improving 
stakeholdersÕ knowledge across different departments at different 
administrative levels through sharing experience and information throughout 
meetings and interactions (Comfort, 2007). Communication and coordination 
process can be seamless and effortless when this cognition develops across 
different stakeholders (Simon, 1996).  
4.5.3 Coordination 
 
Articles on emergency response coordination are scarce and it is not studied 
thoroughly in the emergency management literature (Chen et al., 2008). 
Coordinating emergency activities is an essential element to achieve an 
effective response. The coordination of emergency response is a challenging 
duty as it involves situations with high degree of uncertainty, necessity for 
rapid decision-making, sudden and unexpected events with high mortality, 
and time and resource constraints. This is even complicated by factors such as 
organizational interdependencies, multi-level authorities, and the high 
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demand for timely information (Comfort, 2007). All these factors can make 
coordination of response management quite a challenging task. 
4.5.4 Communication  
 
Internal communication within organizations is one of the essential features 
during emergency planning and response. It includes constant exchange of 
information. During the planning phase, the communication system is 
prepared to exchange information and messages at a certain limit. However, 
during emergency response, an information overload can result from the 
surge in the number of staff using the communication system, which can 
result in communication delays or even system breakdowns (Quarantelli, 
1986, Quarantelli, 1992). 
Not only internal communication can face difficulties during emergency 
response management. Inter-organizational communication system can also 
be challenged during emergency response. This is mainly because of its 
informal nature since officials often communicate with persons with whom 
they are familiar in normal situation. New list of contacts must be established 
and kept with new persons who occupy positions of authority within 
organizations where there had previously been no contact. Given the   
pressures of the disaster situation, this is often difficult to accomplish.  
Therefore, a more formal inter-organizational communication is required to 
be established and maintained during the planning process and not invented 
during the response (Granot, 1997). 
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It is obvious that organizations might have some issues in regards to 
communication that can affect the degree of collaboration and coordination 
between stakeholders. Therefore, the researcher is going to examine the 
available literature pertinent to organizational communication to explore the 
role of communication in creating shared vision and coordinated actions in 
organizations. 
4.6 Organizational communication 
 
Communication within organizations has grown considerably over the past 
decades as organizations have become more complex and hierarchal. The 
study of organizational communication became a priority area in several 
academic disciplines in order to respond to different needs around this area. 
Communication is a diverse topic since it can occur at different administrative 
levels, different formats, and different directions (Baker, 2002).  
Originations nowadays have increased in size and responsibilities in 
comparison to the previous century and this has resulted in a more formal top-
down communication (Conrad and Poole, 2011).  
Some researchers see organizational communication as one element of an 
organization while others see it as the foundation of modern organizations 
(Drenth, 2001). Other researchers define it as Òthe central binding force that 
permits coordination among people and thus allows for organized behaviourÓ 
(Myers and Myers, 1982). Richmond and colleagues define organizational 
communication as Òthe process by which individuals stimulate meaning in the 
minds of other individuals, by means of verbal and nonverbal messages in the 
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context of a formal organisationÓ. This means that it is an active and dynamic 
process. The word stimulate refers to the idea that by interaction with people 
we develop new information and experiences (Richmond et al., 2005). 
4.7 Basics of organizational communication  
4.7.1 Organizational communication as a process 
 
The process of organizational communications is the set of interactions that 
happen within a given organization internally as well externally with the other 
organizations. These interactions can help to develop organizational 
strategies, organizational culture, and decision-making process.  The process 
includes internal interaction between individuals on day-to-day basis as well 
as a wider communication with external clients or the public (Shockley-
Zalabak, 2011). 
4.7.2 Organizational communication as people 
 
Organizational communication occurs between people who share work 
responsibilities in groups or teams as well as inter-personal relationships. 
Individuals are the basic unit of organizations and therefore personal 
attributes and characteristics can shape the style of organizational 
communication  (Miller, 2011). 
4.7.3 Organizational communication as messages 
 
Messages are set of information created and exchanged between individuals 
in an organization. These messages can be verbal or non-verbal interactions 
that aid the distribution of information throughout organizations through 
 60 
different communication channels. Communication as a result of technology 
is reaching wider geographic area connecting people in remote areas. Internet 
and advanced technologies now link people via audio and videoconference 
and shaped how organizations communicate (Shockley-Zalabak, 2011). 
4.8 Organizational structure 
 
Organizations are designed in hierarchical layers with each level has higher 
power and authority than the level immediately below. Information and 
commands flow across different hierarchical levels is called chain of 
commands. Organizational structure together with the chains of command 
ensure that staff stay on track, abide by protocols and regulations, and flow 
instructions from higher levels (Eunson, 2012). 
4.9 Communication flows 
 
There are various directions for communication flow within organizations. 
This can include vertical communication both upward and downward 
communication between administrative tiers with different degrees of 
authority and power. It can take the horizontal direction between stakeholders 
at the same or equal authority. 
 
4.9.1 Vertical communication  
 
This type of communication flow takes place between employees at different 
administrative levels (i.e. hierarchically positioned) and can involve both 
upward and downward communication exchange. This type of 
communication is more common and studied more often in the literature than 
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upward communication. It is useful disseminate information from the tier 
with higher authority and power down to people who are considered 
subordinates. These messages include instructions, reminders, notifications, 
updates, policy statements, recommendations, or technical reports (Eunson, 
2012).  
Upward communication carries information, suggestions, feedback from the 
bottom of the organization up to the managers and leaders. Feedback can 
include new ideas, solution to problems, or suggestions since people in the 
frontline level are closer to particular issues than people higher in hierarchy. 
They can come up with practical solutions that can benefit the entire 
organization when managers listen effectively to them (Eunson, 2012).  
4.9.2 Lateral Communication  
 
Literature on lateral communication is still evolving compared to vertical 
communication. It refers to communication between persons in the same 
hierarchical level.  
There are new organizations trying to flatten their structure and hence the 
importance of this kind of communication. Lateral communication between 
individuals in different organizations is a challenging function since the 
communication is going to be operating at the same time rather then 
following the organization order (Baker, 2002). 
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4.10 Communication network  
 
Two styles of communication can be present within an organization; these are 
formal and informal networks (Baker, 2002). Formal communication is the 
style that follows the organization hierarchical structure and the normal 
communication channels. On the other hand, informal communication does 
not follow the chain of command but instead it follows rumours and gossip. 
The latter is widely spread across organizations and sometime is more 
effective and faster than the formal networks.  
Managers have more control over the formal communication style while staff 
has more control on the informal channels. It is essential for managers and 
their staff to acknowledge the existence and highlight the importance of 
informal networks within their organizations. Informal style of 
communication can convey sometimes more effective and timely messages 
compared to formal networks (Richmond et al., 2005). 
4.11 Conclusion 
 
This chapter highlighted the basic concepts of emergency planning and 
response. It started with describing guidelines for emergency planning 
including flexibility, coordination, training and dynamicity. Subsequently, it 
moved to explain the main objectives of emergency planning: risk assessment 
and risk reduction. Afterwards, emergency response management was 
explored in terms of collaboration, cognition, coordination and 
communication. A particular review of organizational communication was 
performed since the researcher felt the importance of this concept in 
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pandemic preparedness and response. A number of different aspects of 
organizational communication were studied including basic concepts, 
structure, flow, and networks. 
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Chapter 5: Pandemic preparedness activities 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter starts by providing an overview on the issue of emerging 
infectious disease planning with a particular focus on pandemic planning and 
preparedness. The second section provides a summary of the six key elements 
of pandemic influenza preparedness: coordination, surveillance, 
pharmaceutical measures and non-pharmaceutical public health measures, 
health and non-health continuity and communication. The chapter ends by 
pointing out the main features of international and national pandemic 
planning. The role of the World Health Organization and national 
governments are defined clearly in the context of pandemic preparedness in 
the last section. 
5.2 Background on emerging infectious disease planning  
 
The first death from a laboratory confirmed avian influenza was in 1997. 
Health authorities in Hong Kong were able to contain and control the virus 
after it had caused 18 cases and a number of deaths. The virus re-emerged in 
2003 and had caused since then many outbreaks in poultry and human in a 
number of countries (Ligon, 2005). Avian influenza had resulted in millions 
of death in poultry and caused high morbidity and mortality in human 
population. By August 2011, avian influenza had caused 565 cases and 331 
deaths with a quite high case fatality rate of 59% (WHO, 2011b). 
In addition, the first case of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was 
reported in China in November 2002. The causative agent was identified to be 
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corona virus, which is an animal virus that caused cases of acute respiratory 
illness in human population. It resulted in 8098 cases with 774 deaths in 26 
countries. SARS outbreak caused severe social and economic disruption as 
well as its impact on healthcare facilities was substantial (WHO, 2003a). 
Avian influenza re-emergence in 2003 caused concerns among the 
international community and national governments about a potential 
pandemic threat. This motivated many European countries and supranational 
organizations to start preparing and planning for potential pandemic influenza 
caused by H5N1. Most countries in Europe published national pandemic 
strategies, technical and operational guideline for this reason (Mounier-Jack 
and Coker, 2006).  
WHO published a checklist for influenza pandemic planning and 
preparedness in 2005 to support and guide member statesÕ planning activities 
(WHO, 2005a). Similarly, the European Commission reviewed and updated 
its pandemic influenza guidelines and subsequently established the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) to support the WHO work 
to prepare Europe for the next pandemic. In 2005, WHO produced a new 
guidance document to support and encourage countries to start developing 
their national pandemic strategies. In that document WHO tried to increase 
the awareness and understanding among its member states to the importance 
of achieving coordinated actions to respond to international public health 
threats (WHO, 2005b). 
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In recent years, there have been developments in several elements of 
pandemic preparedness. Countries around the world have started stockpiling 
antivirals, antibiotics, and personal protective equipment. Moreover, countries 
attempted to build capacities around immunisation and surveillance system. 
Understanding the differences between seasonal, avian and pandemic 
influenza has improved in the past few years (WHO, 2009g). Public health 
authorities gained extensive experience from dealing with avian influenza 
outbreaks in poultry and human as well as responding to seasonal influenza 
activity and outbreaks annually. In addition, testing and exercising national 
preparedness plans and strategies have made stakeholders more confident and 
comfortable dealing with such public health emergencies. Awareness has 
increased to the fact that pandemic is a whole society responsibility, and it 
goes beyond the health sector to include non-health departments (WHO, 
2009g).  
In 2007, the internal health regulation came into action to provide a legal and 
professional framework to coordinate the response to international public 
health emergencies (WHO, 2008). WHO revised and published a new 
guidance document in 2009 to reflect on years of progress and development 
in this field to make the world better prepared to influenza pandemic (WHO, 
2009f). 
5.3 Elements of pandemic influenza preparedness  
 
National pandemic plans serve as an overarching strategy to prepare and 
respond to influenza pandemic. National governments based their planning 
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activities on six main areas as recommended by the WHO and the outer 
international organization: 
5.3.1 Pandemic planning and exercising 
 
Participatory planning is an important concept that necessitates 
representatives from all sectors at different administrative levels to contribute 
to the planning process. There is a minimum set of stakeholders that is 
required to conduct pandemic planning and preparedness in a given country.  
These consist of national and subnational government officials, national and 
local public health stakeholders, and representatives from primary and 
secondary healthcare workers, and non-health emergency management sector 
personnel. In addition, virologists, epidemiologists, veterinary health 
authorities, modellers, and national drug regulatory authorities can be 
involved too. Public involvement in the planning phase is considered an area 
of good practice as this will enhance the public acceptance to the proposed 
plans as well as improve their engagement during response  (WHO, 2005a).  
In order to sustain and organize these planning activities and response 
measures, financial and human resources are needed. As pandemic could be 
seen as a non-urgent issue, political commitment is essential to allocate the 
required funds (WHO, 2009f). 
The planning process starts by creating a national pandemic planning 
committee that includes representative from different health and non-health 
sectors from different administrative levels. This committee is required to 
meet at regular time intervals in order to follow up on the implementation of 
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different activities during the inter-pandemic phase.  (WHO, 2005a, Academy 
of Educational Development, 2009).  One of the most important functions of 
this committee is to determine the command structure for the stakeholders 
involved in the response phase. This can be achieved by defining roles and 
responsibilities of different stakeholders and their organizations during the 
response and how that might change during different scenarios. This will 
ensure smooth and effortless communication and coordination across 
different organizations (Krumkamp et al, 2009). 
WHO recommends for testing and exercising pandemic plans to assess the 
readiness of health officials to respond to pandemic influenza. Exercises are 
important to translate ideas and concepts into action in an artificial way close 
to reality and they serve as a tool to validate different elements of the national 
pandemic plans. These are communication systems, knowledge and 
understanding regarding pandemic influenza, and incorporating lessons 
learned in the revision process (WHO, 2009h). 
There are three important types of exercise design that can be used in respect 
to pandemic influenza; these are tabletop (desktop), command post, and field 
exercise. Tabletop exercise is a very reasonable and inexpensive approach to 
testing pandemic plans. These are conducted with stakeholders sitting around 
the table and try to test communication and coordination under different 
scenarios. Desktop exercise will provide a face-to- face meeting opportunity 
and participants will get acquaintance with each other in a realistic 
environment (WHO, 2009h). 
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The second most common design is command post exercise, in which 
participating stakeholders are positioned at real control locations similar to 
the real response. Communication systems and IT networks are heavily tested 
in this kind of exercise. The third type is field exercise; it is the most 
complicated and more expensive exercise to conduct (WHO, 2009h). Field 
exercise can test many elements of pandemic preparedness such as hospital 
infection control procedures, port health system operational aspects, and 
logistics of vaccine and medication distribution. Some jurisdictions had used 
a combination of all three designs to test pandemic plans at national and local 
levels (WHO, 2009h). There are many aspects of pandemic-specific issues 
that can be examined using exercises include command and control structure, 
the decision making process by stakeholders across different administrative 
levels, organizational communication within the health system, use of public 
health and pharmaceutical countermeasures, vaccination programmes and 
antiviral medication, and logistics (WHO, 2009h). 
5.3.2 Surveillance 
Influenza surveillance is an essential element of pandemic planning and 
preparedness. Its main role is to measure the clinical activity and impact of 
emerging novel influenza strains. It is a requirement now for every country to 
have an early warning and detection system to collect epidemiologic and 
virologic information to conduct a proper risk assessment (Leese and 
Tamblyn, 1998). As discussed in a previous chapter, pandemic influenza and 
seasonal influenza are not distinct features and they can represent a 
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continuum of the same disease. Therefore, the same infrastructures required 
detecting, identifying, and monitoring the activity of seasonal influenza 
would be necessary during pandemic influenza.   
Surveillance assists national and local authorities to detect novel strains of 
influenza A virus which in turn can help to trigger early and timely response 
actions. Virologic surveillance has developed over the past few years and 
WHO has extended the number of influenza collaborating centres 
participating in its Global Influenza Surveillance System (GISN)  (WHO, 
2005b).  
WHO has supported the international and national communities to establish 
and develop influenza surveillance networks. As part of this, WHO hosted a 
big scientific conference in 2007 on pandemic influenza surveillance. Experts 
and representatives from 25 countries attended the meeting to share 
knowledge and experience pertinent to pandemic influenza surveillance. 
(Briand et al, 2011). The meeting concluded that there is so much work to do 
to improve data quality, timeliness, completeness, and accessibility. In 
addition, stakeholders in this meeting stated that there is a huge diversity in 
countriesÕ surveillance networks and systems and this need to be addressed by 
individual countries. This could be achieved by agreeing on a minimum list of 
core variables that is feasible for all countries to collect (Briand et al, 2011).   
Two years later, WHO published guidance on global influenza surveillance 
and recommended that countries should plan for enhanced surveillance. This 
comprises timely detection, the early assessment of the first 100 cases, and 
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pandemic monitoring (WHO, 2009i). According to IHR, timely detection aids 
authorities to identify the evidence of sustained human-to-human 
transmission and the potential risk of pandemic. The second part, early 
assessment, aims at collection of clinical, epidemiologic and virologic 
information for the first hundred cases. This helps WHO and countries to 
assess the severity and respond accordingly. This does not mean that 
surveillance is confined to the first cases but it should be an on-going activity 
throughout the response phase to improve knowledge about the characteristics 
of the novel virus. Monitoring influenza pandemic consists of activities to 
observe the geographic spread of the virus nationally and locally, determine 
age-specific incidence, transmission rate, mortality and morbidity, and 
sensitivity to antiviral medications (Briand et al., 2011). 
5.3.3 Pharmaceutical measures  
Reducing the spread of disease will depend significantly upon applying 
pharmaceutical measures such as vaccines and antiviral drugs. 
5.3.3.1 Pandemic influenza vaccines 
Influenza vaccines have been used to prevent influenza infection and 
outbreaks for decades and their safety and effectiveness have been 
demonstrated in observational and clinical trial studies in that long period. 
Influenza immunisation reduces morbidity and mortality in high-risk groups. 
Influenza viruses drift and change their genetic component annually; 
therefore, vaccine strains have to be updated accordingly. During a pandemic 
it can take few months before influenza immunisations become available to 
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the human population; therefore, supply is going to be limited during the first 
part of the pandemic (Watson and Pebody, 2011). 
The trivalent influenza vaccine is considered the most effective 
countermeasure to prevent and control influenza virus, but during influenza 
pandemic a monovalent vaccine has to be developed to reduce the spread and 
healthcare burden of pandemic influenza virus. Health authorities are required 
to ensure that plans and mechanisms are in place to produce influenza 
vaccines to cover the high demand. This was highlighted in the 2003 World 
Health Assembly when governments were asked to prioritise pandemic 
planning and preparedness activities including vaccine procurement and 
distribution strategies  (WHO, 2003b). 
International collaboration between health authorities and pharmaceutical 
drug companies during the planning phase is fundamental to avoid challenges 
and difficulties during the response. It is common sense that the seasonal 
influenza vaccine will not be effective against a novel influenza virus. 
However, the on-going production and distribution of seasonal influenza 
vaccines annually are considered an effective capacity building practice for a 
future pandemic. In addition, the implementation of seasonal influenza 
vaccination campaigns will increase vaccine acceptability and distribution 
among the public as well as healthcare workers (Kieny et al, 2006). 
Immunisation strategies within national pandemic plans are required to define 
high-risk categories for immunisation, as the supply will reach countries from 
the manufacturer gradually. National authorities are required to conduct mass 
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immunisation campaign to cover the entire population but sometimes this will 
be challenging in the emergency setting. In addition, governments have to 
prepare a list of key workers in the community to be immunised first during a 
pandemic. These include healthcare workers, police, fire, power and water 
stations workers and others. Immunisation of children has great effect in 
reducing the transmission of the virus early in pandemic (Emanuel, 2006).  
Health authorities on national and international levels are required to plan 
operationally for vaccine logistics in terms of procurements, deployment, and 
distribution. This structure has to be in place before the pandemic to meet the 
need for the vaccine during pandemic (Fedson, 2005). Transporting vaccine 
supplies from pharmaceutical companies to warehouses and subsequently to 
providers needs careful consideration and planning. Next, stakeholders need 
to be familiar with the roles and responsibilities as well as the process of 
collecting vaccines from those centres and their further distribution to the 
public Planning for storing syringes and needles are part of this planning 
process. Security protection for vaccine storage centres is essential during the 
emergency environment of a pandemic (Fedson, 2005). 
The production process of seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccines is 
similar. The candidate strain is isolated first and then made available to 
pharmaceutical companies to start mass production of the pandemic vaccine. 
Both seasonal and influenza vaccine production processes use the same 
facilities and require the same highly trained personnel with skills and 
experience in producing vaccines. However, the production during pandemic 
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is more rapid to accommodate the high and urgent demand. Therefore, 
supporting seasonal influenza manufacturing process is seen as a proxy to 
pandemic preparedness (Carrasco and Leroux-Roels, 2013).  
5.3.3.2 Antiviral drugs stockpiling 
Antiviral medications can be used both prophylactically and therapeutically 
against a novel influenza virus during pandemic. In the first few months of a 
pandemic with no immunisation available yet, antiviral supplies are most 
likely to be exhausted and overwhelmed. Stockpiling antivirals in advance is 
recommended. The two main influenza antiviral medications are Oseltamivir 
(Tamiflu¨) and Zanamivir (Relenza¨) (Longini et al., 2004). 
Antiviral medications are efficacious against all known influenza virus strains 
as supported by in vitro data and this implies that they are going to be 
effective against potential novel influenza viruses. However, antiviral 
resistance patterns should be monitored during influenza pandemic. These 
drugs as demonstrated by clinical trails and systematic reviews reduce 
influenza symptoms, secondary complications, and time required to return to 
normal activity when prescribed early after symptoms onset (Hsu et al, 2012, 
Hayden et al, 1999, Treanor et al, 2000).   
Moreover, data from hospitalized cases demonstrate that death rate can be 
reduced by Oseltamivir therapy (McGeer et al., 2007). Paediatric data show 
that Oseltamivir treatment decreases duration of symptoms, complications, 
requirements of antibiotics, pneumonia, and hospitalization admissions 
(Whitley et al, 2001). A systematic review and meta-analysis from the 2009 
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pandemic shows that treatment with neuraminidase inhibitors was associated 
with reduced mortality, especially if they were administrated within two days 
of symptoms onset. Moreover, early treatment reduced severe outcomes and 
critical care utilization when compared to late treatment (Muthuri et al, 2013).  
Antivirals deployment strategies require careful planning before the 
pandemic. There is a wide range of scenarios on how to implement these 
strategies but every county has to make its own calculations and strategies 
and there is no one size fits all countries. The general rule is the larger the 
stockpile the more options that can be implemented. However, the cost might 
be an issue to low-income countries. Based on the historic data from previous 
pandemics regarding clinical and case fatality rates, 40% of population size 
stockpile is required in order to treat all population during pandemic. 
However, the size would increase to 70% if countries wanted to implement 
treatment and prophylaxis strategies (Longini et al., 2004). 
5.3.3.3 Antibiotics  
The temporal association between influenza virus and secondary bacterial 
infection and pneumonia is well understood and documented for seasonal 
influenza (Murata et al., 2007). This relationship has been documented for 
influenza pandemics for the past century (Louria et al, 1959, Morens et al., 
2008b). Bacterial complication following the influenza infection can cause 
morbidity and mortality unless early treatment with antibiotics can be started. 
Hospital surveillance data from 2009 pandemic revealed that about 30% of 
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the hospitalized and 12% of deceased developed bacterial pneumonia 
(Nguyen-Van-Tam et al., 2010a). 
Although antiviral medications are expected to be effective against a potential 
novel influenza virus during pandemic influenza, it is unsafe assumption not 
to plan for secondary bacterial pneumonia, as antiviral effectiveness during 
pandemic is still inconclusive. In addition, pandemic vaccine would not be 
available during the first few months and therefore it is reasonable to prepare 
a stockpile of antibiotics to reduce the rate of secondary bacterial pneumonia. 
Antibiotics stockpiling is considered an essential element of countriesÕ 
pandemic preaddress process (Nguyen-Van-Tam and Gupta, 2009). 
5.3.4 Non-pharmaceutical public health measures 
Public health measures are aimed at reducing mortality and morbidity as well 
as social and economic disruption. They can reduce and slow the peak of 
pandemic to allow more time until pandemic vaccine become available. 
Evaluating the impact of those measures is challenging and sometimes the 
choice to implement them is not based on concrete evidence. The secondary 
consequences to their implementation should be considered and addressed 
(European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2009). 
 The decision to apply quarantine measures or banning mass gathering can 
have considerable social and economic costs that might be even higher than 
those of the pandemic itself. Therefore, strong legal and ethical frameworks 
are required to address this. Public awareness should be increased about the 
nature of these measures and their impact on their lives. These can include 
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school closure, travel and border restrictions, banning mass gatherings, and 
quarantine (Gostin, 2006). 
5.3.5 Business continuity planning 
5.4.5.1 Health sector 
Preparing hospitals to cope with the surge in the number of cases admitted as 
a result of influenza pandemic is another pillar in pandemic preparedness and 
planning. Surge capacity is the extent to which hospital capacity can expand 
to manage the increase in number of cases and continue working as long as 
possible (Toner et al, 2006).  
Therefore, hospital planners and managers need to start a comprehensive 
assessment and planning processes during inter-pandemic seasons to prepare 
hospitals to respond to outbreaks and pandemics. Hospital facilities could be 
put under immense pressure and could cause disruption of other health 
services provided and high rate of staff absenteeism could complicate things 
further. Proactive and active hospital planning activities are required to 
respond effectively to pandemic at a secondary healthcare facility. These 
activities comprise of the continuity of healthcare services, clear and accurate 
communication, flexibility and adaptability of response measures, and the 
effective use of resources (WHO Europe, 2009). 
WHO regional office for Europe has developed a comprehensive list of key 
elements required to attain preparedness in hospitals against influenza as well 
as other public health emergencies. The checklist serves as a guide to hospital 
managers and planners regarding the current status of implementation of 
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specific elements. These elements include: command structure, 
communication, continuity of patient care, surge capacity, human resources, 
logistics, essential equipment, infection control practices, and clinical case 
management (WHO Europe, 2009). 
5.3.5.2 Non-health sector 
Business continuity planning is essential part of pandemic preparedness as 
pandemic impact could go beyond health. Non-health sector planning should 
focus on essential services important for civil society and social order. 
Priorities differ across different countries but most business continuity plans 
include police, fire, water, power, and transport personnel.  Planning should 
be done by businesses themselves as part of their emergency preparedness 
activities, but they can get technical and operational support from the national 
and sub-national stakeholders (Dalton, 2006). 
The awareness of business continuity planning has increased for many 
organizations and facilities to ensure the continuity to function under 
emergency conditions. However, pandemic influenza has many different 
aspects including its gradual onset and long duration. In an earthquake, for 
instance, organizations might experience a shortage of staff, supplies, or 
communication but assistance can be provided from the unaffected regions 
(Dalton, 2006). However, this is unlikely to happen during influenza 
pandemic as almost everyone is going to be impacted. Three main areas in 
this kind of planning are: staff, supplies, and building. These should be 
identified beforehand and plans should be exercised regularly. The planning 
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process requires managerial and financial support to begin and follow up on 
the planning activities (Cabinet Office, 2011). 
5.3.6 Communication 
Clear, accurate and, timely communication during pandemic planning and 
response is essential to attain the coordinated and evidence-informed actions. 
Communication is another essential element in pandemic planning and it is 
essential to reduce confusion and unwanted disruption during response to 
pandemic (Paget and Aguilera, 2001). 
5.3.6.1 Internal communication among stakeholders involved in the 
pandemic response  
Coordination group at national level is mandatory to gather and disseminate 
information relevant to pandemic to all sub-national and local levels in all 
phases. This group may consist of stakeholders from the ministry of health, 
ministry responsible for the civil emergency response, and primary and 
secondary healthcare workers. This group needs to ensure exchange of 
information with international organizations such as WHO and other United 
Nations departments (WHO, 2005b).  The main role of this group is to ensure 
a rapid and consistent share of information between national sub-national 
authorities. Using a variety of communication channels including audio and 
video techniques, electronic mailing systems, fax, and websites are 
mandatory to disseminate messages during planning and response of 
pandemics (Collins, 2009). 
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5.3.6.2 Communication with the public 
In the planning phase a communication with the public plan need to be in 
place, this discusses target groups such as media, general public and 
healthcare workers. This needs to determine the nature of messages that will 
be communicated to the public, communication and dissemination networks, 
and spokespersons. Media training to spokespersons and other staff is 
mandatory to give confidence when speaking to reporters and the media. 
Communication planning is required to be a dynamic process and to be 
exercised and revised regularly in line with new technologies, knowledge or 
organizational reforms.  Lessons identified as a result of these communication 
strategies should be incorporated with the section of communication within 
the national pandemic plan (Collins, 2009). 
Furthermore, the plan needs to highlight the importance of ensuring 
consistent key messages during response and relevant material (flu websites, 
posters and leaflets) and communication channels to be used to target the 
population at risk. These channels can be the official national or sub-national 
influenza pandemic websites. To guarantee consistent messages and 
recommendations during the response to pandemics, governments need to 
nominate a spokesperson at the national and sub national levels. These will be 
presenting at media press conferences and to other wider community 
presentations. During pandemic media briefings need to be held regularly and 
sometime daily briefings are needed when pandemic is active locally (Gupta 
et al., 2006).  
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Planning for different forms of communication channels will ensure an 
effective communication with the public during the pandemic response. This 
will ensure that messages will reach as far and accurate as possible. Examples 
of various communication channels include television, radio, official 
websites, and recorded information for those phoning the organization. In 
addition, leaflets and other public education materials can also be used both 
before and during pandemic response (Abraham and Pople, 2013).  
We live in the information technology age and the Internet and social media 
access have engulfed us, Internet is the most accessible source of information 
during pandemic and this is why authorities are required to create and update 
their websites. Moreover, national and local pandemic websites are required 
to be tested regularly since the numbers of site visitors are going to increase 
considerably during pandemic. It is required to test for any broken links and 
make sure the webpage is linked to other websites with further information 
and guidance (Abraham and Pople, 2013). 
5.4 International vs. National pandemic planning 
 
Pandemic influenza planning and preparedness require a close collaboration 
within different administration levels in the health sector and with other 
emergency responders within the same country as well with the wider 
international community (Cox et al., 2003).  
5.4.1 International Planning 
As described earlier, WHO has been authorized by the World Health 
Assembly (WHA) to provide member states with leadership, advice, and 
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technical assistance. The essential role of WHO is to achieve international 
coordination state in the following areas:  
5.4.1.1 Coordination  
The International Health Regulations (2005) are legally binding laws that 
were legislated by the WHA in 2005. IHR present an international legal 
structure for communicable disease prevention and control. IHR oblige 
countries to inform WHO of all cases of influenza caused by a novel 
influenza strain in their regions according to WHO case definition (WHO, 
2008). There is an extra obligation to inform WHO of any evidence of 
influenza cases in other countries. IHR gives the power to WHO to declare 
that a Public Health Emergency of International Concern is taking place. If 
this happens, the Director-General will make a decision regarding issuing 
temporary recommendations to nations on the measures required to control 
the transmission of the virus to reduce its morbidity and mortality (WHO, 
2008). 
In order to comply with the IHR (2005), national governments will have to 
develop and implement influenza surveillance measures in order to detect, 
identify, and monitor the spread of influenza pandemic and to sustain and 
build capacities around airports, ports, and other points of entry. These 
required close cooperation between WHO and countriesÕ national health 
authorities as well as inter-sectoral collaboration within the countries 
themselves. This comprises partnership and coordination among different 
administrative levels at national and local levels. The revised IHR version 
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addresses the issue of interoperability between neighbouring countries, 
economic partners, and other member states with mutual relationships   
(Rodier, et al., 2007).  
5.4.1.2 Pandemic vaccine  
Once a novel influenza virus causes sustained outbreaks in human population, 
WHO has the role to recommend the production of pandemic influenza 
vaccine instead of seasonal vaccine.  The process of producing pandemic 
influenza vaccine is dependent on how rapid the first affected countries could 
share influenza viruses with WHO through the Global Influenza Surveillance 
Network and WHO collaboration centres (WHO, 2007a). 
5.4.1.3 Containment of pandemic influenza 
Containment operation is the responsibility of national authorities in each 
country with the support of WHO to control the spread of the pandemic as 
soon as possible following its initial recognition. Evaluation of the situation 
by experts will determine whether countries will implement containment 
measures. Containment activities are not recommended by experts when the 
virus has sustained human-to-human transmission and spread widely in the 
population. WHO will offer advice and support on organization and scientific 
aspects of the containment process. In addition, WHO supports coordination 
of international activities such as the distribution of expert teams, mobilizing 
and dispatching antiviral medications and other materials during containment 
phase (WHO, 2007b). 
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5.4.1.5 Situation monitoring and assessment  
WHO has an essential responsibility is to gather, analyse, and distribute data 
on the global spread of the virus and this is achieved through collaboration 
with countries. In addition, it provides support and tools for detection and 
reporting of influenza-like illness and it provides advice to countries with 
human cases of influenza as well as assisting in developing systems to assess 
the burden of seasonal and pandemic influenza (Heymann and Aylward, 
2006). 
5.4.2 National planning: a whole-of-society approach  
Countries national planning activities start by forming a national pandemic 
planning committee at national or federal levels. This committee must have 
coordinators and representatives from different stakeholder groups. National 
goals and priorities must be clearly determined in advance and these include 
reduction morbidity and mortality, continuity of health and non-health 
essential services, and lessen pandemic economic and social consequences. 
During the inter-pandemic period, national plans and all related guidelines 
have to be implemented and need to be in place. Pandemic preparedness 
activities consists of increasing seasonal influenza uptake among risk groups 
and HCWs, enhancing surveillance system, stockpiling antiviral drugs and 
undertake research that will support the pandemic response (Mounier-Jack 
and Coker, 2006). 
National pandemic plans as recommended by WHO usually include sections 
on surveillance, vaccine, antiviral agents, command and control, civil 
 85 
emergency response and communication. Since WHO adopted ÒThe Whole 
Society ApproachÓ in 2009, the planning involved now all non-health related 
sectors such as private businesses, university, etc. (WHO, 2009g). 
5.4.2.1 Leadership and political commitment  
Pandemic planning process starts by creating a national pandemic planning 
committee to coordinate and lead the process. Representatives from the 
national government usually chair this committee. This is essential to ensure 
that the preparedness stays high on the political agenda to ensure on-going 
funding and commitment. This committee has many activities including 
signing off the national pandemic plan, revise and modify policies, and 
monitor capacity building activities. Political commitment is a fundamental 
part of the planning process in order to maintain financial and human 
resources available (Cox et al., 2003). 
5.4.2.2 Non-health sectors 
In addition to preparing the health sector, national authorities should be 
committed to support and fund business continuity planning activities. The 
collapse in business continuity during a pandemic could cause further social 
and economic consequences due to improper and ineffective planning 
activities. Developing well-organized preparedness and business continuity 
plans may reduce economic and social consequences of pandemic (Simpson 
and Sellwood, 2009) In addition, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
that have direct contact with the public are often well placed to increase 
public awareness, provide updates, and supplies. NGOs should have clear 
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roles and responsibilities during pandemic planning and response phases. 
These community-based groups can work collaboratively with other 
stakeholders (WHO, 2009g). 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter describes how pandemic preparedness and planning developed 
since the emergence of avian influenza A/H5N1in 1997 and how it was 
recognised as a high priority for all national and international bodies working 
on communicable diseases prevention and control. In addition, it stated the 
major six elements of pandemic preparedness; these are: planning and 
coordination, surveillance, pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical public 
health measures, sustaining health and non-health services, and 
communication. Responsibilities of international and national bodies were 
explored in the last section. This chapter gives a good overview of what is 
needed to be in place before pandemic and what pandemic preparedness 
activities needed to be implemented to ensure rapid and effective response.  
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Chapter 6: Methods 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The chapter starts by discussing the qualitative research methods used to 
conduct this evaluation and discusses the reasons behind this choice. Also, it 
highlights the process of selection of countries using the stratified random 
sampling procedure. The data collection tools and processes, and the 
inductive approach used in the data analyses were discussed too. It is 
important to highlight before starting with the method chapter that this 
research was a collaborative effort between the WHO regional office for 
Europe and the Health Protection and Influenza Research Group at the 
University of Nottingham in the UK. Both of which regarded this research as 
`service evaluationÕ of pandemic responses.  
National and sub-national health authorities responded to influenza A (H1N1) 
pandemic in 2009, many draw on plans and experience gained from several 
years of pandemic preparedness activities and through the response to 
outbreaks of avian influenza A (H5N1). WHO Regional Office for Europe 
has been extensively involved in these activities in the region and decided to 
assist countries in evaluating the usefulness of their pandemic planning 
activities such that this will guide their future planning and response 
activities. Although officially designated as a service evaluation by WHO, it 
had nevertheless decided to collaborate with the University of Nottingham in 
order to increase the academic rigor of the project and to add independence to 
the findings. Therefore, the researcher would like to start with describing the 
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involvement of each member of the collaborative team in this study at 
different steps of this study.  
Table 1 Team participation by stage of the research project 
Step  Contributors   
Protocol design Ahmed Hashim (the researcher), Jonathan Van-
Tam, Caroline Brown, Michala Hegermann-
Lindencrone 
Interview guides 
writing up 
Ahmed Hashim, Jonathan Van-Tam, Caroline 
Brown, Michala Hegermann-Lindencrone, Ian 
Shaw 
Sampling of countries  Ahmed Hashim, Puja Miles  
Data collection 
(stakeholders 
interviews)  
Ahmed Hashim 17 interviews, Jonathan Van-
Tam  5, WHO experts 14, External experts 13 
Transcription Ahmed Hashim, WHO interns, research 
assistant 
Data analysis Ahmed Hashim, Lucie Lucie Jean-Gilles 
Result writing up  Ahmed Hashim 
Data interpretation  Ahmed Hashim  
 
6.2 Qualitative evaluation methodology 
 
Qualitative evaluation methods have evolved in various ways and many 
social scientists offer different ways to design, undertake, and analyse 
qualitative data (Denzin and Lincoln, 2007). The Evaluation Checklists 
Project by Patton states that qualitative techniques are often used in 
evaluation of health programmes because they tell the story of the 
programmes by listening to staff experience and attitude (Patton, 2003). 
Qualitative evaluation involves individual interviews, focus group 
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discussions, narrative data, field notes, and documentary analysis. An 
evaluation can be conducted exclusively by qualitative research methods but 
the choice of which research methods to use is completely dependent on the 
circumstances and the objectives of a given evaluation (Patton, 1980).  
Evaluation of programmes aims at understanding and revealing the processes 
of programme functionality rather than its outcome. Process evaluation 
studies target the following topics. What are the processes and procedures 
that make the programme working? What are the useful and less useful 
aspects of the programme? What is the area of improvement in the 
programme? What could have done differently to change the outcomes of the 
programme? (McDavid and Hawthon, 2005).  
Process evaluation requires a comprehensive description of programme 
operations. These descriptions maybe based on observations and/or 
interviews with stakeholders at different administrative levels. Moreover, 
process evaluation may focus on how the programme is perceived by the 
staff, clients and programme administrators (Patton 1980). This type of 
evaluations starts by describing the overall process of programme operations 
and it is characterized by being dynamic, adaptable, and inductive. The 
researcher explores successes, shortcomings, and areas of improvement in a 
give programme (McDavid and Hawthorn, 2005). In other words, process 
evaluation examines unusual sequences and patterns of a given programme 
by looking at programme planning and implementation (Patton, 2002). 
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Qualitative research methods are compatible with process evaluation because 
it looks at the internal operational aspects of the programme without prior 
assumptions regarding the weakness and strengths of the programme. Such an 
open-ended approach using interviews or observations allows successes and 
failures to emerge from qualitative data analysis rather than prior hypotheses 
and expectations of the programme evaluator (Patton, 2002). In addition, the 
programme processes are very complex in nature and interdependent, which 
makes their understanding difficult using quantitative-deductive approach. In 
other words human services/programmes have more uncontrolled and 
complex variables in play that cannot be captured by quantitative method. 
This understanding needs in depth understanding of human knowledge, 
experience, actions, and perception at different situations. In qualitative 
evaluation, the focus is on the uniqueness of human experience and to avoid 
attempts to force categories or structures to these experiences. Qualitative 
evaluation attempts to construct from these experiences upwards while 
leaving the opportunity towards the new or unexpected (McDavid and 
Hawthorn, 2005). The approach used in this kind of evaluation is an inductive 
approach that starts with data and not with prior assumptions or hypotheses. 
This approach helps the evaluator to construct an understanding of the 
programme using narrative, direct and indirect observations, communication 
with programme stakeholders, documentary evidence and other sources of 
information. 
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A naturalistic approach is another key issue while conducting qualitative 
evaluation this means that the researcher is going to observe the naturals 
setting of the programme without trying to intervene to change the 
programme. This is a contextual investigation to naturally occurring 
components of a programme (Willems and Raush, 1969). The evaluator 
works with stakeholders as they interact with or perform their duties in 
relation to the programme or each other. In addition, naturalistic refers to 
natural language used by the evaluator- the same word used by the 
participants themselves. Therefore, naturalistic approach is an observational 
approach that is different from clinical trails where the investigator tries to 
control the setting to see the difference between exposed and non-exposed 
groups to measure the effectiveness of a given intervention. 
A holistic view is the third key feature (after being inductive and naturalistic) 
of qualitative evaluation; the evaluators do their best to understand the 
programme as a whole. In order to get a holistic understanding, evaluators 
examine different aspects of the programme under study. They tend to 
examine documents, interview people, review programmeÕs descriptions in 
order to get a comprehensive knowledge and understanding about the 
programme (Patton, 1980). 
Furthermore, as this was a novel approach to evaluate effectiveness of 
pandemic preparedness activities prior to influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in 
2009, there was a necessity to explore the issue in depth. Facts related to any 
issue about which little is known can be explored using qualitative research 
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(Strauss and Corbin, 2007). Qualitative research can reveal things that are 
incompatible with prior hypotheses related to a given research topic under 
question and can answer question regarding the mechanisms and operations 
of a given programme rather than trying to get programme statistics (Murphy 
et al., 1998). 
Moreover, qualitative methodology gives the opportunity for more in-depth 
discussions, consequently providing detailed information of research 
questions that are difficult to answers for using quantitative methods (Patton, 
1980). It aims to understand facts in a holistic approach that take into account 
different point of views on the programme, its internal dynamics, and its 
effect on stakeholders. Therefore, an evaluation is not just conducted from the 
programme managerÕs point of view but considers into account participantsÕ 
opinions as well as other stakeholdersÕ views. This holistic-naturalistic-
inductive approach aims at exploring and describing a given event while the 
deductive reasoning tries to examine a particular hypothesis. 
6.3 Selection of countries 
6.3.1 Countries stratification  
 
WHO regional office for Europe serves the WHO European Region, which 
comprises 53 countries, covering a vast geographical region (including 
Central Asian countries) from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans. Fifty-three 
countries within the European Region were assigned by the WHO Regional 
Office for Europe to one of three broad categories that represented those that 
had Ôwell-advancedÕ pandemic plans by March 2009 (i.e., category A, 10 
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countries), those Ôless well-advancedÕ (i.e., category B, 31 countries), and 
those that had plans still directed mainly toward an avian influenza A (H5N1) 
zoonotic threat (i.e., category C, 12 countries). The allocation of countries 
into these categories was performed confidentially by the Influenza and other 
Respiratory Pathogens Team of the WHO Regional Office for Europe and 
based on its sustained dialogue with the Member States and a series of 
pandemic preparedness assessments and country (Caroline Brown, personal 
communication, March 03, 2010). 
6.3.2 Sample size 
 
Patton in his qualitative evaluation checklist states that there is no formula to 
calculate sample size for qualitative research (Patton, 2003). Ritche and 
colleagues claimed that sample sizes for qualitative research are much smaller 
than those use in quantitative methodology. They stated that in qualitative 
research context frequency of data does not necessary lead to more 
information and new occurrence and recurrence of themes are more important 
to the researcher than their actual numbers. Qualitative research is a 
hypothesisÐgenerating methodology that aims at understanding meanings and 
interpretations and not used for generalization of evidence as in quantitative 
methodology. Moreover, qualitative methodology results in large volume of 
data that makes the transcription and analysis processes challenging and 
resource intensive. Therefore, choosing a large sample size can make data 
repetitive and less useful (Ritchie et al., 2003). The team agreed to include 
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two countries from each category on the basis of methodology, scope, 
timelines and feasibility of this evaluation.  
6.3.3 Stratified random sampling  
 
This sampling method involves the separation of a large group into smaller 
subgroups called ÒstrataÓ based on shared features or attributes. Then a 
random sampling occurs within each stratum to get the final sample size. This 
sampling method is useful when sampling a group with diverse and different 
characteristics in order to get subgroups that are relatively more homogenous 
(Collins et al. 2007). The aforementioned classification was then passed on to 
an independent statistician who assigned a sampling order, based on stratified 
random sampling within the three categories. On 24
th
 February 2010, the 
researcher received a list of six countries from the statistician to contact 
initially (two per category) and a further list of six ÔreserveÕ countries to be 
contacted in case any country from the first list declines to participate. By 
applying this procedure it was possible to select six countries for participation 
along with Denmark that independently agreed to act as the venue for the 
pilot study.  This classification has been used exclusively for the selection of 
countries to participate in the study. The categorization has not been shared 
with the participating countries or with any persons external to the study 
team. This was a very sensitive issue on the political level; especially when 
the less well-prepared countries perceived this evaluation as an inspection on 
their performance during the actual response.  Stratified randomization as 
described above led to the inclusion of a sample of six countries. Of the six 
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countries initially approached in March 2010, five agreed and one did not 
agree. That country did not participate because they had an election that 
coincided with the proposed country visit in 2010. A second-choice country 
from the same category Òa reserve countryÓ replaced this country. This was 
done to reduce the likelihood of bias since both countries belonged to the 
same category of pandemic preparedness. The six countries, in alphabetical 
order, who agreed to participate after official invitation letters (attached in the 
appendix) were sent on the 8
th
 of March 2010 were: Armenia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Germany, Portugal, Switzerland, and Uzbekistan (Fig. 1). 
Figure 1 Map of Europe and Central Asia highlighting the seven 
countries selected for the study. 
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6.4 Data collection  
6.4.1 Identifying key stakeholders for pandemic preparedness  
One of the aims of qualitative research is to explore stakeholdersÕ point of 
view. This means that stakeholders participating in the study are asked to 
report their perception on what was important for pandemic planning.  The 
selection of the stakeholders was based on the study objectives and 
practicality. In addition, WHO input was sought in order to determine the key 
stakeholders who are vigorously involved in inter-governmental coordination 
during pandemic planning and response. These stakeholders were selected 
because they represent the minimum required administrative levels in a 
country to prepare and respond to pandemic influenza, as recommended in 
WHO pandemic preparedness guidance checklist published in 2005 and 2009 
(WHO, 2005a, WHO, 2009f.) There are far more stakeholders involved in the 
pandemic planning and response; including private sector, pharmaceutical 
companies, and the public but these were outside the scope of this study.  
Representatives from the following stakeholders of each participating country 
were interviewed separately: Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Civil 
Emergency Response (CER) (or equivalent), National Public Health 
Authority (NPHA), Subnational Government tier (SNG), primary and 
secondary healthcare workers (HCWs). The national governments agreed to 
participate in the study, and s nominated official representatives as 
interviewees. Stakeholders group numbers by participating countries is shown 
in table two. The number of participants in each category per country was 
determined by the national health authorities based on the role played during 
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pandemic planning, involvement in the actual response, availability, and 
seniority. As discussed earlier, qualitative research aims at providing rich and 
comprehensive understanding regarding certain aspects of human experiences 
and not to generalise the finding to the larger population. Therefore, the small 
numbers of participants interviewed in a focus group setting was optimal to 
achieve this goal. 
6.4.2 Interview setting: Focus groups 
Focus groups involving more than one interviewee usually explore particular 
topics in depth. This means the interviewees are stimulated to speak to one 
another instead of asking single person to answer one question. This allows 
interviewees to exchange experiences, comment on each other statements as 
well as challenging each otherÕs ideas. Also, it is a practical way to collect 
information from quite a few people at the same time.  
Focus groups can provide a platform to investigate ways in which participants 
as a larger group can understand a specific issue and it is useful to explore 
critical and sensitive topics (Morgan, 1997). The group communications 
generate ideas and assist in brainstorming that enable the participants to see 
and discuss their point of views in a way different to individual interviews 
(Kitzinger, 1995). During a given focus group interview, participants are 
encouraged to reflect more deeply about the topic, and build new ideas and 
alter existing ones. Focus groups interviews are casual in which participants 
are asked to talk about their own views regarding a specific issue in a less 
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stressful and friendly setting. This can make participants at ease and motivate 
them to share their views and opinions unreservedly  (Punch, 2005).  
The possibility of dominance by some participants during the conversation is 
one of the potential drawbacks of this type of interviews. This means that 
some participants remain silent or keep echoing their managersÕ views 
(Darlington and Scott, 2002). To overcome this, interviewers tried to 
encourage silent and less active participants to answer questions and share 
their views and experiences. This was mainly used in the less prepared 
countries and this will be discussed further in the discussion chapter. The use 
of one on one interview setting could have overcome this limitation but at the 
same time would have impaired the interactions and brainstorming required 
to get a proper and in depth knowledge about complex programmes such as 
pandemic preparedness. Another issue related to focus groups is that there a 
possibility for discomfiture with sensitive issues that can make participants 
reluctant to share their personal intakes on critical topics (Darlington and 
Scott, 2002). Confidentiality breach is another limitation in this kind of 
research as other participants in the group will also hear sensitive and 
confidential information (Kitzinger, 1995). 
6.4.3 Structuring data collection instruments  
Qualitative data collection of programme evaluations is structured to some 
extent.  It is very unusual to conduct interview without at least a general 
agenda of topics. Additional topics can be anticipated during interviews; 
 99 
however, interviews are focused and semi-structured because of time and 
financial constrains.   
Qualitative data collection instruments generally use open-ended questions, in 
contrast to quantitative surveys, which typically use predetermined closed-
ended questions. In March 2010, six interview guides were developed for the 
six stakeholder groups; Ministry of Health, Civil Emergency Response, 
National Public Health Authority, Subnational Government, Healthcare 
Workers. However, the questions being asked were tailored according to the 
stakeholder group. These interview guides were therefore semi-structured 
with a good deal of flexibility and were derived from the available literature, 
they were subdivided mainly into four sections, section A consists of a set of 
questions about the planning process, section B is regarding implementation 
of the pandemic activities prior to pandemic, section C is about the use of the 
plan before the pandemic and finally section D explores the reflection on 
what could have been done differently in the planning phase. The full set of 
interview guides is provided in appendix B.  
Before and after each country visit there was a briefing and debriefing 
respectively. During the briefing sessions, the team presented the study 
objectives, expected outcomes, why participants were selected, voluntary 
participation, confidentiality of the results, recording interviews, as well as 
promised to organise a workshop to get stakeholdersÕ input and endorsement. 
The research team allowed for stakeholders to raise questions and all were 
answered professionally. Finally, participants were asked to fill in the role 
 100 
profile forms that implied their consent to participate. A copy of the role 
profile from is included in the appendix F. 
6.4.4 Information gathering before country visit 
Information was obtained in two stages: before the country visits and during 
the visits. Before each country visit, the team of interviewers assessed the 
entire available national, regional and other pandemic plans and associated 
guidelines. These included collection of relevant documents developed as part 
of pandemic preparedness activities and documents developed after the start 
of pandemic 2009. Interviewers therefore became familiar with the 
documents and guidelines prior to the interviews. Moreover, during the data 
analysis step, these documents helped the researcher to construct ideas in 
relation to pandemic planning and preparedness and to understand the setting 
where these activities were planned and implemented. The stakeholders were 
also asked to answer a set of selected questions prior to being interviewed.  
They were asked to provide the following information by email: 
1. A description of three successes and three challenges in pandemic 
preparedness activities Description of five key tasks/responsibilities for 
stakeholders at national, regional and local level during planning process and 
five key tasks/responsibilities in the response to the influenza A (H1N1) 
pandemic in 2009.  
2. Key pandemic preparedness activities documents available at the start of 
the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in 2009, as well as any document 
developed by stakeholders after the start of the pandemic. 
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6.4.5 The pilot study 
Denmark, which hosts the WHO Regional Office, unilaterally agreed to act as 
a pilot country. University of Nottingham and WHO regional office for 
Europe staff as a collaborating team visited Copenhagen in the period from 
27
th
 April to 29
th
 April 2010.  The team interviewed five groups of 
stakeholders from the Ministry of Health, National Board of Health, regional 
tier, primary and secondary health care workers. Stakeholders responsible for 
civil emergency preparedness DEMA (Danish Emergency Management 
Agency) declined participation in the study because of staff unavailability as 
the agency was conducting an emergency response exercise during the time of 
visit in April 2010  
6.4.5.1 Preparations before the interviews 
1. The team had frequent and prolonged meetings to discuss the six interview 
guides and went through them one by one to agree on the final format of the 
questions. A good input was received from a colleague from the DPR 
(disaster preparedness and response). Some questions were left to be tested 
during the interviews to see their appropriateness. 
2. The team discussed the role of each member in the interviews and who will 
meet whom and the role of each one during the interviews.  
3. There was no briefing session on the morning of the 27
th
 April due to staff 
unavailability. The briefing session aims to present the objectives, rational 
and expected outcomes.  
4. The audio recorders were tested to make sure they work properly.  
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6.4.5.2 Interview analysis  
Five interviews were performed with the ministry of health (MOH) and 
National Board of Health that represent the national public health authority in 
Denmark (NPHA), subnational government tier (SNG), primary and 
secondary healthcare workers (HCW). Two interviews were done in parallel 
(NPHA and secondary healthcare workers). The primary healthcare workers 
interview was done by phone. MOH interview took 60 min (the ministry was 
not able to provide 2 hours), NPHA lasted for 110 min, SNG was the longest 
one taking 120 min and both the primary and secondary healthcare interviews 
took about 60 min. 
Wording of some questions needed revision as well as some questions were 
removed and some were added. Section B was the most problematic section 
during the interviews as stakeholders did not understand the concept of 
implementing planning activities before pandemic and it took some time to 
explain to them what meant by implementing pandemic activities before 
pandemic and particular example were given to promote their answers such as 
antiviral drugs stockpiling, advance vaccine purchase agreements and 
seasonal influenza surveillance. 
 
6.4.5.3 Post interviews 
1. The team met after each interview to plan for the final report presentation 
(debriefing). There was an agreement to present four slides as per sections of 
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the interview guides. Each slide represented key messages/ recurrent themes 
identified or the most important outcome from all interviews.  
2. Team leader debriefed the main findings in a professional way and 
highlighted the main finding, which came out from all interviews. Comments 
from the participants were received and the discussion went as planned. All 
comments were taken into account and were discussed later on.    
3. All the audio files were stored in a safe folder preparing for the 
transcription. 
4. The team thanked the stakeholders for their time and hospitality and 
promised to invite them to a workshop to present the final aggregated report.  
5. Next step was to refine the interview guides before the next mission to 
Germany. 
The interview guides after the pilot study in Denmark were re-evaluated and 
edited. As the methodology was tested in Denmark, the input was fed into the 
multi-sectoral interview guides. It was a post-hoc decision to include the 
findings from Denmark in the findings due to the high quality of data 
obtained during the interviews. 
 Last but not least, the researcher prepared a Standard Operating Procedure 
(SOP) document, which helped interviewers to follow during the interviews 
as attached in the appendix D. 
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6.5 Data analysis 
 
6.5.1 Data transcription  
Following each country visit, the recorded audio files were transcribed word 
for word and then later word-processed. A number of WHO interns, research 
assistants, and the researcher participated in the transcription process that was 
a very time consuming process. The researcher prepared a Standard Operating 
Procedure for transcribing audio file for the transcribers to use to assist them 
in the process. Afterwards, the researcher double checked audiotapes cross 
the transcripts to make sure that they were precisely transcribed to protect the 
meanings of stakeholdersÕ answers. Each single interview file was printed and 
stored as a backup in addition to the electronic copies. The 90 hours of 
information took around 350 hours of transcription as well as extra time to 
double check the accuracy of the transcripts.  
6.5.2 Organizing data 
NVivo software was used to facilitate the data coding process. This includes 
organizing and labelling data into themes and subthemes. NVivo is very 
useful in organizing the text and managing the coding process. It allows the 
search for conflicting statements in order to protect against data 
misunderstanding (NVivo, 2008).  
Interview texts were imported into NVivo for analysis after editing and 
formatting the transcripts. Data analysis implicated searching for concepts 
and attempting to investigate similarities and differences in addition to seek 
for understanding the relationship and connection between them. These 
concepts are called ÔnodesÕ that allow the researcher to organize similar 
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information in one space and relate them to other information. Concepts that 
are unique and irrelevant to other facts can be put in Ôfree nodesÕ, while text 
that is relevant to each other in certain way can be structured in hierarchy of 
Ôtree nodesÕ. Data coding is a continuous and iterative process that allows the 
transformation of free nodes into tree nodes and vice versa.   
6.5.3 Data coding  
Data analysis was driven by the research objectives which highlighted topics 
to be investigated which included description of pandemic planning activities, 
describing major successes, breakdowns, areas of improvement and 
expectation from WHO for future pandemic planning. An inductive approach 
is compatible with qualitative evaluation methodology and was used to code 
data in this project. This means that findings emerged directly from analysing 
raw data as well as it was influenced by research objectives without prior 
assumptions or hypotheses. Inductive approach is useful to explore inter-
dependent and complex aspects of health programmes and can be used to 
generate hypotheses, which can be tested later by deductive-quantitative 
approach. Once the text has been ready for analysis, the raw text has been 
read in detail for multiple times until the researcher was familiar with the 
content and his understanding was increased in relation to data content. Most 
of the upper-level or more general themes were derived from evaluation aims 
and objectives. However, the more specific themes were identified from 
multiple readings of the raw data when recurrent regularities appeared in the 
data. Similar text that is identified similar to each other was organized into 
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distinct categories and subsequently under subthemes and themes. For 
example, initially electronic plan dissemination was set as a free node but 
later on the researcher identified that there are many ways of pandemic plan 
communication which then set as sub-categories for plan dissemination which 
included electronic, postal, seminars and posters.  
Finally the conceptual framework emerged and the researcher kept reviewing 
the text to ensure that all relevant texts were assigned to their corresponding 
category. 
6.6 Credibility of the findings  
 
The World health Organization regional office for Europe, invited all the 
countries that agreed to participate in this study to a workshop to discuss the 
findings of the evaluation and to get countries endorsement before publishing 
the final report (The purpose and scope for this workshop is attached in 
Appendix D). The researcher travelled to Denmark and stayed at WHO office 
in Copenhagen for two weeks to prepare for the event which was held in the 
period between 20
th
 and 22
nd
 October, 2010. Participants and other experts 
who may have special interest in pandemic preparedness and response were 
sent the final draft of evaluation report to comment on or assess its findings, 
interpretations and conclusion. During the workshop stakeholdersÕ delegates 
were asked if the major themes and subthemes are related to their personal 
experience and if they have any comments and concerns regarding the 
evaluation findings. Finally, the endorsed findings were published on WHO 
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Europe website as ÒRecommendations for Good Practice in Pandemic 
PreparednessÓ (WHO Europe and University of Nottingham, 2010). 
6.7 Ethics  
This work was a service evaluation, to determine how useful the pandemic 
preparedness activities driven by WHO had been in preparing countries for 
the 2009 pandemic. Interviewees provided information as part of their official 
roles; they were nominated to take part by their respective governments, in 
their capacity as government officials/employee and not as patients or 
volunteers. Here is a quote form the NHS Health Research Authority website 
ÒÉ.where a project is considered to be solely audit or service/therapy 
evaluation, it will not be managed as research within the NHS or social care. 
Such projects do not require ethical review by a NHS or Social Care Research 
Ethics Committee or management permission through the NHS R&D office. 
Under these circumstances, there is no need to submit applications to the 
NHS Research Ethics Committee (REC) or NHS/HSC R&D officeÓ (NHS 
Health Research Authority website, n.d.). As such, the study protocol lies 
outside the scope of institutional review board consideration. An official letter 
from WHO Regional Office for Europe confirming that the project was a 
service evaluation is attached in Appendix G. 
6.8 Summary and conclusion 
 
The chapter went over the main points of the methods used in this study. It 
started by highlighting the notion of qualitative evaluation as well as the 
significance of inductive approach concept in this kind of evaluation. It also 
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described the selection of the study participants; interview guides 
development and data collection methods. Towards its end, it illustrated how 
data were collected and analysed. The findings of the analysis are presented 
in the next chapter. 
Figure 2 Qualitative data analysis flow chart 
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Chapter 7: Findings  
7.1 Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to describe the characteristics of the study 
participants and the nature of country visits. Subsequently, the findings 
identified from the stakeholders at different administrative levels are 
presented. This evaluation identified six thematic domains that shape 
pandemic preparedness and planning and influence the usefulness of planning 
activities across countries. These major themes were further subjected to 
thematic analysis to form subthemes that built the conceptual framework 
mentioned in the previous chapter. The major themes emerged were: 
communication, coordination, capacity building, mutual support, leadership, 
and adaptability and flexibility.  
7.1.1 Characteristics of study participants 
 
The study team interviewers interviewed six stakeholder groups across the 
seven countries independently. These were: Ministry of Health (MOH), Civil 
Emergency Response (CER), National Public Health Authority (NPHA), 
Subnational Government authority (SNGA), primary healthcare workers 
(primary HCWs), and secondary healthcare workers (secondary HCWs). 
Table 2 illustrates the stakeholdersÕ group numbers by participating countries. 
The study team interviewed 177 stakeholders in all the participating 
countries. All interviews were focus group interviews but we conducted three 
personal interviews due to staff unavailability in two countries. The number 
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of participants per country ranged from 17 to 32 and group size ranged from 1 
to 8 across the countries. 
Table 2 Stakeholders group numbers by participating countries 
Country MOH NPHA CER SNGA Primary 
HCW 
Secondary 
HCW 
Armenia 5 7 6 4 7 3 
Bosnia 4 6 6 4 6 4 
Denmark 1 6 - 8 1 1 
Germany 5 6 3 4 3 2 
Portugal 5 7 7 4 5 2 
Switzerland  5 6 2 4  5 4 
Uzbekistan  5 1 3 4 1 5 
Total 30 40 27 31 28 21 
 
Table 3 Background information by stakeholder group 
Stakeholder No. Age Range Job title (number) 
MOH 30 34-63 Director General 6, National Epidemiologist 5, 
Virologist 7, National Influenza Centre 5, Drug 
regulatory authority 4, experts in animal 
influenza viruses 3 
NPHA 40 36-48 Epidemiologists10, Virologists 8, veterinary 
authorities 5, Public health doctors 7, influenza 
planning experts 6, Vaccine logistics advisor 1, 
press spokesman 2 
CER 27 28-55 Military services 12, Ministry of interior 7, 
Civil Emergency specialists 8 
SNG 31 41-57 Regional government officials 12, Regional 
planning directors 8, Regional drug authority 3, 
Pharmacists 5, Regional academic advisors 3 
Primary 
HCW 
28 29-53 General practitioners 24, representatives of 
physiciansÕ associations 4 
Secondary 
HCW 
21 33-61 Infectious disease specialists 6, Hospital 
directors 5, Nurses 4, Hospital lab director 5, 
paediatrician 1 
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Table 3 shows the attributes of the study participants by stakeholder group. It 
gives the number of participants per each stakeholder group, their age range, 
and job title as per the role profile forms filled in before the interviews. The 
highest number of stakeholders was that of NPHA with 40 while the lowest 
was secondary HCWs with only 21 participants. The participants were from 
different professional backgrounds including academic and technical 
positions, civil emergence response personnel, government senior officials, 
clinical staff, and other policy makers involved in pandemic planning and 
preparedness process. 
7.1.2 Country visits 
Seven country visits were conducted over a period of 8 weeks from April 
27th to July 1
st
 2010 as shown in table 4. It is important to mention that each 
country visit lasted for three days with three to four members of the team 
participating in each visit. The team made sure that at least one of the 
contributors to the study design and methodology to be present in all of the 
seven country visits to ensure consistency and make sure that all audio 
recorders to be checked and collected after interviews, role profile forms to be 
collected before leaving, and to answer all queries during each visit. 
Interviewers were drawn from the University of Nottingham, WHO Regional 
Office for Europe, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and 
experts from Member States.  English language was used in the interviews in 
four countries, Russian was used in Uzbekistan and Armenia and the local 
language was used in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consecutive translation was 
the method used during the interviews in non-English-speaking countries. 
 112 
Non-English interviews were translated and transcribed by the translators 
themselves. Afterwards, the researcher double-checked audiotapes cross the 
transcripts to make sure that they were precisely transcribed to protect the 
meanings of stakeholdersÕ answers. Subsequently, raw data files consisting of 
transcripts of the recorded interviews were prepared and cleaned; transcripts 
from 41 interviews constituting 90 hours of information which resulted in 
around 600 pages of text which were formatted into common content 
structures. 
 
Table 4 Timetable of country visits  
Country  Dates Interviewers Language  
Denmark  27-29 April 
2010 
Ahmed Hashim, 
Jonathan Van-Tam, 
Caroline Brown, Michala 
Hegermann-Lindencrone  
English 
Germany 25-27 May 
2010 
Ahmed Hashim, Peet 
Tll, Caroline Brown, 
Thomas Hofmann 
English 
Switzerland  8-9 June 2010 Ahmed Hashim, Peet 
Tul, Caroline Brown, 
Un-Yeong Go 
English  
Portugal 8-9 June 2010 Jonathan Van-Tam, Jo 
Newstead, Pasi 
Penttinen, Ana Paula 
Coutinho 
English 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
23-24 June 
2010 
Caroline Brown, Peet 
Tul 
Local 
Language 
Armenia  21-24 June 
2010 
Ahmed Hashim, Liana 
Martirosyan, Irina 
Papieva 
Russian 
Uzbekistan  29June-1 July 
2010 
Ahmed Hashim, Peet 
Tul, Mark Witschi, 
Dmitriy Pereyaslov, 
Russian 
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7.2 Theme one: Communication 
 
Communication was the most recurring theme during the interviews across all 
levels in all countries. This is mainly due to the high importance of 
communication in managing infectious disease outbreaks. Precise, 
appropriate and multi-levelled information was vital in order to minimize 
unwanted and unforeseen social, inter-organisational and intra-organisational 
disruptions, and economic consequences associated with the pandemic. 
It is important to mention that stakeholdersÕ quotes presented here are 
rephrased, when appropriate, in order to protect the confidentiality of the 
participants. 
7.2.1 Multi-sectoral participatory planning  
7.2.1.1 Participatory planning at national level  
ÒI want to add that a working group was created to develop the plan, 
including epidemiologists from NPHA, virologists, representatives from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, CER, and SNGAÓ, commented an MOH stakeholder, 
category A. 
 ÒIt was a joint effort between the SNGA and the NPHA. We worked through 
monthly meetings and even more frequently if necessaryÓ, commented a 
SNGA stakeholder, category A.  
ÔÔDid you participate in the national planning for pandemic influenza? No, it 
was done at a national levelÕÕ, commented a SNGA, category B. 
ÒBut did MOH send you the plan for comments or feedback? A: No, only the 
final version was provided to us when pandemic preparations startedÓ, 
commented a SNGA, category C. 
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Category A countries reported that their pandemic planning committees 
involved a wide range of central and sub-national representatives, including 
healthcare workers, actively participated and communicated with each other 
during the planning process. Moreover, epidemiologists, virologists, expert 
groups, and other public health officials supported the pandemic planning 
process. These multi-sector activities were also maintained throughout the 
implementation and response phases of the 2009 pandemic. In contrast, 
countries in categories B and C reported less participation of SNGA 
stakeholders in the planning process at the national level. 
7.2.1.2 Intra-communication channels 
ÒThe plan was developed and it was done together with (diverse) 
stakeholders, and we had continuous meetings, on a regular basis, weekly, to 
get everyone on-boardÓ, commented an MOH stakeholder, category A. 
ÒWe used different ways of communication including emails, correspondence, 
telephone communication, and direct presentation on the TV. What was the 
frequency of your meetings? We met twice in the past two yearsÓ, commented 
a NPHA, category B. 
ÒThe national pandemic planning committee used to meet once a year before 
the pandemic but after the pandemic we started meeting more frequently to 
cope with thingsÓ, commented an MOH stakeholder, category C. 
Stakeholders interviewed at the national level in category A countries 
reported that participatory planning meetings were an important success 
factor during the planning process before the pandemic. They reported a 
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variety of means of communication during the planning process; these 
included regular face-to-face meetings, round-table discussions, 
teleconferences, workshops, seminars, conferences and videoconferences. On 
the other hand, countries in category B and C reported less frequent meetings. 
The meetings were reported to be an opportunity to meet each other and to 
discuss roles and responsibilities during the planning and response phases. 
7.2.1.3 Participatory planning for non-health sector 
ÒIt is impossible to make a local contingency plan without other stakeholders 
input, like airport authority, port authority, airlines and so on. This is very 
important for usÓ, commented the Head of CER, category B. 
Countries across all categories reported that CER and other relevant 
stakeholders participated in writing up and implementing the non-health 
sector plan before the pandemic. Category B countries reported that inter-
minstrel panels from the MOH, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Transport, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Education were formed and had 
regular multi-sectorial meetings. 
7.2.1.4 Participatory planning at sub-national level 
 ÒWe collaborated with our partners at the NPHA and MOH. We worked 
through regular meetingsÓ, commented a SNGA stakeholder, category A. 
ÒSo, actually, this plan was developed with the participation of different 
physicians from the region, epidemiologists, infectious diseases specialists, 
immunologists, paediatricians, and representatives of NPHAÓ, commented a 
SNGA, category B. 
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Sub-national plans were developed across regions in all categories prior to 
influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in 2009. Sub-national planning committees 
with various multi-sectoral representations developed these plans. 
Coordination activities and meetings were held on a regular basis at sub-
national level with direct support and follow up from national stakeholders, 
facilitated by effective upward communication and channels for feedback.  
7.2.2 Plan dissemination channels and target groups 
7.2.2.1 The national plan 
 ÒThe plan was placed on the MOH website. In addition we have an official 
bulletin where we publish all new government decrees, laws and other legal 
acts. We have distributed the plan by mail to public health units in regions. It 
was provided to all managers who were responsible for organization of 
health response activities. Was it disseminated to the non-health sector? 
Answer: NoÓ, commented NPHA, category C. 
       ÒNPHA published the plan on their website and of course it was sent directly 
by mail to municipalities, primary and secondary health care, and non-health 
institutionsÓ, commented an NPHA stakeholder, category B. 
Ò We distributed the national pandemic plan to all health professionals by 
email and this was an effective way to reach our healthcare providers. 
However, in rural areas most physicians do not have Internet connection and 
this was a big concern,Ó commented a NPHA stakeholder, category C. 
Countries in categories A and B reported disseminating their national 
pandemic plans and other associated policy documents to all health and non-
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health stakeholders involved in the planning and response via national 
influenza pandemic web sites. National plans were also actively disseminated 
through e-mail and regular mail during their development and 
implementation. The targeted groups were primarily comprised of the 
following: sub-national government, primary and secondary healthcare 
settings and non-health institutions. In contrast, category C countries 
distributed their plans to the health sector only. 
7.2.2.2 Non-health sector plan 
ÒEmergency planning checklists were sent to police, fire departments, and 
airportsÓ, commented a CER stakeholder, category A. 
ÒWe sent information to all schools and kindergartens as well as public and 
private business,Ó commented a CER stakeholder, category B. 
 ÒQ: Did you support BCP in businesses and private sector in your 
jurisdiction? A: No, they were supposed to do the work themselves and if they 
need support we can give our adviceÓ, commented a CER stakeholder, 
category C.  
During the planning process, the non-health sector business continuity plan 
was actively disseminated to sub-national authorities, airports, small and 
medium enterprises, public and private businesses, schools and non-
governmental organizations by countries in all categories via email or post. 
However, category C countries reported no dissemination of BCP as this was 
to be done within businesses independently. National decrees, regular 
meetings, public awareness, human resource and financial support were 
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reported to be facilitating the development and implementation of business 
continuity plans in all countries.  
7.2.2.3 The distribution of the sub-national plan and related guidelines  
ÒEverything was disseminated to all health facilities primary and secondary 
via our regional website as well as holding several meetings with the media 
representative in our regionÓ, commented a SNGA, category B. 
ÒThe plan for our region was disseminated mainly to health institutions and 
we realized later that this had to go beyond the health sector to include some 
of non-health institutionsÓ, commented SNGA category C. 
ÒWe relied on passive dissemination via our websites but we needed to do 
more outreach communication by meeting peopleÓ, commented SNGA 
category C. 
Sub-national authorities communicated with relevant stakeholders at the local 
level; these included primary and secondary healthcare workers, local public 
health units and representative of the national government in each region. In 
addition, the sub-national authorities in category A and B countries sent their 
plan to both health and non-health institutions including the public, the media, 
and scientific, political, religious and academic organizations via film, 
reports, bulletins and other publications. On the other hand, sub-national 
authorities of countries in category C disseminated their plans and guidelines 
locally to health institutions only; including primary and secondary healthcare 
professionals and various specialized medical facilities. Channels used for 
disseminating the sub-national plan were both active and passive ways of 
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communication. Active channels were mainly email, mail, telephone, official 
letters, regular meetings and workshops.  
7.2.3 Useful actions for effective communication  
7.2.3.1 Communication with the public during the implementation phase 
ÒWe distributed a number of booklets and flyers with videos on prevention of 
flu and we highlighted the importance of hand wash in reducing the spread of 
fluÓ, commented an NPHA official, category A. 
ÒWe provided good media coverage even before pandemic. Our purpose was 
to ensure that every citizen knows about influenza in terms of symptoms, 
spread, and preventionÓ, commented primary HCW, category C. 
Specific factors considered to have facilitated the implementation of the 
pandemic planning activities before the pandemic; this included raising public 
awareness through pandemic-related television programmes and campaigns, 
which were reported to have increased awareness among the public during the 
response.   
7.2.3.2 Communication with the public during the response 
ÒWe communicated with the public regarding self isolation and hygiene 
measures and how to avoid spreading this disease. NPHA established a 
national call centre that can be used by the public to get informationÓ, 
commented primary HCW, category B. 
ÒHow did you as NPHA ensure consistency of information provided to the 
public? A: In the initial period I personally gave three press conferences, 
radio, TV live programmes, and information clip. We had a communication 
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plan since the time of avian influenza. Spokespersons were identified in the 
planÓ, commented a NPHA stakeholder, category C. 
 ÒWe had predetermined spokesperson in our office to speak to public during 
crises, we did not allow anyone to speak to the public, the words should have 
weight, so it should be a representative of the NPHA, people with knowledge, 
position and respectÓ, commented NPHA, category C. 
All countries reported that communication with the public was a useful 
pandemic preparedness practices during response. Stakeholders commented 
that educating the public about pandemic influenza symptoms and personal 
hygiene was essential to raise public awareness during the response. 
Communication activities were implemented through media campaigns; such 
as the distribution of flyers and posters in hospitals and primary health clinic, 
giving press conferences, and national call centres. This was all done to 
ensure the consistency of message to the public.  
7.2.3.3 Communication with healthcare professionals  
ÒWe faxed information to our physicians, hospitals, and emergency rooms 
with all relevant information. In addition, we posted updates on staff intranet 
with clinical guidelinesÓ, commented NPHA, category A. 
ÒThere was a line specific for flu. It was a special one, because our chief 
medical officer believes that it was crucial to have a line for educating 
professionalsÓ, commented secondary HCW, category B. 
 ÒWe provided our staff with Questions and Answers document before the 
pandemic and we updated it during the pandemic and it was useful in 
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reducing confusion among HCWs in our regionÓ, commented a SNGA, 
category B. 
Two countries in category B designed hotlines for healthcare professionals in 
order to guide them during the response regarding case definition and clinical 
management protocols. Stakeholders from these countries mentioned that 
influenza lines were very effective way to guide healthcare doctors regarding 
management of patients during the response. Other countries used email 
contact lists, faxed information, intranet, and Q and A documents as way of 
communication with HCW during the pandemic. 
7.2.3.4 Feedback communication channels in place 
ÒSub-national and national experts were listening, we could call or email if 
something needed changing,Ó commented primary HCW, category A. 
ÒNo specific channels for feedback. Authorities tried to formalize but did not 
work, so mainly informalÓ, commented secondary HCW, category B. 
ÒWe were not asked to give our input both before and during the pandemic. I 
personally faced challenges regarding clinical management of hospitalized 
patients. It was a messÓ, commented secondary HCW, category C. 
Countries in category A and B mentioned having formal and informal upward 
communication systems in place for feeding back issues and suggestions from 
the frontline health workers to the sub-national and national authorities. These 
communication channels allowed comments and suggestions to be fed into 
national and sub-national planning revisions and updates. While category C 
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countries demonstrated the lack of such channels both formally and 
informally. 
7.2.4 Areas of under planning and communication difficulties 
encountered 
7.2.4.1 Communication difficulties with primary healthcare professionals 
during preparedness and response phases 
ÒWere you involved in the development of the national pandemic plan? A: 
No, neither I nor other doctors did participate in the development of 
pandemic plans; we are the implementersÓ, commented a primary HCW, 
category A. 
 ÒQ: your input in the regional and national plans was minimal? A: Yes 
mainly it came from top to us. And then the regional adapted from the 
national and the local adapted from the regional. It was that wayÓ, 
commented a secondary HCW, category B. 
ÒThis was done at high level and doctors in our region and other regions as 
far as I know were not consultedÓ, commented a secondary HCW, category 
B. 
ÒIn our region, primary HCWs are not familiar with the Internet and rarely 
use e-mails and we needed to increase their awareness during the response 
but that was not possible,Ó commented a SNGA stakeholder, category C.  
 ÒWe also missed part of the cooperation with the primary health care as we 
didnÕt have full contacts with those before the pandemic and we tried to set 
things up during the pandemic in our region. I donÕt know for the other 
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regions if they had planned enough regarding thisÓ, commented a SNGA 
stakeholder, category C. 
While multi-sectoral participatory planning was considered to be highly 
effective, there was a consistently identified lack of primary care 
representativesÕ awareness or contribution of pandemic preparedness 
activities during pandemic planning, implementation and eventual response in 
all countries. This problem was reported at both national and subnational 
levels. Failed communication channels between primary care professionals 
and other regional and national levels contributed to this problem. Important 
communication channels such as the Internet, phone and e-mails were 
necessary for efficient and rapid delivery of information related to pandemic 
preparedness and response. However, in category C countries and certain 
category B countries, some primary HCWs lacked internet and e-mail access 
at work. 
7.2.4.2 Poor communication with the media 
ÒIt didnÕt work very well with media I think. The media in general had 
different and conflicting information all the time, and this caused confusion to 
the public regarding vaccine safety and effectiveness. I think it is one of the 
reasons why vaccination rate went so low in our countryÓ, commented an 
NPHA official, category A. 
Ò I think we at NPHA needed more media planning and training to respond 
and coordinate effectively with the media during crises environmentÓ, 
commented an NPHA stakeholder, category B. 
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ÒA coordination group during the implementation phase was required to 
bring media and health officials closer. We have to address this in the revised 
planÒ, commented a SNGA stakeholder, category B. 
Category A and B countries signalled that their communication with the 
media did not work well during the response and a more comprehensive 
media planning should be incorporated into the wider communication plan. In 
addition, stakeholders from category A countries claimed that it is essential to 
establish a coordinating group during the implementing phase to facilitate the 
communication with the media and ensure consistent messages during the 
response phase. Countries underestimated the impact of media on the 
population and the negative consequence of some of its misleading messages 
on the vaccine uptake rates among the public.  
7.2.4.3 Poor communication between healthcare providers 
ÒPrimary HCWs in the region failed to provide the requested history data for 
patients with severe flu and were not responding to multiple requests made by 
our hospital HCWs,Ó commented a secondary HCW, category B. 
ÒWe had formal communication channels between HCWs in our region but it 
was not functioning properly as we did not test them beforehandÓ commented 
a SNGA, category B. 
Category B countries mentioned that poor communication was recognised 
during the response between secondary and primary healthcare workers since 
primary healthcare workers failed to provide requested clinical information to 
hospitals upon referral. Communication channels between HCWs should be 
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testes regularly as mentioned by SNGA stakeholder. No data available for 
category A and C countries. 
7.2.4.4 Under planning for risk communication with healthcare workers 
ÒWe faced many difficulties regarding how to convince hospital personnel to 
get the vaccine. We at the office discussed how we communicate the risks and 
the benefits of the vaccine. We tried to put some pressure on them to do thisÓ, 
commented an MOH stakeholder, category A. 
Communication during pandemic with healthcare workers was challenging 
because of the uncertainties associated with the novel virus and its severity. 
There was a big demand from our HCWs for information and updatesÒ, 
commented a NPHA stakeholder, category B. 
ÒOur physicians required a better risk communication and education 
regarding the importance of wearing personal protective measures while 
caring for flu patientsÓ, commented a SNGA, category C. 
Healthcare workers in countries across all categories reported deficiencies in 
the risk communication process between the national and sub-national 
authorities and healthcare workers regarding vaccine safety and the 
importance of wearing masks. Stakeholders commented that this have had 
negative consequences, for example, the vaccine acceptance rates among 
HCWs were quite low in most of the countries surveyed. 
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7.3 Theme two: Coordination  
 
The second most recurring theme reported by stakeholders was coordination. 
It was a fundamental component of pandemic planning activities in order to 
enable vibrant and timely decisions; coordination is required for a uniformed 
action plan or policy to be implemented efficiently by all stakeholders 
involved in pandemic planning and preparedness activities. Best pandemic 
response outcomes can be envisaged when essential activities are coordinated 
in a seamless fashion through effective communication, leadership and 
support. Certain preparedness activities were considered to be useful and can 
have a great impact on pandemic preparedness through effective coordination 
between various sectors and stakeholders prior to and during a pandemic. The 
below-mentioned key sub-themes were considered to have a great impact on 
coordination prior to and during the pandemic. 
7.3.1 Timelines of coordinated pandemic planning activities  
7.3.1.1 National pandemic planning activities  
 ÒThe real process started in 2001. The draft of the plan was there in 2004. It 
was discussed for roughly a year with different committees at sub-national 
level. It was finally published in 2005Ó, commented an MOH stakeholder, 
category A. 
ÒPandemic planning activities started in 2007 (2--3 years before H1N1 
pandemic in 2009) and was published in early 2009Ó, commented a NPHA 
stakeholder, category C. 
Organized and coordinated pandemic planning activities commenced in the 
period between 1995 and 2001 in category A countries and two category B 
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countries while they were initiated at later stage, in the period between 2005 
and 2007, in the other countries.  These activities were finalised between 
2005 and 2007 in countries that started their planning process at earlier stage 
compared to 2009 for countries that started their pandemic planning at later 
date.  
7.3.1.2 Non-health sector planning activities  
 ÒInfluenza emergency preparedness in private sector started in late 2006 
after consultations with national and subnational health authoritiesÓ, 
commented a CER stakeholder, category A. 
 ÒThe plan was published and sent out to people in late 2008Ó, commented a 
CER stakeholder, category A. 
ÒThe emergency planning committee met in 2008 to start the process and we 
disseminated the plan in 2009, just before the pandemic hit our countryÓ, 
commented a CER stakeholder, category B. 
ÒWe initiated our coordinated activities to develop a non-health pandemic 
plan in January 2009, and we finalised it in October of the same yearÓ, 
commented a CERÓ stakeholder, category C. 
The non-health sector pandemic preparedness activities were initiated in 2006 
by a category A country and two category B countries, in 2008 by a category 
A country and a category B country, and during the start of 2009 by category 
C countries. These activities were finalised in late 2008 for countries which 
started in 2006 while countries which started their planning in 2008 finished 
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in early 2009. However, countries in category C did not finish their planning 
when the pandemic unfolded in March 2009. 
7.3.1.3 Sub-national planning activities 
Ò We used to do things independently since we started in 2006 and people in 
ministry supported us financially and technically but they were not involved 
directly with our processes,Ó commented a SNGA, category A.  
ÒSub-national pandemic planning activities were initiated in 2006 when 
WHO asked countries to plan and were finalized in 2008 July,Ó commented 
an MOH stakeholder, category B.  
ÒWe started sub-national preparedness in late 2006 and we had many 
meetings with the officials in our MOH and NPHA to give them updates 
about the progress and they visited our region to follow up on the 
implementation of different activitiesÓ, commented a SNGA, category C. 
Sub-national pandemic planning activities started since 2006 and were 
finalised before 2009 in six countries. Only a category C country did not 
finalise their sub-national pandemic planning activities before March 2009 
(prior to the pandemic). In some category B and C countries, the national 
health authorities were following up with regions to make sure that things are 
in progress. In category A countries, planning was more independent and 
national authorities supported local activities financially and technically. 
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7.3.2 Useful coordination activities  
7.3.2.1 Command and control structure 
ÒHaving a clear command structure during the preparedness phases was 
very instrumental for the response itself. It assisted stakeholders 
understanding roles and responsibilities of each other. Preparing for this in 
advance will save us the hassle later in the responseÓ, commented a NPHA 
stakeholder, category A. 
 ÒThe plan was a priority document as it defines who is supposed to do what. 
It coordinated everybodyÕs activities all over the country. Actually any 
activity, pandemic or different, needs to be arranged like thatÓ, commented a 
MOH stakeholder, category B. 
ÒBecause our plans are mainly based to respond to avian influenza 
outbreaks, we did not plan the command structure between health and other 
emergency sectorsÓ, commented a NPHA stakeholder, category C. 
Category A and B countries mentioned that having a clear command and 
control is crucial during the planning process since numerous stakeholders 
and institutions are involved in the pandemic preparedness and management 
activities. This structure defines roles and responsibilities and will ensure 
effective and smooth coordination between different players during the 
response.  While countries that based their planning activities on avian 
influenza did not plan outside health sector and they reported lack of 
command structure between health sectors and other non-health emergency 
stakeholders.  
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7.3.2.2 Coordination groups for implementation at the national level 
ÒA special team was created, the so-called core implementation team to 
ensure proper implementation of pandemic plans at all timesÓ, commented an 
MOH stakeholder, category B. 
Countries in categories A and B established a designated coordination group 
within the national level that was responsible for the implementation of 
pandemic preparedness activities. This group was responsible for defining the 
command and control structure, monitoring and following up the 
implementation of the national pandemic plan, and ensuring that the plan is 
active at all times. The presence of this group was not reported in category C 
countries 
7.3.2.3 Coordination activities at the sub-national level 
ÒA sub-national coordination board was created in 2007 chaired by the 
governor. It was called Board on Prevention and Fighting Avian FluÓ, 
commented a SNGA stakeholder, category B. 
At the sub-national level, all countries had their own influenza-coordinating 
committees. Category C countries stated that more inter-regional coordination 
was needed for these committees to implement their pandemic plans better in 
order to achieve an even response. These committees facilitated multi-
sectoral verbal discussions and played an important role in the development 
and implementation of the sub-national planning activities.  
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7.3.2.4 Coordination activities at the hospital level 
ÒBroad representation of our hospital planning committee and expert input 
were essential in preparing our hospital, as well as the MOH follow up and 
legislationsÓ, commented a secondary HCW, category A. 
ÒReference hospitals were important to coordinate our efforts; itÕs impossible 
to have 80 hospitals prepared at the same time, but to have 3-4 and then 
other hospitals can followÓ, commented a NPHA, category B.  
Countries across all categories mentioned that experts input, joint hospital 
planning efforts between the national level and individual hospitals, and 
frequent hospital meetings were very useful factors. In addition, a category A 
country stated that the binding legislations and decrees were very important 
factors to oblige hospitals to prepare for pandemic influenza. A category B 
country prepared a number of hospitals and called them reference hospitals. 
7.3.3 Exercises related to pandemic preparedness 
7.3.3.1 Exercises at the national level 
ÒWe did some exercises on directions of operations and how decisions would 
be made. It was quite important because we had to deal with the emergency 
stakeholders from other sectors and having them in the decision process 
would make our lives much easier during the response. We«ve been practising 
decisions on mass vaccinations, and taking notes of our experience during 
previous outbreaksÓ, commented a MOH stakeholder, category A. 
ÒIn 2007, there were two table top exercises and in 2008 there was a field 
exercise with the involvement of all stakeholders, including agriculture, 
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epidemiology, emergency service and sub-national partners. It was obvious 
from 2007 exercises that the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of 
Agriculture did not cooperate well, so the exercise highlighted the importance 
of cooperation between agencies. The other lesson was that we need to have 
common knowledge, good communication, and well-organized information 
exchange channels,Ó commented an NPHA stakeholder, category B. 
ÒWe were planning to conduct our first national pandemic exercise but 
unfortunately pandemic was earlier than what we all anticipated. Given the 
fact that pandemic was mild, we can consider it as a real life exercise. We 
learned many lessons that we are going to incorporate in our next versionÓ, 
commented an MOH stakeholder, category B. 
 
Stakeholders from all the countries that participated in the study, except a 
category B country and category C countries, described undertaking exercises 
at the national. Specific elements of the pandemic plan related to 
communication systems and organizational structure were tested via table top, 
command post exercises, and field exercises. Lessons learned from these 
exercises were fed back into the pandemic plan as mentioned by the 
interviewees. These lessons include multi-stakeholder level consensus 
facilitation, adaptation of a good communication medium between 
stakeholders, and local and international coordination within and between 
countries. 
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7.3.3.2 Exercises related to non-health sector 
ÒI was personally responsible to carry out these exercises and they had a 
scenario, when someone brought this infection from a neighbouring country. 
It was an exercise jointly with the Ministry of Emergency Situations, Ministry 
of Interior, and Ministry of Agriculture. We carried out two times this 
exercise at a national level in 2008 in link with the flu. I have a video of these 
exercises,Ó commented a CER stakeholder, category B. 
ÒWe had two different exercises in the airport about having a flight coming in 
with patients with infectious disease and how would we had managed them, 
we thought that our plans were just right. And we learned and changed 
procedures and that was not only the health authorities but also together with 
the policeÓ, commented a CER stakeholder, category A. 
The non-health sector plan was tested in exercises in all countries except two 
countries from category B and C. The Ministry of Sanitation, Ministry of 
Agriculture, MOH, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Defence and police 
participated in these exercises. These exercises were based particularly on the 
scenario of avian influenza outbreak. Lessons learned from these exercises 
were incorporated into the plan; these comprised improved coordination 
between key stakeholders, proper planning for command structure, inter-
sectoral cooperation, tackling weaknesses effectively, and defining required 
capacities for the implementation of the pandemic preparedness activities. 
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7.3.3.3 Exercises at the sub-national and hospital levels 
ÒThere was an exercise held in the region to test communication and 
command system; lessons were clear that there should be changes in 
command structure due to many problems perceived during the exerciseÓ, 
commented a SNGA stakeholder, category A. 
ÒIn our paediatric department we had exercises for nurses to explain their 
steps and how they have to work with parents of children and explain that the 
number of visits will be restricted. Each department of our hospital has such 
exercisesÓ, commented a secondary HCW, category C. 
Category A countries participated in sub-national pandemic exercises, as a 
result of these pandemic exercises, command and organizational hierarchy 
proved to be underdeveloped as well as the organizational structure of quite a 
few departments required certain degree of modification. Hospitals in a 
number of countries conducted exercises and found them to be a useful 
preparatory activity. 
7.3.4 Areas of under planning in terms of coordination 
7.3.4.1 Vaccine procurement  
ÒI would like one thing to happen in a different way, it was the question of 
vaccine. It was very sad that each country in Europe had its own politics and 
its own connection and contracts with companies. This was not the right way 
and it was the reason of some discredits, it was the politics within the vaccine 
process. And this is shame and this was the worst that happened during the 
pandemic. There were a lot of comparisons on TV; this country bought this 
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vaccine, this country did this and this country did that, countries can join, can 
choose together, they can have common contract with companies. Leadership 
and coordination was really neededÓ, commented an NPHA stakeholder 
category A. 
Ò Future contract agreements should be more flexible and should include 
sections about the possibility to change and return excess vaccinesÓ, 
commented an MOH stakeholder category A. 
Ò We would like to see a joint procurement strategy coordination by WHO 
and ECDC as this will provide high access, low cost, and less variability 
across countriesÓ, commented a NPHA stakeholder category B. 
Countries stated that planning for vaccine procurements was different across 
Europe before the pandemic and coordinated procurement strategies should 
be adopted in the future to achieve a better coordination of activities and to 
ensure universal access to vaccine across Europe. Joint contracts with 
pharmaceutical companies were mentioned to be a good solution to bridge 
this gap.  
7.3.4.2 Vaccine logistics 
ÒA lot of planning in logistics was completely given as a responsibility to the 
sub-national authorities, we would try now to have a more comprehensive 
and a much more centralized approach, obviously we delegated too much to 
the districts,Ó commented a CER stakeholder, category A. 
Ò More robust operational planning for vaccine logistics was required before 
the pandemic. We had long discussions during the pandemic regarding 
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vaccine distribution, transportation, syringes and we were not sure about 
who was supposed to do what. It was tough to be honest with you,Ó 
commented a NPHA stakeholder, category B. 
Category A countries mentioned problems in planning for vaccine logistics of 
distribution and delivery across their sub-national regions. They reported that 
the process needed to be more centralized and comprehensive as there was 
confusion as where the responsibility of national government stops and when 
regions start their authority. Two category B countries reported the need for a 
more comprehensive vaccination planning before the pandemic to reduce the 
chaos during the response. 
7.4 Theme three: Capacity Building  
 
The third major theme emerged from the interview was capacity building. 
Multiple capacity facets need to be assessed and addressed prior to a 
pandemic and monitored during the response in order to properly plan useful 
pandemic preparedness activities and to achieve effective pandemic response 
goals, respectively. Financial, equipment, medicine and human resource 
capacities were particularly needed to increase pandemic preparedness 
efficiency. Activities related to capacity building before the pandemic were 
considered important to respond adequately to a pandemic. These were 
further analysed into four subcategories:  
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7.4.1 Training as a useful activity before pandemic 
All countries reported that staff training was a crucial pre-pandemic 
requirement. This training was specific to a generally low baseline knowledge 
concerning potential differences between pandemic and seasonal influenza. 
7.4.1.1 Staff training on laboratory diagnostics  
 ÒWe trained our virologists on diagnostic techniques including virus 
isolation in cell culture and rt-PCR. In addition, we trained them on types of 
specimens, transportation, and disinfection practices, and antiviral sensitivity 
screening to detect resistant strainsÓ, commented a SNGA stakeholder, 
category A. 
ÒWe renovated three laboratories, purchased equipment (some were 
donated), and then we started training our virologists. Although they have 
good experience, the virologists from regions did not have expertise 
concerning PCR technique. Therefore, the virologists had several PCR and 
biosafety trainings, and the trainings courses were conducted several times to 
provide the sufficient knowledgeÓ, commented a secondary HCW, category 
C. 
Training on laboratory diagnostic techniques was mentioned to be crucial 
pandemic preparedness activity for all countries. These activities were 
performed to build hospitals capacity regarding influenza virus laboratory 
confirmation, antiviral sensitivity, and laboratory surveillance reporting 
networks.  
 138 
7.4.1.2 Healthcare workers training  
ÒBy March 2006 the sub-national health administration at the central part of 
the country began a training course in order to provide training and 
technical guidelines to health care workers, clinical and non-clinical staff. 
We provided the core training and clinical guidelines to more than 1000 
health care workers during 2006-2007Ó, commented SNGA stakeholder, 
category B 
ÒOur MOH conducted staff awareness campaigns to educate us on the basic 
differences between seasonal and pandemic influenza, use of antiviral 
medication as treatment and prophylaxis, infection control practices in 
outbreak setting, and ethical considerationsÓ, commented secondary HCW 
stakeholder, category C. 
Sub-national authorities in all countries realised the importance of healthcare 
workers training on case definition, clinical management, and the use of 
pharmaceutical measures. Sub-national authorities with the support from 
national government and the World Health Organization provided training 
sessions and clinical management guidelines to primary and secondary 
healthcare workers to increase their capacity to diagnose and treat pandemic 
influenza. 
7.4.1.3 Training on business continuity planning  
ÒWe have a colleague who is on vacation now, she spent a lot of time going 
to companies to make informative sessions, education sessions, to help them 
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to make their own contingency plans,Ó commented a CER stakeholder, 
category B. 
ÒWe at CER recognised the differences between influenza pandemic and 
other types of disasters. We trained our clients on the importance of having a 
BCP and about the importance of testing and updating it regularly. We 
focused on the complexity of pandemic influenza and how this should be 
addressed during the planning and response stages. We trained staff on the 
importance of identifying key personnel and the significance of staff 
resilience during health emergencesÓ, commented a CER stakeholder, 
category A. 
National authorities organized training sessions on non-health sector planning 
in companies and other businesses to assist them in their pandemic planning 
activities. A category B country organized regular visits to small and medium 
enterprises to monitor their pandemic planning progress and gave some input 
and feedback regarding their performance. Category A countries raised staff 
awareness regarding BCP and how this should work before and during 
influenza pandemic. 
7.4.2 Useful activities implemented before the pandemic 
7.4.2.1 Surveillance as an important infrastructure  
ÒWe have a comprehensive system of influenza surveillance. We use data 
from a variety of sources such as primary healthcare physicians, emergency 
rooms, national and local labs, and hospital data on mortality and morbidity. 
Seasonal influenza in our country forms the basis for pandemic influenza. 
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However, during the pandemic we used the same system; though the 
objectives were different. Therefore, we did not get data on time and we 
missed important information too. We needed to establish a flexible system 
that can be adapted according to the situationÓ, commented a NPHA 
stakeholders, category A. 
ÒSurveillance system was used to detect and monitor new cases of pandemic. 
Next time we would collect less but more comprehensive data important for 
policy and decision makersÓ, commented a SNGA stakeholders, category B. 
ÒIn January 2009, we established a sentinel surveillance system in three 
regions in our country. The sentinel surveillance system works fully in two 
regions now. In addition, the lab in the third region will start working soon. 
So currently we have one in north and one in south, Òcommented an MOH 
stakeholder, category C.  
National authorities in all seven countries identified surveillance of seasonal 
influenza as a basic capacity building activity to detect and monitor 
healthcare burden of pandemic influenza. This means that having a well 
organized and efficient surveillance system in place for seasonal influenza 
will assist to respond to future pandemics. Category A and B countries 
reported that a more flexible surveillance system was needed before the 
pandemic to allow for timey and accurate data collection. 
7.4.2.2 Antivirals, antibiotics and personal protective equipment (PPE) 
ÒOne of the most useful things we did before the 2009 pandemic was antiviral 
stockpiling. It could be used for treatment in secondary and primary care as 
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well as prophylaxis in the community. We devolved this to our SNGA but this 
needed to be more centralized in the futureÓ commented an NPHA 
stakeholder, category A. 
ÒWe implemented certain activities at the national level before the pandemic 
such as antiviral and antibiotic stockpiling as well as personal protective 
equipment which helped us a lot during our response to pandemic influenza 
last yearÓ, commented an MOH stakeholder, category B. 
Ò Antiviral, PPE, ventilators, oxygen tubes, and antibiotics stockpiles were 
useful activities before the pandemic because I canÕt imagine starting from 
scratch during the actual pandemic. Delivery systems did not work properly 
at the start of pandemic and there were significant delays and as you know 
antiviral need to be administrated within 48 hours to be most effective. We 
need to look at this in the next stepÓ, commented an MOH stakeholder, 
category C. 
Antibiotics and PPE were distributed to national and sub-national medical 
centres and hospitals during the pandemic (H1N1) in 2009. Countries 
reported that antiviral stockpiling before the pandemic was a very useful 
action as these stockpiles are the only therapeutic and prophylactic measure 
against widespread infection since influenza vaccine production and 
distribution can take several months. Operational guidelines pertinent to 
antivirals distribution and delivery need to be addressed before the pandemic 
to ensure timely arrival to clients in hospitals and outpatient clinics. 
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7.4.2.3 Advance vaccine purchase agreements 
ÒWe were the first country in Europe to have an advance purchasing contract 
for a pandemic vaccine with the pharmaceutical companies in our countryÓ, 
commented an MOH stakeholder, category A. 
ÒWe initiated joint procurement agreements after the pandemic and this 
should be coordinated beforehand to ensure solidarity among member 
statesÓ, commented a NPHA stakeholder, category B. 
ÒOur vaccination programme relied entirely on donations from donor 
governments and vaccine manufacturersÓ, commented an MOH stakeholder, 
category C. 
Acquirement of advanced vaccine agreements was considered to enhance the 
capacity for a good pandemic response because several months are needed 
before a pandemic vaccine become available and distributed to the global 
community. However, stakeholders stated that these contracts should have 
been more flexible and this need to be addressed in the revised plans. Less 
prepared countries reported reliance on donations from other countries and 
industry. 
7.4.3 Useful actions for enhancing capacity building 
7.4.3.1 Expert groups 
ÒThe most important thing is that we have expertise to plan and respond to 
outbreaks professionally. We built on years of experience gained from SARS 
and avian influenza preparedness and planningÓ, commented an MOH 
stakeholder, category A. 
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ÒOur national pandemic committee was supported by a group of experts. This 
group gave us technical input and helped us review the scientific evidence of 
pandemic influenzaÒ, commented an MOH stakeholder, category B. 
Ò Experts from MOH supported pandemic planning initiatives as part of their 
day to day duties and we did not have dedicated experts to help us. They were 
overwhelmed sometimesÓ, commented a NPHA stakeholder, category C. 
Expert groups were considered by all countries as an important asset to direct 
the process of capacity building during pandemic planning and preparedness 
period. Category A countries dedicated expert groups to write up and revise 
pandemic national plans and related guidelines; this step increased the 
potency of country-specific capacity building activities supported by the plan. 
7.4.3.2 The national plan act as a framework to sub-national and hospital 
planning activities  
ÒThe hospital plan flows from the National Plan and is adapted to the 
specifics of the given hospitalÓ, commented a SNGA stakeholder, category A. 
Ò The plan provided us with tools and checklist rather than hundred of pages. 
We found this useful when we developed our regionÕs planÓ, commented a 
SNGA, category B. 
All countries reported that national pandemic plan provided an overarching 
strategy and framework for the lower administrative levels to ensure more 
effective planning happens at sub-national and local levels. Stakeholders 
found checklists and tools are more important than the detailed plans that 
cannot be followed exactly.  
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7.4.4 Under planning of certain capacity building activities 
7.4.4.1 Lack of hospital surveillance for severe outcomes 
ÒQ: So can I ask the last question here about the surveillance in hospitals? A: 
It was not implemented despite the fact it was in part one of the national 
framework plan. The infrastructure to do it might have been there, but it was 
not identified until the situation really arose,Ó commented an NPHA 
stakeholder, category A. 
Ò We overlooked collecting data in secondary healthcare setting and this 
impaired our capacity to monitor the impact of the pandemic in terms of 
mortality and morbidity. In addition, this diminished our capacity informing 
policy makers regarding high-risk groups. This needs to be addressed in the 
next planÓ, commented a MOH stakeholder, category B. 
National health authorities in all countries reported the lack of surveillance 
capacity for hospitalized patients. Hospital surveillance is an important 
preparedness measure to identify risk groups eligible for vaccination during a 
pandemic. Category A countries started collecting data on hospitalised cases 
and deaths as soon as the pandemic unfolded; however the network was not 
working properly since the system to collect and analyse data was not in place 
before the pandemic in 2009. 
7.4.4.2 Shortage of Intensive Care Unit (ICU) equipment  
ÒOn hospital level; ICU machines were lacking as they are expensive. 
Currently, we are trying to increase the number of ventilation equipmentÓ 
commented a secondary HCW stakeholder, category B. 
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ÒThere seems to be lack of ICU equipment for children. Few hospitals in our 
region have them, but many other hospitals do not,Ó commented a SNGA 
stakeholder, category A. 
Ò A number of kids died in our hospital because we were not able to offer 
them ICU beds because we lack the capacityÓ, commented a secondary HCW 
stakeholder, category C 
Planning for ICU capacity building before the pandemic was underdeveloped 
in all countries. The lack of ICU equipment particularly for children had a 
negative impact on the management of the hospitalised cases and led to a 
higher mortality rates among children in a number of countries. 
7.5 Theme four:  Mutual Support 
 
Support was identified as a fourth theme during interviews. International and 
national support can be obtained and provided in different forms. The below 
mentioned key sub-themes were considered important: 
7.5.1. Guidance documents were useful pandemic activities before and 
after the pandemic 
7.5.1.1 Support from the international organizations and other countries 
Ò We and our neighbouring countries exchanged plans and related guidelines 
to ensure inter-operability,Ó commented a CER stakeholder, category A. 
 ÒWe received guidelines and support through WHO country office and 
ECDCÓ, commented NPHA stakeholder, category B. 
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ÒWe looked at other plans. I still have some old French plans in my office.  
We looked for sure at the Canadian plans,Ó commented an NPHA 
stakeholder, category B. 
ÒMainly we used the WHO global plan and checklist along with CDC Atlanta 
guidelines. In addition, expert groups provided us some examples of other 
countries that had developed a plan, as an example for us to see,Ó commented 
an MOH stakeholder, category C. 
Pandemic preparedness support provided by guidance documents was 
considered highly essential for good pandemic preparation and response. 
National stakeholders received guidance documents and checklists from 
international organizations that provided support for pandemic planning and 
preparedness. Category C countries were supported by the WHO, European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and United States Centre for 
Disease Control and Prevention pandemic guidelines. However, countries in 
categories A and B were less dependent on support from international 
organizations. The WHO guidance documents for pandemic planning, clinical 
management and methodological and technical guidelines were widely used 
by national stakeholders as a framework to develop country-specific plans. 
This guidance continued after the start of the pandemic. In addition, countries 
from category B and C reported that the ability to access published pandemic 
plans from other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
proximal neighbours, was also useful to address inconsistencies. Category B 
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countries reported working with other countries to ensure plans are 
interoperable.  
7.5.1.2 Support from national authorities  
ÒSince planning is delegated at our region, we have a WHO liaison person 
and she provided us with planning guidelines, answered queries, and even 
provided us with epidemiologic updates on the global status of the 
pandemicÓ, commented SNGA, category A. 
Ò We shared our plans and policy documents with our neighbouring region 
and we found this useful exercise and we would like to do more inter-regional 
coordination in the futureÓ, commented a secondary HCW, category A. 
ÒDid the MOH provide input to the development of the non-health sector 
plan? A: Yes, of course. They sent us all the technical documents we asked for 
and they supervised our planning activities in a direct wayÓ, commented a 
CER stakeholder, category B. 
ÒQ: Did the MOH also help the regions to develop sub-national capacities 
before the pandemic? A: Yes, of course. Q: What kind of support did you 
receive from MOH? Methodological guidance was provided, instructions, 
technical guidance documents, orders, booklets with description of influenza 
that we distributed among the health facilities and the population, bus stops, 
kindergartens, etc.Ó, commented SNGA stakeholder, category C. 
Sub-national tiers in all countries relied mainly on technical and 
methodological guidelines, frameworks, strategy and policy documents 
provided by their national tiers but also made direct use of the support 
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materials from the WHO, European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control, and neighbouring countries. In countries where planning was 
devolved, SNGA worked with each other as well as they received direct 
support from international organizations. In terms of non-health planning 
support, interviewees reported that MOH and NPHA provided important 
guidelines and support for the development of business continuity plans. 
7.5.1.3 Supporting healthcare workers  
 ÒMOH published on intranet the clinical management guidelines and 
treatment protocols to support HCWs. We received case definition, 
recommendations on clinical specimens, and how to use antiviral drugs in 
different age groupsÓ, commented a secondary HCW stakeholder, category 
A. 
ÒWe provided technical guidelines to healthcare workers and clinical staff in 
our region. It was important to provide information during peacetime, and 
when the war began we were quite prepared,Ó commented a SNGA 
stakeholder, category B. 
ÒWe supported our healthcare professionals via technical guidance 
documents and protocols on infection control and respiratory precautions 
practices during outbreaks of influenzaÓ commented a SNGA, category C. 
Healthcare workers received different treatment guidelines before the 
pandemic start and they were found to be useful in guiding treatment and 
infection control practices in hospitals. These were national and sub-national 
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plans, other pandemic guidelines, WHO guidelines, vaccination plans and 
treatment protocols. 
7.5.2 Under planning of financial support   
ÒWe funded an independent expert group of consultants to write up the 
national pandemic plan and to coordinate the planning process across 
different organizations. This included exercising and revising plans too. This 
group was a devoted group to pandemic preparedness and they showed real 
commitment to this jobÓ, commented an MOH stakeholder, category A.  
ÒThere is no finance allocated for development of the plan. It is done free of 
charge. It is part of our day-to-day jobÓ, commented an NPHA stakeholder, 
category B. 
ÒWe have made financial allocations to implement our pandemic plans, these 
funds were used to buy antiviral stockpiles and personal protective 
equipmentÓ, commented an MOH stakeholder category C. 
The countries in categories B and C stated that preparation of the plan and 
guidelines was not financially supported by international, national or sub-
national government bodies and was considered a routine activity to be 
included within existing budgets; only category A countries funded dedicated 
expert groups to prepare their national plans. However, all countries allocated 
funds for plan implementation and inter-pandemic phase activities, such as 
surveillance networks, personal protective equipment, vaccines and antiviral 
drugs. 
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7.5.3 Under planning for support in certain areas: 
7.5.3.1 Political support in funding pandemic preparedness  
ÒNext time, I would like to see more involvement of the finance committee in 
the parliament in order to make them aware and involve them actively in the 
tough decisions regarding the risk of overspending and the risk of under 
protectionÓ, commented an NPHA stakeholder, category A. 
ÒOur government showed a great deal of interest and commitment to 
pandemic preparedness. But when it comes to money regarding antiviral 
medication stockpiling and immunisation contracts, we face objections and 
challenges all the timeÓ, commented an NPHA stakeholder, category B. 
ÒWe realize that we have a long list of competing and urgent priorities. A 
high-level political involvement and commitment is necessary to ensure 
dedicated budget lines both for development as well as implementation of the 
plansÓ, commented a NPHA stakeholder, category C. 
A number of countries mentioned that more political support was needed 
regarding financing the planning activities and to involve politicians in some 
critical decisions on money spending issues. Countries stated that government 
showed interest and put pandemic preparedness high on the political agenda 
but financing the preparedness and planning activities was an issue in certain 
countries. 
7.5.3.2 More support is required from the WHO regarding data sharing 
ÒThere was a problem with receiving data on new cases and the total number 
of cases. And, unfortunately, neither WHO nor other sources provided this 
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information in a timely mannerÓ, commented an NPHA stakeholder, category 
A. 
Ò We would like to see timely collection and sharing of surveillance data in a 
more standardized and coordinated patterns to ensure appropriate and 
evidence informed decision makingÓ, commented an MOH stakeholder, 
category A. 
Ò Next time we would like to get more guidance on how to conduct a proper 
risk assessment and what is the minimum data set required to do thisÓ, 
commented an NPHA stakeholder, category B. 
Category A countries reported poor support and delays from the WHO and 
other international organizations in providing real-time clinical and 
epidemiological data during the pandemic response. Country B countries 
asked for more support on how to document proper risk assessment using 
surveillance data to inform decision-making and outbreak response 
management. 
7.6 Theme five: Leadership 
 
Leadership was identified as an important part of countryÕs pandemic 
preparedness and planning efforts during interviews across all level of 
preparedness. For successful pandemic preparation and responding to a 
pandemic, coordinated actions and communications by all levels of 
government and all segments of society from the countries need to be 
undertaken through a variety of different, but complementary, leadership 
 152 
roles.  Issues and activities considered important for pandemic preparedness 
leadership among countries are discussed below. 
7.6.1 Sectoral lead roles during pandemic preparedness planning 
7.6.1.1 Pandemic planning committee as a useful planning activity 
ÒThe pandemic committee at the national level consists of the best of our 
scientists and policy makers who started the process of developing, 
exercising, maintaining, and translating those documents into practice. Their 
role was fundamental to get our preparedness activities startedÓ, commented 
a NPHA stakeholder, category A. 
ÒWe started our pandemic planning activities by creating a national 
pandemic planning committee which was responsible for leading on 
organizing, implementing, and exercising the national pandemic planÓ 
commented an MOH stakeholder, category B. 
ÒNational pandemic committee was essential to ensure even preparedness 
across the country and was essential to bring health and non-health sectors 
from different administrative levels togetherÓ, commented MOH stakeholder, 
category C. 
Countries across all categories mentioned that national pandemic 
preparedness starts by creating national pandemic planning committee from 
various stakeholders to supervise, organize, and lead on the writing and 
implementation of the pandemic plans and associated guidelines. This group 
is instrumental to decide on the mechanisms of pandemic planning and 
planning process.  
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7.6.1.2 Lead roles during national pandemic planning 
ÒExpert group within NPHA led the planning processÓ, commented an NPHA 
stakeholder, category A. 
ÒThe lead institution was NPHA during national pandemic planning,Ó 
commented an NPHA stakeholder, category B. 
 ÒIt was agreed that MOH leads on BCP regarding preparing non-health 
institutions to pandemic influenza and this worked very well during 2009 
because of the mild nature of pandemic. I donÕt know what could have 
happened if the pandemic turned to be more severeÓ, commented an MOH 
stakeholder, category B. 
Ò MOH supported by the NPHA led the national pandemic planning activities 
Ò, commented an MOH stakeholder, category C. 
Ò Our CER agency led the planning and response phases for BCP in airports 
and portsÓ, commented a CER stakeholder, Category C. 
The institution that led the pandemic planning committee and the other 
preparedness activities at the national level was the MOH and/or NPHA in all 
countries except a category A country where an independent group of experts 
was leading the planning process. It is worth saying that NPHA in a number 
of countries in the WHO European Region is working under the umbrella of 
the MOH or as a department within the MOH according to the organizational 
structure of the healthcare system in each county. The business continuity 
planning for non-health services was led by the Ministry of the Interior in 
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category C countries and the NPHA and MOH countries in categories A and 
B. 
7.6.1.3 Lead roles during sub-national and hospital planning  
ÒGovernor of the region was leading the planning process in our localityÓ, 
commented a SNGA, country A. 
Ò We are a big country, leadership was devolved to SNGAs and we provided 
funding and technical support. We feel that certain decisions and 
responsibilities should be more centralized. We should have exercised the 
plan to discover these areasÓ, commented NPHA stakeholder, category B 
ÒThe lead institution was the NPHA. They headed both the planning and 
preparedness and infectious diseases control teams. This works well in our 
small country to keep things tight and focused, Òcommented a SNGA 
stakeholder, category C. 
Sub-national planning leadership varied between countries, with the central 
government authorities assuming leadership roles in category C countries, 
and regional government mostly leading sub-national pandemic preparedness 
actions in countries in categories A and B. Country A countries reported that 
certain elements should have stayed more centralized; these were decisions to 
implement mass vaccinations and antivirals and vaccines logistics. Countries 
in categories A and B commended the effective role of the sub-national 
government on leading hospital planning activities in terms of on-going 
follow-up and introducing legislation to require hospital preparedness. 
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7.6.2 Actions considered useful by countries for effective pandemic 
preparedness planning through leadership 
7.6.2.1 Political commitment  
ÒDo you think there was enough political commitment to the preparedness 
activities? A: Yes. There was sufficient assistance and support from the 
government to enforce all our policy decisions like school closures Ò, 
commented an NPHA stakeholder, category B. 
Ò Political commitment was instrumental to facilitate the planning and 
implementation processes. The government officials kept following up with us 
via MOH regarding the status of our country preparedness and they issued 
decrees and orders to make it a legal obligation for all sectors to be involved 
actively to make the nation well prepared. We had a comprehensive approval 
processÓ, commented a SNGA stakeholder, category C. 
Countries across al categories stated that strong government political 
commitment combined with efficient governmental approval processes 
through orders and decrees were useful factors. 
7.6.2.2 National government following up sub-national planning activities 
 ÒThe MOH was following up on our sub-national planning process. We 
developed, for instance, the first draft, submitted it to the Ministry of Health 
and in the Ministry there was a special working group or commission as they 
call it, and they revised it and sent it back to us,Ó commented a SNGA 
stakeholder, category B. 
ÒEvery region and every municipality have to send regular updates to the 
NPHA about what are they doing regarding pandemic planning and how are 
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they preparing to do it and it is then checked in here for missing or unclear 
sections,Ó, commented a NPHA stakeholder, category B. 
At sub-national level, countries stated that having orders and decrees; strict 
supervision and close follow up of the leading group of experts at the national 
government to be instrumental during sub-national planning process. The 
national pandemic planning committee also provided comments and technical 
feedback to the sub-national authorities regarding their pandemic planning 
activities. 
7.6.2.3 Strong sub-national leadership on hospital planning  
ÒSub-national administration obligates hospitals in certain region to do 
things in certain time frame to work and was the case in our region. While in 
other regions, this process was optional and they have many problems during 
the response in their hospitals,Ó commented a secondary HCW stakeholder, 
category A. 
Hospital doctors mentioned that solid leadership and direction by sub-national 
planning committee were major success factor during hospital planning 
process. Moreover, countries in categories A and B reported on the effective 
role of the sub-national government on leading hospital planning activities in 
terms of on-going follow-up and introducing legislation to require hospital 
preparedness  
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7.6.3 Expectation from WHO as a leader on pandemic preparedness  
7.6.3.1 WHO data collection and reporting network  
ÒI think more simple reporting system was needed. We do not need to go to 
three databases during the pandemic. ItÕs WHO Europe, WHO Geneva, and 
ECDCÓ, commented an MOH stakeholder, category A. 
ÒThe other thing on the management part is that we donÕt need the WHO to 
give us so much information. We were overloaded but we need the WHO to 
give us distilled and up to date detailed informationÓ, commented an NPHA 
stakeholder, category B. 
Category A and B countries reported being confused during the response 
phase because of complex reporting system with poor guidelines on data 
sharing. Moreover, they complained of information overload during the 
response and asked for distilled and up to date detailed information. No data 
is available for category C countries. 
7.6.3.2 WHO reaction to the pandemic 
ÒLess panic from WHO was required and we think it was an overreactionÓ, 
commented an MOH stakeholder, category A. 
Category A countries criticized the leading role of the WHO during the 
response and reported that the WHO overreacted to the 2009 pandemic and 
that there should have been more field investigation prior to announcing 
phase 6. Moreover, category A countries requested additional transparency 
regarding scientific advice that was provided. This was not reported in 
category B and C countries.  
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7.6.3.3 WHO leadership role for future pandemic preparedness  
Ò We want WHO to coordinate and regulate joint procurement for antiviral 
and immunisationÓ, commented a MOH stakeholder, category B. 
ÒWe were just discussing this issue. For the future, I think we need WHO 
support to help us building our pharmaceutical capacity. We require more 
training from WHO particularly on specific issues such as communicable 
diseases control and risk communication. In addition, we need WHO 
contribution to the translation of important documentsÓ, commented an 
NPHA stakeholder, category C. 
Ò We wanted WHO to help us buying antiviral medications and coordination 
donations for vaccinations next time. All donated vaccines arrived late in 
pandemicÓ, commented a secondary HCW, category C. 
Countries in category C and a category B country expected WHO to lead on 
capacity building matters such as antibiotics, antivirals and vaccine related 
issues for future pandemic planning. While, the rest of countries asked for 
more training on risk communication mainly with media and how to build 
trust with the public and HCWs, workshops, technical guidelines and 
translation of technical and operational documents.  
7.7 Theme six:  Adaptation and flexibility in pandemic planning 
 
The effectiveness of pandemic plans can be measured according to their 
adaptability and flexibility. Pandemic plans need to be flexible in the sense 
that they allow for adaptation of appropriate measures to be undertaken 
during the response according to the actual situation on the ground rather than 
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documented scenarios and geographical spread. The below-mentioned points 
demonstrate different aspects of pandemic preparedness activities, plans and 
guidelines in which flexibility was necessary for countries to respond 
effectively to the 2009 pandemic. 
7.7.1 Revision of pandemic plans before the pandemic 
ÒThe plan was revised because of multi-stakeholders meetings we had about 
pandemic. We clearly needed a new guidance for the new type of influenza 
virus, a document that would bring together activities of multiple agencies. 
We used the expertise from local and international expertsÓ, commented an 
MOH stakeholder, category B. 
ÒIt was a dynamic document which is revised regularlyÓ, commented an 
NPHA stakeholder, category A. 
National pandemic plans for two countries from category A and two countries 
from category B were revised before the pandemic at the national level. The 
revision of the plan was triggered by stakeholdersÕ discussion regarding 
aspects of the plan needed to be changed to increase its usefulness. Plan 
revision by countries in category A was considered to be an on-going and 
dynamic process. Whereas, plan revision by category B countries was 
triggered by vaccination logistics problems identified from national pandemic 
exercises. 
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7.7.2 Planning scenarios 
 ÒWe also studied international experience and made our approximate 
estimations. We expected 70-80% attack rate and that approximately 50% of 
infected would dieÓ, commented an NPHA stakeholder, category C. 
ÒDifferent range of planning scenarios from our previous outbreak 
experience was adoptedÓ, commented an MOH stakeholder, category B. 
All countries included the worst-case scenario from 1918 pandemic in their 
pandemic planning scenarios. Category C countries based their planning on a 
scenario of a 30% and a 70-80% attack rates. A category B country based its 
plan on multiple scenarios of 30%, 40% and 50% clinical attack rates and 
additionally used excess hospitalization capacity as a scenario. Two other 
countries from category B mentioned using a mixture of scenarios for 
pandemic planning without giving exact estimates. Similarly, category A 
countries reported using flexible and adjustable planning scenarios without 
mentioning exact figures. 
7.7.3 Useful actions for flexible planning and response 
7.7.3.1 New documents developed during the response 
ÒYou know an important thing was, when WHO provided us with the clinical 
treatment protocols for pregnant women or children, those protocols did not 
work here. So our specialists had to use the WHO guidance to develop a new 
guidance for usÓ, commented an MOH stakeholder, category B. 
During the pandemic response, new documents and strategies were created 
during the pandemic response, as they were not envisaged during the 
planning stage. Two countries form category A and category B developed 
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new protocols for vaccination logistics and specific clinical guidelines for 
new risk groups (pregnant women and children). They said WHO guidelines 
were too long and complex for frontline health practitioners and they had to 
produce more condensed documents with flow charts on indications, 
contraindications, dosing, and severity of illness. These were more acceptable 
and worked well in hospitals and clinics. Pandemic (H1N1) information 
updates and clinical guidance for diagnostic differentiation were also 
developed by countries from category B and C. 
7.7.3.2 Adaptation of pandemic plans  
ÔÔWell, it really doesnÕt matter which declared phase we are in, we had to 
take measures that were appropriate and are based on the actual situation [in 
the country] and not in Mexico or elsewhereÕÕ, commented a primary HCW 
stakeholder, category A. 
Ò Because the impact of the pandemic was milder than what we anticipated 
and planned for, we had to rewrite our influenza immunisation strategies 
during the pandemic. Consequently, primary HCWs were to immunize high-
risk groups rather than setting up flu clinics to implement mass immunisation 
for the whole population, This caused some confusions as this was not 
something we discussed before the pandemicÓ, commented a SNGA 
stakeholder, category B. 
Ò Since the start of the pandemic, we realized that mass immunisation 
campaigns would not be needed and therefore we tweaked the plan to allow 
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primary HCWs to do it for certain risk groupsÓ, commented a primary 
HCWs, category B. 
National authorities were forced to adapt their plan framework to the context 
of the 2009 pandemic, which was milder than that which had been anticipated 
and planned for. The issue of mass vaccination logistics was a recurrent 
problematic theme encountered at national and sub-national levels that had 
access to pandemic vaccine. Countries in categories A and B originally 
planned to vaccinate their entire population via mass campaigns. During the 
pandemic these countries modified their strategies to vaccinate only those 
groups at risk of severe disease. This was done because it was obvious that 
the pandemic was milder than what had been expected. This modification 
indicated, for example, that the responsibility for vaccinating the public 
devolved from the national level to the primary healthcare sector. Hence, 
vaccination strategies were rewritten during the pandemic. Moreover, case 
definition and treatment protocols were regularly adapted to prevailing 
clinical circumstances; many hospitals adapted their own plan into a more 
concise and user-friendly version. No data was available for category C 
countries. 
7.7.4 Under planning in certain areas  
7.7.4.1 Lack of flexibility in WHO phases 
ÒWHO phases were too strict and was reflecting geographical spread not 
severity, this caused confusion to our response activitiesÓ, commented an 
NPHA stakeholder, category A. 
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ÒWe developed our own risk assessment during the pandemic based on our 
local data and we used WHO data to inform our decision making and 
response measuresÓ, commented a primary HCW stakeholder, category B. 
Ò We followed the WHO phases to the letter and we found this very detailed 
and challenging and irrelevant to the flu activity in our region. It is better to 
have less details and more than one planning assumption to be implemented 
at different times in different places in a same country. An example on this 
would be containment strategiesÓ, commented a secondary HCW 
stakeholder, category C. 
The lack of flexibility in WHO phase criteria and the countriesÕ national plans 
was a recurrent issue throughout the pandemic. Measures applicable to each 
pandemic phase were overly specific and focused on the global situation to be 
relevant within an individual country. Stakeholders at the national level from 
countries in categories A and B adjusted their response according to the 
actual situation and did not adhere to the WHO phases and requested a more 
flexible guidance document for future pandemic planning from the WHO. In 
contrast, category C countries followed the WHO phase guidelines precisely 
and faced the aforementioned challenges.  
7.7.4.2 Containment phase was difficult to be continued for a long time 
ÒContainment activities such as contact tracing and contact management 
were very difficult to be carried out for a long time as the sub-national 
resources were exhausted. We also heard this from our colleagues in the 
UKÓ, commented a NPHA stakeholder, category B. 
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ÒContainment was not feasible because the novel virus was already 
spreading and causing outbreaks in the population. We followed the WHO 
phases precisely during containment but this did not work for us as different 
countries were at different stagesÓ, commented a primary HCW stakeholder, 
category C. 
During the response to the pandemic a number of countries highlighted the 
problem of long containment phase that was both time and resource intensive. 
Stakeholders at national and sub-national tiers who share this view mentioned 
that resources required for containment activities and contact tracing need to 
be identified beforehand.  
7.8 Conclusion  
 
The findings identified a number of consistent themes, which highlight areas 
of good practice and areas where further development is needed in the 
aftermath of the 2009 pandemic. These were distributed across six major 
recurring and interdependent themes. The findings suggest that in general 
these were mostly in place prior to the 2009 pandemic and they did aid the 
response to influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in 2009. However, it was equally 
clear from our analysis that a subset of pandemic preparedness activities did 
not work well or were under developed when the 2009 pandemic occurred. 
Table 5 provides a summary of the good practices and shortcomings in all of 
the countries that participated in the study. 
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Table 5 Summary of good practices and gaps identified in the study 
Theme  Successes  Challenges 
Communication ¥ Raising Public 
awareness 
¥ Multi-sectoral 
meetings 
¥ Plan 
dissemination  
¥ Communication 
Primary HCW  
¥ Poor risk 
communication 
¥ Communication 
with the media 
Coordination ¥ Command and 
control structure 
¥ National and 
sub-national 
coordination 
group 
¥ Exercises  
¥ Inter-regional 
coordination 
¥ Vaccine 
procurement and 
logistics 
 
Capacity Building ¥ Training 
¥ Expert groups 
¥ National plan 
¥ Surveillance, 
antivirals, and 
PPE 
¥ Hospital 
surveillance  
¥ Advanced vaccine 
contracts 
¥ ICU equipment 
Mutual Support ¥ Guidance 
documents 
¥ Finance 
implementations 
¥ Different 
administrative 
levels support 
¥ Funding planning 
activities and 
expert groups 
¥ WHO data sharing 
Leadership  ¥ Political 
commitment 
¥ Pandemic 
planning 
committee 
¥ National and 
sub-national 
leading roles 
 
¥ WHO data 
collection and 
reporting network 
¥ WHO reaction to 
pandemic 
  
Adaptability/Flexibility  ¥ Revision of 
plans 
¥ New documents  
¥ Adapting 
response to the 
actual situation 
¥ Lack of flexibility 
in WHO phases 
¥ Containment 
activities 
¥ Pandemic planning 
scenarios  
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The pandemic in 2009 was the first pandemic to have occurred in the era of 
modern pandemic planning. Although at the time of writing many evaluations 
of pandemic response have now been performed or are underway (European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2012), to the best of our 
knowledge this is the only evaluation that has explicitly focused on the 
usefulness of pandemic preparedness activity planning, rather than the 
response measures themselves. We intentionally used a randomized sampling 
framework and accepted social science evaluation methodologies to 
maximize the rigor of the study findings. 
The following discussion sections are based both on the key findings from the 
evaluation derived from the stakeholder group interviews and on the results 
that have been discussed and endorsed by the participant countries during the 
workshop on the evaluation of how pandemic preparedness activities aided 
response to the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in 2009 in countries in the 
WHO European Region held in Copenhagen (Denmark), 20-22 October 2010. 
Delegates participated in the workshop were derived from the same 
stakeholder groups interviewed for this study, and therefore the aggregated 
findings presented and discussed in the workshop were similar to their 
opinions. Their input was used to refine the results before publishing the 
WHO recommendations for good practice in pandemic preparedness. 
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8.2 Development of public health management of communicable diseases 
 
Infectious disease outbreaks in the past have led to a gradually coordinated 
centralised approach to disease control and prevention. Literature describes 
how care for sick people evolved beyond family and religious authorities into 
the responsibility of governments and public health authorities on central and 
local levels (Cipolla, 1973). In the Middle Ages, the Black Death was 
recognised as a contagious disease, and the only countermeasure employed 
was quarantine. During that period, patients were considered as public 
jeopardies and were expelled from the community. This was the basis of what 
is known now as public health countermeasures that is implemented to 
prevent the spread of infectious diseases (Porter, 1999). At that time 
authorities started building capacitates to report all infected victims and 
deaths to central and local authorities. The history of reporting infectious 
diseases is connected to the history of public health surveillance.  
Venice was the first state in Europe to attempt a coordinated public health 
response to epidemics of plague at that time (Simpson, 2010). The city 
council was responsible for the administration of day-to-day community 
activities as well as they provided leadership on disease prevention and 
protection of the community. The government of Venice determination and 
political commitment had led to the setup of a board of officials to supervise 
the health of the city which was the precursor of boards of health that were 
implemented centuries later (Porter, 1999). 
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The joint actions to protect public health that were implemented at that time 
show patterns that are very much in existence in our current public health 
programmes; interventions aimed at population health improvement, 
involvement of national and regional authorities, and potential for violation of 
individual rights to protect the public.  It is clear from the literature that the 
ruling classes and authorities during early history and the Middle Ages did 
not have proactive and functional preparations to respond to public health 
emergencies. Response countermeasures were predominantly immediate 
reactions to epidemics and they were directed at addressing only ill patients. 
There was no prior planning or clear vision of how to implement these public 
health response measures. While each country was trying to protect itself 
without communication or coordinating with the neighbouring countries, 
quarantine requirements were often redundant, imposing a great burden on 
commerce and travel. The nature of these epidemics helped to define the 
public health approach to disease later since they cannot be prevented 
successfully by addressing only ill persons (Nelson and Williams, 2007).  
In the recent centuries, public health authorities around the world based their 
response measures to outbreaks on scientific facts as well as on measures 
used to prevent and control outbreaks in medieval time to control the Black 
Death. The concept of contagion was the basis of most of the public health 
measures used at that time including quarantine and banning public 
gatherings. With more advances in epidemiology and microbiology fields, 
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health authorities implemented more advanced measures such as vaccinations 
and infection control campaigns in the previous two centuries (Spink, 1979). 
During the first pandemic of the twentieth century, public health systems 
were put under huge pressure as many of the prevention and control measures 
that were used previously proved to be futile in decreasing the mortality and 
morbidity rates in 1918-1919 pandemic. National and public health 
stakeholders in the United States and Europe implemented different public 
health countermeasures to stop the spread of the pandemic. They were able to 
notice the nature of human-to-human transmission via air and droplets and 
they based most of the measures taken at that time on this notion. They 
implemented quarantine measures as well as they tried to reduce mass 
gatherings and encouraged social distancing. It was believed by public health 
professionals that good ventilation was the best of all preventive measures 
especially during public and mass gatherings. As a result, public health 
measures such as quarantine or isolation were implemented. These signalled 
the start of provocative and authoritative interventions in terms of closing 
public organizations during outbreaks (Billings, 2005).  
In the Unites States and Europe, local health authorities varied in their power 
of authority that in turn led to the variability in strictness of implementation 
of these public health measures. In the Unites States, the American Public 
Health Association (APHA) recommended to restrict any form of mass 
gathering including sport events, ceremonies, bars, theaters and cinemas. 
However, religious ceremonies in churches were exempted and authorities 
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believed that only the least services should be carried out (American Public 
Health Association, 1918). On the other hand, measures in the UK were less 
strict as health officials allowed mass gathering in music performance, for 
instance, for a maximum of three hours with sometime between shows to 
allow for air circulation (Anon., 1918a). In Switzerland, sport events, music 
hall performance, ceremonies, and theaters were all banned during the 
pandemic that caused panic and fear among the public (Anon., 1918b).  
Health authorities started public health education campaigns to raise public 
awareness regarding ways stop the transmission of the virus and the 
importance of hand washing in reducing the spread of infection (Billings, 
2005). 
In terms of the more advanced public health preventive measures, mass 
vaccination was available for the first time during the following pandemics in 
1957 and subsequently in 1968. As concluded by Meiklejohn, three years 
after the 1957, vaccination programmes implemented during the pandemic 
were not effective to reach the level of protective immunity in the population. 
He suggested that two doses were required to protect vaccines with a 4-weeks 
interval (Meiklejohn, 1961). 
In contemporary history, international and national authorities executed 
pandemic preparedness activities for the past ten years due to increase 
awareness of the need of coordinated action and unified response to cross-
border public health threats. The re-emergence of avian influenza strain and 
SARS outbreak motivated countries to invest considerably in these activities. 
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These events produced high mortality and morbidity and caused severe social 
and economic consequences around the world. These events gave the 
impression that countries were unprepared yet for a global international 
health emergency and motivated the international community to implement 
the new International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO, 2008, Penn, 2011). 
8.3 Core principles for pandemic preparedness 
 
Developing, improving and maintaining preparedness for influenza pandemic 
is a high priority for all national governments and supra-national bodies 
responsible for communicable disease control and prevention. The European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and WHO support countries in 
improving their national pandemic influenza preparedness (Nicoll, 2010, 
Brown, 2013). WHO and European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control on their websites release updates and recommendations for good 
practice in pandemic planning and preparedness and conduct individual 
country assessments and workshops to enhance member statesÕ capacity to 
respond and manage pandemic influenza and other public health emergencies 
(European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control official website, n.d., 
WHO Europe official website, n.d.). 
 The broad aim of pandemic preparedness activity is to reduce transmission, 
hospital admissions, and mortality, maintain essential services, and reduce 
socioeconomic consequences (WHO, 2009f). The planning cycle starts with 
writing up and developing national plans and associated operational 
guidelines, exercising these plans regularly and to incorporate lessons into the 
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planning process, and translate into action these plans at different 
administrative levels. 
In the aftermath of the pandemic (H1N1) in 2009, individual countries started 
evaluating their own pandemic response and in the light of this, revise and re-
issue updated plans and frameworks, as well as continuing to undertake 
further pandemic preparedness actions (European Centre For Disease 
Prevention and Control, 2012). This study has been conducted in the WHO 
European Region to evaluate the extent to which pandemic planning activities 
proved useful and efficient and to identify areas of under planning.  The 
overall outcome was to ensure that activities collectively identified and 
documented (across a majority of countries) as worthwhile elements of 
pandemic planning are incorporated more or less as standard essential items 
across all countriesÕ pandemic plans. However, we did not assess the 
adequacy of individual country responses and public reflections as these were 
outside the scope of this study. 
Despite differences in the level of their preparedness prior to 2009  (European 
Centre For Disease Prevention and Control, 2007, Mounier-Jack and Coker, 
2006) and considerable geopolitical and political diversity between countries 
(Central Intelligence Agency official website, n.d.), we identified a number of 
consistent themes, which highlight areas of good practice and areas where 
further development is needed. These were distributed across six major 
recurring and interdependent themes. These findings suggest that it is possible 
to define essential elements for effective pandemic preparedness, namely: 
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multi-sectoral, cross-disciplinary approaches; political commitment; expert 
technical input (from individuals and supranational organizations); public 
awareness, the use of exercises and simulations; staff training; stockpiling in 
advance for drugs and personal protective equipment; regional and local tier 
involvement in pandemic planning and strong leadership. Our findings 
suggest that in general these were mainly in place prior to the 2009 pandemic. 
However, it was equally clear from our analysis that a subset of pandemic 
preparedness activities was under developed when the 2009 pandemic 
occurred.  The lack of flexibility in national pandemic plans and the poor 
linkage of WHO phases to practical action thresholds within individual 
countries are both illustrative of a general anticipation of a probable avian 
influenza pandemic. Paradoxically, however, the threat from H5N1 has not 
decreased and it would be unwise to modify plans to cope with only a mild 
pandemic event (World Health Organization, 2014). 
Moreover, countriesÕ guidelines and protocols changed too often and became 
too complex for end-users, regional and local plans, especially hospitals, were 
not well developed enough. In addition, operation planning pertinent to 
vaccine logistics including distribution and delivery was not adequately 
planned out. This has been highlighted in other reports and can be addressed 
by improved operational planning and the use of exercises especially at a sub-
national level (Nguyen-Van-Tam et al., 2010b, Mcllwain, 2010).  
Last but not least, it is widely documented that at the start of pandemic timely 
and high quality data on the emerging situation in Mexico and other early-
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affected countries were inadequate (Hashim et al, 2012). Accurate data on 
community cases were sparse, and reported data mainly from hastily 
assembled case series on hospitalized patients with severe H1N1 disease were 
lagging (Kumar et al, 2009, Nguyen-Van-Tam et al, 2010a). Paradoxically, 
the heath impact of the 2009 pandemic was mostly observed in secondary 
care settings. Our data illustrate widespread concerns that hospital 
surveillance of severe acute respiratory infection had been inadequately 
addressed during the pandemic planning process and required urgent remedial 
development. This deficiency had a negative impact during the pandemic 
response when critical data from secondary care were unavailable or 
unreliable. Surveillance of severe acute respiratory infections (SARI) is 
important to assess and monitor the mortality and morbidity of the pandemic 
in hospitals. The absence of these systems during the pandemic made it 
challenging to give regular updates to clinicians, decision makers, media, and 
the public. Data on mortality and patients who required intensive care were 
slow and inaccurate in countries interviewed for this study. Countries 
reported that these systems have to be in place during the inter-pandemic 
phase and should be tested every year. A minimum dataset on clinical, 
epidemiological, and demographic characteristics of the most severely 
infected patients has to be agreed upon in advance.  The following sections 
represent areas of good practice and core elements in pandemic preparedness: 
 175 
8.3.1 Leadership and national pandemic planning committee 
Pandemic influenza has the potential to cause high mortality and morbidity on 
international and national scales as well as potentially causing wide social and 
economic disruption. Therefore, solid leadership and political commitment in 
conducting pandemic preparedness activities are essential to cope with the 
complexity and impact of pandemic influenza. National health authorities 
may recognise pandemic preparedness as a priority on their political agendas 
with dedicated finance and human resources throughout the whole cycle of 
planning, implementation, and evaluation. However, this may be challenging 
for most governments since there are more urgent and competing priorities 
that may be prioritised over pandemic influenza. In category A and B 
countries, governments showed a high degree of commitment to support the 
planning and implementation of pandemic preparedness activities. Category 
C countries relied heavily on the support and donations provided by other 
countries and international organizations. All countries reported on the need 
of more engagement of politicians to ensure continuous and dedicated 
funding for pandemic preparedness. 
Emergency planning and response management is, of necessity, a hierarchical 
and top down process. Pandemic preparedness starts by creating a national 
pandemic planning committee at the government level to create the national 
pandemic preparedness policy (i.e. the national pandemic plan). Afterwards, 
the national plan and associated guidelines is disseminated to the lower 
authority levels for implementation. Countries reported that a top-down 
approach was essential to achieve effective and even response across all 
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regions. Countries also reported on the importance of having feedback 
channels in place to ask questions and to be actively involved with the 
decision making process (i.e. bottom-up approach). 
The responsibility of the national pandemic planning committee is crucial 
during planning and response phases (Mounier-Jack and Coker, 2006). The 
committee functions as a coordination body to prepare or continuously revise 
the national pandemic plan and relevant guidelines. During the planning 
phases, the committee works with all stakeholders to ensure a proper 
management process, well-structured chain of commands, and secure a 
dedicated budget for implementation of planning activities. The committee 
writes up the operational guidelines to aid health and non-health institutions 
to attain an effective and timely response (WHO, 2005a). Supporting the 
committee by providing adequate human and financial resources is essential 
to its work and productivity 
It is essential for the committee members to meet and communicate regularly 
throughout the planning process and discusses the process and steps to 
implement the pandemic planning activities. The implementation of the 
national pandemic plan serves as a comprehensive strategy to reduce the 
potential impact of pandemic influenza and it can serve as a framework to 
guide sub-national and local planning activities.  
8.3.2 Participatory planning 
The findings demonstrate that participatory planning is a useful and effective 
preparedness activity. This includes the involvement of multiple sectors from 
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health and non-health organization at different administrative levels in 
planning and response phases. The whole process of the national influenza 
pandemic planning process requires broad communication and collaboration 
across different stakeholder groups. The organization of such efforts is 
essential to assure a more feasible national approach through implementation 
of a comprehensive response at both national and local levels (Gensheimer et 
al., 2003). Because pandemic influenza can cause wide social and economic 
disruption as well as health consequences, representation from different 
sectors are required to participate in pandemic preparedness and response 
activities (WHO, 2009f). National pandemic planning committees consist of a 
core planning group (health and non-health sectors) that is responsible for 
writing the plan and engaging other stakeholders to develop specific chapters 
of the plan, and an expert group, which gives technical support to the 
committee.  
National governments interviewed mentioned that working through a multi-
sectoral and inter-ministerial planning committee with partnership to reflect 
the wide range of partners and stakeholders improves the planning and 
delivery of effective response measures. The evaluation of Sweden response 
showed that the coordination group functioned well as a forum for solving the 
coordination challenges faced by the responsible authorities in cases where 
there was an overlap of responsibility between two or more organisations 
(National Board of Health and Welfare and the Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency, 2011). These coordination bodies and pandemic planning 
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committees create the platform for stakeholders across all administration 
levels to work in partnership with health officials and policy makers, organize 
what information will be disseminated, and decide how this will be 
accomplished.  
8.3.3 Financial support to preparedness and planning activities  
Participants across all countries reported that financial support is an essential 
and useful preparedness activity to maintain and keep the dynamicity of the 
process. Dedicated budget for pandemic preparedness and planning is 
considered a useful practice to fund expert groups and other staff tasked with 
writing up and revising national plans. Therefore, funding the planning 
activities is as important as funding their implementation as reported by the 
participants of this study. Funding is crucial to build capacities relevant to 
antiviral stockpiles, vaccination contracts, surveillance networks, 
communication systems, and hospital preparedness.   
8.3.4 Communication and coordination 
Pandemic planning and response encompass a wide range of expertise, 
stakeholders, and administrative levels. Robust communication mechanisms 
are required between different governmental tiers in order to coordinate 
planning activities at the different administrative tiers. Moreover, sharing 
pandemic plan with neighbouring countries and international community is a 
useful coordination activity that can facilitate the inter-operability of 
pandemic plans. Stakeholders at different administrative levels during the 
pandemic will need situation updates and risk assessments in order to make 
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evidence informed decisions in terms of interventions to be implemented 
during the response. 
Attention has already been drawn to a large number of communication 
difficulties that occurred during the 2009 pandemic. Our findings identified 
challenging communications between central health authorities and frontline 
healthcare workers. Difficulties in accessing guidance, information overload 
and a lack of HCW involvement in pandemic planning were all highlighted. 
These data suggest that planning for internal communication within the health 
sector requires improvement in future pandemic planning (Hashim et al., 
2012). Effective emergency management coordination can be achieved when 
communication is clear, accurate and timely. One of the most frequent 
challenges to the communication system is conflicting and inconsistent 
messages and information overload of the frontline healthcare workers. In the 
United States, health professional faced the same issue of rapidly changing 
information and conflicting recommendation (Locatelli et al., 2012). Findings 
highlight the importance of developing and exercising a comprehensive 
communication plan to improve coordination between stakeholders across 
organizations and reduce confusion among responders and the public. 
Lessons learned from the interviewees in this study could be used as lessons 
to be incorporated in future responses to public health emergencies. These 
lessons include better planning for risk communication; improve the 
communication networks between different stakeholders, and more 
engagement of healthcare workers in planning and response phases. 
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8.3.5 Command and control structure 
The literature highlights the significance of having a command and control 
structure in place before the pandemic. Organizations at all administrative 
levels including the ministry of health, national and local public health 
authorities and primary and secondary healthcare facilities are part of this 
structure (Krumkamp, 2009). This underscores the need for preparing 
administrative structures that ensure smooth and effortless information flow 
and exchange among these institutions during a pandemic. Communication 
within a countryÕs healthcare system has to be improved. The command 
structure with predetermined roles and responsibilities of different 
stakeholders is necessary to maintain a smooth flow of information among 
authorities (Krumkamp, 2009).  
Avian influenza outbreak experience in Turkey in 2006 revealed that 
organizational structure and command system was not quite ready to respond 
to public health emergencies. Authorities reported on the poor connection and 
coordination between the MOH and Ministry of Agriculture (Sarikaya and 
Erbaydar, 2007). In the evaluation of Sweden response, stakeholders felt that 
they were not sufficiently informed about the allocation of roles between 
them and what their expectations of each other should be and with regard to 
the demarcation of which issues fall under which department (National Board 
of Health and Welfare and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, 2011).  
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8.3.6 Communication with the public 
Communication with the public is a crucial element during planning and 
response to a public health emergency. Communication with the public aims 
at preventing further morbidity and mortality, reduce panic among the 
community and to stimulate confidence in operational response (Gupta et al., 
2006). Risk communication is an essential element during emergency 
response as it can be used to educate the public and raise their awareness on 
pandemic influenza and provide people with relevant health information and 
advice about what to do at different stages of pandemic (Hine, 2010). This 
type of communication can engage people to protect the wider community by 
following for example hand hygiene and disposing of used tissues in the right 
way (Reynolds and Quinn, 2008).  
Stakeholders across countries interviewed highlighted the importance of 
communication with the public to ensure an effective and smooth response by 
engaging the public in prevention and control strategies. A variety of 
communication channels were implemented before and during the pandemic 
to educate the public about influenza disease and prevention. These 
communication channels include the use of official pandemic influenza 
websites, leaflets and posters, hot lines and media spokespersons. In addition, 
countries with advanced pandemic plans mentioned having communication 
specialists to interact with media and public as part of press office or a public 
relation team. This team is responsible to ensure consistency and transparency 
of messages and public education material so they can be easily understood 
and perceived by the public (Reynolds, 2006). 
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Findings suggest that communication planning for pandemic influenza is an 
essential pandemic preparedness activity because it determines the set of 
messages to be shared with the public during the response and the 
communication channels that will be used and spokespersons. It is considered 
good practice to integrate the communication plan with the pandemic plan. 
The national and the regional level, and also any other actors felt to have a 
role to play, should be involved. It is best to have a flexible plan to be 
adaptable to the actual situation.  
Planning for communication tools and infrastructure before the pandemic will 
enhance countriesÕ ability to cope with the rapid and intense demand for 
information during pandemic. These include pandemic websites and 
information hotlines for the public and healthcare workers. CDC reports on 
the importance of establishing information hotlines to respond to outbreaks of 
smallpox (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 2002). This is 
applicable to other public health emergencies including pandemic influenza. 
Hotlines are necessary to be established before the pandemic in order to be 
able to deal with the immediate and sustained demand for information from 
the public and healthcare workers. The plan highlights the importance of 
providing the hotline staff with the most up-to-date and accurate information 
to be able to respond to the publicÕs demand for information (Centres for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2002). 
Communication training is an essential activity to be implemented beforehand 
to ensure that spokesperson is confident and comfortable to speak in press 
 183 
conferences or broadcast. Exercising the communication plan on a regular 
basis is highly recommended and this can be done using exercise scenarios 
and getting stakeholders feedback on how to revise the plan in line with new 
developments. 
During the response it is crucial ensure consistency of messages that target 
the public (Reynolds and Quinn, 2008). The source of information and the 
content of messages need to be consistent throughout all stages so that 
general public do not get confused and know which advice and information to 
follow. Uncertainty and the unpredictable course of influenza pandemics play 
an important role in delivering inconsistent and controversial messages to the 
public. Consequently, this will make the response to the novel virus 
challenging and complex. The World Health Organization communication 
guidelines focus on building trust between the public and the lead 
organization, announcing updates at early stage, provide information whether 
good or bad as soon as possible, sharing precise and full information 
transparently, listening to public fears and concerns, and planning for 
communication.  
Stakeholders from sub-national authorities mentioned that communication at 
the local level was different from those at higher levels. This is mainly due to 
pandemic can affect different areas at different times with different severity. 
For example, schools in one region can be closed before the rest of the 
country because the rates of influenza infection are higher. This mandates a 
direct communication with the public in that region to update them about this 
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localized situation and to answer their concerns. Local websites and media 
can be utilized to deliver such information to the target populations but this 
will be challenging in low-income countries such as category C countries 
with limited access to computers and the Internet.  
8.3.7 Flexibility and adaptability of pandemic plans  
It is important to acknowledge that emergencies including pandemic 
influenza can create dynamic changing environments, and therefore it is not 
feasible to anticipate all the details relevant to the impact and severity of a 
future emergency (Frosdick, 1997). Despite the fact that the pandemic plan 
will direct the response, the ongoing risk assessment will determine the 
pandemic severity and the appropriate response measures. This occurs when 
the local disease severity does not reflect what has been written in the plan or 
what is happening internationally. 
All countries surveyed in this study included the 1918 pandemic worst-case 
scenario as a possibility in their pandemic planning assumptions. Category C 
countries based their assumptions entirely on a scenario similar to that of 
1918 pandemic as well as on the avian influenza case fatality rate. Other 
countries reported using multiple scenarios but without giving exact figures. 
Plans that take into account a range of scenarios would be more adaptable.  
Countries mentioned that planning for more than one scenario will enhance 
plans adaptability and flexibility to choose response measures in accordance 
with disease severity as determined by risk assessment tools. This means that 
some measures will be escalated in case of severe pandemic while others 
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might not be needed due to the mild nature of pandemic. An evaluation of 
Sweden's pandemic preparedness concluded that plans should be flexible and 
be composed of three different levels of pandemic severity: mild, 
intermediate or severe. This is meant to be a tool for grading the outbreak at 
an early stage, while retaining enough flexibility to adapt if the pandemic 
develops in a way that calls for different strategies and measures (National 
Board of Health and Welfare and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, 
2011). 
All countries mentioned that the trigger to activate their pandemic 
preparedness measures relied largely on the WHO phases instead of 
measuring the severity of pandemic on the ground. Countries were confused 
about the use of WHO phases and reported on the lack of guidance during the 
pandemic on how to use them. WHO six phases were designed to describe the 
global and geographical spread of the novel virus, not the impact or severity 
of the pandemic which can be different across countries or even across 
regions within the same country (World Health Organization Europe and 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2011). 
Doshi argues that there was no proper definition by WHO before the 
pandemic and WHO and member states defined pandemic on the basis of 
global spread and not on the actual impact and severity on the healthcare 
systems (Doshi, 2011). Barnett supported Doshi views and commented that 
risk assessment should make the basis of decision-making, which can be 
informed by the global spread of pandemic influenza (Barnett, 2011). 
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However, different parts of the world could face severity differently and this 
is because of the variation in the course of the spread of pandemic, different 
surveillance systems, and differences in vulnerable populations. The severity 
of pandemic H1N1 in 2009 differed considerably across the world with a 
higher morbidity and mortality documented in the Americas in comparison to 
Australia, New Zealand, and Europe (Simonsen et al., 2013). 
National and local levels reflected on the importance of conducting 
continuous risk assessment during the pandemic. This can facilitate the 
decision-making regarding escalation and de-escalation of response measures 
and allow for variable severity in the same country which in turn allows more 
flexible response measures within the same country (World Health 
Organization Europe and European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control, 2011).  
In connection to flexible pandemic planning, stakeholders from national 
authorities reported several challenges in relation to vaccine purchase 
agreements, identifying risk groups, logistics of distribution and delivery. 
National authorities had to adjust vaccination plans due to the mild nature of 
the pandemic, from conducting mass vaccination to vaccination of priority 
groups only. Accordingly, vaccination strategy was adjusted from the national 
mass vaccination operation to the local vaccination approach through primary 
healthcare workers (World Health Organization Europe and European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control, 2011). Findings from interviews 
highlighted inadequate operational planning relevant to vaccine delivery and 
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logistics. The capacity building of different public health systems within the 
health organization, down to the sub-national level is essential to conduct 
nationwide immunisation campaigns as well as other large-scale distribution 
of antivirals and PPEs.  
8.3.8 Sub-national planning 
In countries categorised A and B, governments dedicated operational 
planning to sub-national authorities while countries in the category C kept 
sub-national operational planning at national level control. Countries reported 
that the national pandemic plan was a useful document and it served as a 
framework for sub-national and local strategies. In addition, stakeholders 
reported that planning checklists and scenarios facilitated the local planning 
process since these documents provided specific details on how primary and 
secondary healthcare services will be managed and details on business 
continuity of essential non-health services. The main programme and policy 
planning happens at the national level but the implementation of these 
measures occurs at a local level. Collaboration across different regions is 
important to ensure organized approaches. National planning committee has 
an essential role in sub-national planning activities by providing technical 
support as well as training and exercise. Vice versa, the contribution of sub-
national pandemic planning stakeholders to national pandemic preparedness 
activities will enhance the quality and feasibility of the national pandemic 
plan (Brown and Hegermann-Lindencrone, 2013). 
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8.4 Review of national and multi-national evaluations  
 
A number of published national and international evaluation reports have 
been reviewed in order to give a comprehensive overview of how countries 
evaluated their pandemic preparedness and response as well as to relate their 
results to the findings and themes emerged from this study.  
These reports concluded that planning activities implemented before the 2009 
pandemic were useful and worthwhile and this conclusion is in line with the 
findings of this study. In general, these activities were worthwhile and 
effective for the response made in 2009. However, there are still areas of 
weakness and further planning that will have to be addressed for future 
pandemic preparedness activities. Five evaluation reports from Europe, one 
report from Canada, and one international report were reviewed. These are 
Germany (Krause et al., 2010), Norway (Directorate for Civil Protection and 
Emergency Planning, 2010), the UK (Hine, 2010), Switzerland (Nguyen-
Van-Tam et al., 2010b), Sweden (National Board of Health and Welfare and 
the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, 2011), Canada (Standing Senate 
Committee on Social Affairs Science and Technology, 2010), and IHR 
review report (Fineberg, 2010). 
Most countries in their evaluation reports have reviewed the way their 
pandemic plans were structured so they can understand the pandemic 
planning activities that did not go well during the pandemic. All the reports 
highlight the importance of having had a pandemic plan to follow; especially 
in the initial stages of the outbreak, the plans provided valuable direction and 
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support. However, one major deficiency is that the plans were set up for a 
more severe pandemic in comparison with pandemic (H1N1) in 2009. The 
findings from these evaluations were in parallel with our results and the 
national plans were found to be too rigid with little or no flexibility. As a 
result, the adaptation of these plans to the local situation was found to be 
challenging during the response phase. Public health authorities in the 
countries included in this study operated in accordance with their plans, and 
not in response to the existing actual situation.  
Furthermore, communication with the media was described in several reports 
to be a major challenge during the pandemic. In this study, countries in 
category A and B reported poor communication with the media and stated 
that a more comprehensive media planning is required for future pandemic 
planning. The issue was that there were no clear guidelines determining 
which authority had the overall responsibility for communicating with the 
media particularly. Moreover, there were also shortcomings with regard to the 
collecting and presenting of information for publication; the result of this was 
that a lot of the information was presented in an inconsistent way. This 
caused confusion among the public. An example of this comes from Norway, 
where the National Institute of Public Health and the National Directorate of 
Health presented the public with different assessments of the severity of the 
pandemic. This generated a great deal of uncertainty among the public. The 
first press conference on April 27 by the National Directorate of Health 
communicate the risk of the worst case scenario and this would be quite 
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severe pandemic while three days later the spokesperson of the National 
Institute of Public Health presented more conservative estimate. This had 
consequences on public opinion and engagement during the pandemic. 
(Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, 2010).   
Coordination emerged as an important theme from this research and the other 
reports too (Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, 2010, 
National Board of Health and Welfare and the Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency, 2011). It is essential to establish a coordination team during the 
planning and implementation phases that is given the responsibility for co-
ordinating and publishing all official information in the form of press 
releases. This will help health authorities to deal with the information 
requirements in future crises in a way that safeguards its credibility. 
In regards to the severity of the pandemic of 2009 and the effectiveness of the 
pandemic planning activities undertaken before 2009, the Norwegian and 
German reports, in contrast to this study, stated that the reason why the 
pandemic could be dealt with so well was that it turned out to be mild in 
nature and not as severe as planned for. The result would probably not have 
been as positive if a more severe pandemic scenario had developed: there 
would not have been enough beds available in intensive care units, 
laboratories would have been buried with samples, and smaller hospitals 
would have less capacity to cope with the high volume of patients seeking 
care (Krause et al., 2010, Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency 
Planning, 2010).  
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On the other hand, Dame Deirdre Hine evaluated the UK response to the 
2009 pandemic and arrived at a conclusion similar to this study that the wide 
range of pandemic preparedness activities including the capacity building of 
antiviral stockpiles and pandemic vaccine purchase to cover the entire UK 
population were worthwhile. The report states that these preparedness 
measures were cost-effective. The report commends the UK governmentÕs 
crises management committee that was successful in supporting and 
maintaining the decision making process during periods of uncertainty during 
the pandemic. The first recommendation was ÒMinisters should determine 
early in a pandemic how they will ensure that the response is proportionate to 
the perceived level of risk and how this will guide decision-making. This 
approach should be reflected in the revised pandemic-specific Concept of 
Operations by summer 2011Ó (Hine, 2010). 
The reports commented on the role of the coordination group that facilitated 
the organization of response measures and reduced inconsistencies and 
variability across the four nations. A and B countries established such groups 
to ensure and monitor pandemic planning and response activities (Hine, 2010) 
In the report, interviewees criticised the UK containment phase in a similar 
way category A and B public health authorities criticised long and resource 
intensive containment phase activities such as contact tracing and contact 
management. In line with the findings of this study, the UK evaluation report 
highlighted the pandemic flexibility stating that UK authorities struggled to 
adapt and flex response measures to fit the local circumstances. In terms of 
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communication, similar to stakeholder views from this study, the UK 
evaluation report concluded that public health education campaigns were 
successful in increasing public awareness regarding pandemic influenza 
spread and prevention measures (Hine, 2010).  
The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology 
reviewed CanadaÕs response to the 2009 pandemic. In parallel to other 
evaluation reports, the committee concluded that pandemic preparedness 
activities that commenced few years ago proved to be efficient and useful in 
reducing the pandemic impact in terms of mortality and morbidly. The report 
highlighted the importance of financial support for both planning and 
implementing pandemic plans (Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs 
Science and Technology, 2010). In this study, category B and C countries 
reported the lack of financial support during the planning phase since it was 
considered part of their day to day responsibilities and so this illustrates the 
importance of financial support for the writing up of the plan and related 
guidelines as well as funding expert groups. Similarly, the Canadian report 
mentioned that the Canadian government should continue funding pandemic 
preparedness activities. Furthermore, several themes emerged from the 
Canadian evaluation including roles and responsibilities of different public 
health administrative levels (federal, provincial, local levels), the national 
pandemic plan for Canada, communication, pharmaceutical measures, 
surveillance, collaboration, First Nation and Inuit, and research. Coordination 
including command and control themes emerged from the Canadian report 
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and the committee reported that more coordination at different government 
administrative levels was required to create a more even response across all 
jurisdictions (Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs Science and 
Technology, 2010). 
Internal communication issues with healthcare workers were also reported by 
Canadian public health stakeholders as challenges and concerns were stated 
in respect to pandemic response. Therefore, the committee suggested that 
communication plan to be revised to clarify the command and control 
structure of the different administrative tiers in Canada. One of the most 
important deficiencies identified in this study was the lack of healthcare 
workers engagement in the planning activities at the national and sub-national 
levels in all countries. The Canadian report identified the same problem in 
terms of participatory planning and collaboration of healthcare workers 
(Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs Science and Technology, 
2010). The committee called for wider participation of primary and secondary 
health workers in pandemic planning and preparedness. Stakeholders 
interviewed in this study across all administrative levels stated that here was a 
consistently identified lack of primary care contribution and awareness of 
pandemic planning activities during pandemic planning, implementation and 
eventual response. Last but not least, research and development emerged as 
an important theme from the Canadian evaluation report response to the 
pandemic of 2009. Influenza research emerged as an important theme in the 
Canadian report as the committee recommended ongoing financial support to 
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research and development initiatives pertinent to pandemic preparedness 
(Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, 
2010). The Swiss government reviewed its federal immunisation strategy and 
the reviewers identified challenges in regards to vaccine delivery and logistics 
(Nguyen-Van-Tam et al., 2010b). These were consistently highlighted by our 
data in category A and B countries. Improved operational planning and the 
use of simulations and exercises, especially at a sub-national level, could 
address these challenges. 
The issue of pandemic severity was highlighted in the WHO evaluation report 
on the implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005), the 
evaluation in its third conclusion which contrast the finding of this study 
claimed that ÒThe world is ill-prepared to respond to a severe influenza 
pandemic or to any similarly global, sustained and threatening public-health 
emergency. Beyond implementation of core public-health capacities called 
for in the IHR, global preparedness can be advanced through research, 
reliance on a multi-sectoral approach, strengthened health-care delivery 
systems, economic development in low- and middle-income countries and 
improved health statusÓ (Fineberg, 2011). The report recommends four 
actions to address its third conclusion. First, countries should establish a 
reserve staff of public health professionals to support countries and provide 
advice and technical assistance. Second, member states have to create an 
emergency fund for public health threats. This funding would support surge 
capacity and could be during a declared Public Health Emergency of 
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International Concern (PHEIC). Third, member states need to collaborate 
regarding sharing viruses for vaccine manufacturing and establish joint 
procurement strategies to reduce cost and improve access to all countries The 
Review Committee recommends Member States and WHO complete 
consultations on sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines. The last 
recommendation focused on the need to establish a comprehensive influenza 
research and evaluation programmes, which is similar to the Canadian report 
recommendation (Fineberg, 2010). 
The report of the IHR Review Committee, together with the aforementioned 
national pandemic evaluation reports, offers a strong groundwork for 
improving international and national preparedness for influenza pandemic 
and other public health emergences. In addition, the World Health Assembly 
(WHA) in 2011 approved a Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) 
framework that combines the identification, characterization and sharing of 
novel viruses (WHO, 2011c).  
8.5 Evaluation issues and study limitations 
 
Although this evaluation can assist countries in the revision of their pandemic 
plans and improve their preparedness through the identification of good 
practice models, specific issues and limitations related to the methodology 
also need to be discussed. Notably, the political, environmental, geographical, 
economic, social, cultural or circumstantial context under which these 
thematic domains were presented during each pandemic stage could have 
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determined how pandemic preparedness activities in the Member States were 
executed: 
8.5.1 Thematic interdependency 
The relationship between the identified major themes and sub-themes is 
complex and highly inter-dependent. Thus, the full extent of the inter-
dependency of these themes may not have been reflected in the results as only 
the themes considered to have the most impact on pandemic preparedness 
have been assessed to date. Thus, it is possible that because of this correlation 
between identified themes, the results as presented are limited in providing a 
clearer picture on other issues or factors that could also have been important 
for improving pandemic preparedness and planning. Therefore, a more in-
depth evaluation with more specific objectives is recommended to understand 
the full implications of this association.  
8.5.2 Organisational structure 
Organisational structural differences varied considerably across countries and 
this may dictate what is considered good practice or not. Organizational 
structures may affect the way pandemic planning, implementation and 
response activities are conducted and their perceived effectiveness. In all 
countries interviewed emergency management structures were hierarchical 
and command oriented structures with a top-down model. However, category 
A and some of category B countries devolved certain responsibilities to the 
subnational and local tiers in order to give a greater degree of flexibility and 
transparency in the decision making process. In this model, the top level 
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develops plans and policies and the bottom level has the responsibility to 
implement or modify these policies Consequently, this might lead to 
differences in coordination and communication strategies which may not be 
suitable for other countries. In category C, centralized and command oriented 
structures were noted and these were rigid structures that did not allow local 
authorities to change or modify policies because they were not part of the 
decision making process.  
For example, when HCWs want to change or modify what is in the national 
plan; this can be considered a good practice in some countries but it might not 
be acceptable practice in the other countries with more centralized and tight 
structures. Similarly, seeking frontline workersÕ input and feedback regarding 
the planning process is considered a good practice in certain countries while 
they are seen as the ÒimplementersÓ in counties with more centralized 
administrative structures. Each model has its pros and cons and each country 
adopt the model that fits their scope of work and organizational culture. 
Another example is vaccine logistics, some category A and B countries 
devolved this to the lower levels and found this to be inappropriate during the 
response, while this was already centralized in category C countries and 
proved to be working. These examples show the impact of the administrative 
structure on the perceived usefulness of pandemics preparedness activities. 
8.5.3 Nvivo in data analysis  
The use of computer-assisted qualitative data seawares (CAQDAS) has 
transformed the way social scientists analyse textual data. There is an on-
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going controversy about using these packages in the analysis process. 
Therefore, it is essential to highlight these views in the context of this 
evaluation. 
On one hand, the opposing group of social scientists claim that CAQDAS has 
made the process of qualitative data analysis more rigid and automatic. They 
claim that these packages ignore the context and meaning of the text during 
data analysis. Also, they argue that CAQDAS pay more attention to the 
occurrence and frequency of words on the expense of meaning which might 
lead to give more attention to quantifying data rather than focusing on 
recurrent themes (Murphy et al., 1998,  Bryman, 2012). 
On the other hand, other social scientists point out to the importance of using 
CAQDAS to facilitate the data coding process when dealing with a large 
volume of text. This can save the researcher time and effort to examine data 
in depth rather than trying to organize and label them manually. They add that 
these packages allow the evaluator to identify trends and pattern in data and 
subsequently add more quality in the analysis process. In addition, it adds to 
the reliability of the analysis process by making it more transparent to other 
researchers (Fielding and Lee, 2002).  
8.5.4 Intrinsic Limitations 
The following issues may have impacted on the evaluation results and their 
subsequent interpretation: 
a) Lower and medium income countries are more dependent on WHO and 
rely on external support.  This may lead to an increased level of acceptance of 
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external views and WHO recommendations. Whereas, higher income 
countries are more independent and have more capacity to implement 
required plan adaptations. 
b) Countries may want to portray themselves in a positive light, afraid of 
being judged for inappropriate action or lack of action (though this was 
explicitly not within the remit of the study).  More time to implement probing 
techniques during the interviews is required to allow the true nature of the 
responses to emerge.  Trust between parties takes time but is also needed as 
some countries (Category C) may think of the evaluation as an inspection or a 
scale against which their own country is being graded or rated, though this 
was explicitly not within the study remit. 
c) For the maintenance of consistency (i.e. evaluation context, questions, 
probing to get behind the scene), time for training interviewers was needed 
along with good briefing of evaluation intent. 
d) The level of public health infrastructures and surveillance vary greatly 
across countries in the EU region in terms of case definition, reporting 
systems, and facilities and diagnostics capacities (European Centre For 
Disease Prevention and Control, 2007). Therefore, the amount of data from 
which relative severity can be judged may have been different across 
countries, and a low number of confirmed cases or deaths might reflect, in 
certain cases, a lack of accurate reporting rather than a lack of infections. 
e) It is important to note that the scope of evaluation was wide and certain 
areas such as (surveillance, antivirals, risk communication and vaccinations) 
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were not explored in depth. We tried to cover as many topics as possible and 
asked around 40 questions in two hours time and this was on the expense of 
getting deep understanding about how particular planning activities were 
implemented and how stakeholders perceived their usefulness. 
8.6 Alternative approaches  
 
If I started the project over, I would develop more specific research objectives 
in order to collect in depth data to get a better understanding on certain issues 
in pandemic preparedness and planning. The project ended up collecting too 
much information that covered a variety of topics. The interviewers did not 
use probe or follow up questions so often to get a greater understanding about 
certain activities including vaccination, antivirals, surveillance, etc. 
Moreover, I would try to get more homogenous participants in each focus 
group to overcome the issue of dominance of high level and senor staff over 
their subordinates and might even reduce the number of participants to a 
maximum of three in each focus group. This was a major problem in category 
C as the more senior staff tried to dominate the interviews and did not give 
the opportunity for the subordinates to reflect on their experiences. This 
project was an urgent response to the pandemic in 2009 and WHO Regional 
Office for Europe wanted to publish guidelines for the first winter in the post-
pandemic phase. Therefore, the study team did not have time to train the 
interviewers who kindly contributed to the data collection process and this 
was a fundamental limitation in the context of this evaluation. The use of 
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probe and follow up questions were lacking in a number of interviews and 
this led to shallow data in certain areas.  
 
8.7 Future work 
 
Future work can be conducted on the basis of the findings from this research 
project. Firstly, a quantitative survey to evaluate the usefulness of the 
pandemic preparedness activities across all the member states within the 
WHO Euro region is worth doing. As mentioned in the methods section, 
qualitative evaluation is an exploratory method to generate hypotheses. An 
evaluation using quantitative methods can test these hypotheses and produce 
more generalizable and representative findings. For example, our findings 
revealed lack of primary HCWs in the countries participated in our study, this 
can be considered a hypothesis that can be further tested and examined using 
observational studies. Secondly, another round of interviewing would be 
worth doing since this evaluation was an urgent response to the pandemic in 
2009. The timing of the interviews was within the pandemic itself and even 
before the announcement of the post pandemic phase by the WHO. This 
might not have allowed for enough time for stakeholders to explore all the 
issues pertinent to the preparedness and response to the pandemic. Interviews 
could focus on countriesÕ reflections as well as any sort of revisions and 
updates to their national and sub-national pandemic planning strategies based 
on the lessons learned from the first pandemic in the twenty first century. 
8.8 Recommendations 
 
National level 
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¥  Strong political commitment and government involvement are essential in 
the pandemic preparedness process. 
¥  National authorities should ensure accessible and on-going financial 
support to pandemic preparedness activities. 
¥  Participatory planning from different stakeholder groups across different 
administrative levels proved useful during the pandemic. 
¥  Improve operational planning regarding vaccine procurement and 
logistics across different stakeholder groups. 
¥ National authorities should adopt more flexible and adaptable plans in 
order to be prepared to respond to different scenarios in regards to pandemic 
severity.  
¥ More careful planning to hospital surveillance should be undertaken in the 
post pandemic phase. 
¥  It is essential to have a risk communication plan with healthcare workers 
beforehand as this was found to facilitate the process of communicating the 
vaccine effectiveness and safety with frontline healthcare workers during the 
pandemic. 
¥  Exercising the national and sub-national plans is essential and should 
include all stakeholders and lesson should be fed back into the plans. 
Sub-national level 
¥ The sub-national health authorities should use national plans and 
associated guidelines as a framework to develop more local plans. 
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¥  Sub-national pandemic preparedness planning activities and meetings 
should be an on-going process with continuous support and follow up from 
the national levels. 
¥ Effective communication channels for comments and feedback from 
frontline HCWs facilitate sub-national pandemic preparedness process.  
¥ Increasing public awareness before and during the pandemic is an 
essential task. 
¥ Subnational health authorities should invest in training and educating 
HCWs on pandemic preparedness. 
¥ Subnational tiers should follow up and support healthcare workers in 
regards to hospital pandemic preparedness activities. 
Healthcare workers 
¥ Healthcare workers should be actively involved in the national and sub-
national pandemic planning process and their views and input should be given 
a considerable weight during planning and implementation phases. 
¥ Communication channels between the national tier and healthcare workers 
and between the primary and secondary health workers should be established 
and tested in the inter-pandemic phase. 
¥ Training healthcare workers on treating influenza cases, laboratory 
diagnostic skills and on the main difference between pandemic and seasonal 
influenza are essential preparedness activity. 
¥ Balanced approaches that combine both bottom up and top down models are 
required during preparing and response to pandemic preparedness activities. 
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8.9 Conclusions  
 
1. It has been possible using a qualitative methodology to review the extent to 
which pandemic preparedness activities proved useful during 2009Ð2010 
influenza A (H1N1) pandemic and to identify areas of under planning that 
require further improvement in the future.  
The findings from this evaluation were in line with other national and 
international reviews; it has been found that the overall pandemic 
preparedness activities that were undertaken before the pandemic in 2009 
were worthwhile and appropriate to the level of severity of the 2009 influenza 
pandemic. In general, multi-sectoral participatory planning, political support, 
national pandemic planning committees, dedicated funding for pandemic 
planning, expertsÕ input, simulation exercises, capacity building activities, 
and staff training were the core principles of pandemic preparedness 
activities.  
Planning for certain pandemic preparedness activities were underdeveloped 
and required rectification in the post pandemic phase; these were planning 
flexibility and the need to plan for multiple scenarios, the involvement of the 
healthcare workers in the planning and response process, comprehensive 
planning for risk communication with the public and healthcare workers, 
vaccine procurement and logistics, and hospital surveillance. 
2. Despite the differences between the seven countries in terms of pandemic 
preparedness activities and public health infrastructures, it was possible to 
identify six consistent, recurring and interdependent themes that reflected 
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good practices as well as shortcomings in regards to pandemic preparedness. 
These are communication, coordination, capacity buildings, mutual support, 
leadership, and flexibility. It was obvious from the findings that the planning 
process of developing, implementing, exercising, maintaining, and evaluating 
the pandemic plans at different administrative levels were more important 
than the documents and plans themselves. 
3. This evaluation methodology using accepted social scientific principles is 
the first of its kind to focus on the utility of the pandemic preparedness 
activities compared with the eventual response, rather than the response itself. 
It can be replicated to study particular pandemic planning activities in depth 
in the European region as well as other regions.  In fact, the WHO regional 
office for Europe has already successfully replicated and used this 
methodology to evaluate pandemic preparedness activities in the national 
influenza centres (NIC). 
4. The findings from this study provide several hypotheses for future 
research. Based on the results, quantitative surveys can be used to test these 
hypotheses in order to generalise the findings to the larger population not 
only for pandemic influenza but also for other public health emergencies that 
might have international public health concerns.  
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APPENDICES  
                   Appendix A Study Protocol  
 
How pandemic preparedness activities aided the response to the pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009: A study in countries of the WHO European Region 
Introduction 
On 11 June, 2009, WHO declared pandemic phase 6 due to a new strain of 
influenza A(H1N1). Countries across the globe are responding to the 
pandemic. Many draw on the experience gained from several years of 
pandemic preparedness activities (PPA) as well as the response to outbreaks 
of avian influenza A (H5N1).  
Pandemic preparedness activities aim to reduce transmission of the pandemic 
virus strain, decrease cases, hospitalizations and deaths, maintain essential 
services and to reduce the economic and social disruption of a pandemic. 
These activities include the whole planning process of development, 
exercising, maintaining, revising and translating into actions the national 
pandemic preparedness and response plans. Plans can be developed at 
national and regional levels to ensure a good quality response.  
WHO EURO has been extensively involved in PPA in the Region during the 
past few years, and, as a next step, will perform an evaluation of how 
countriesÕ PPA contributed to the response to pandemic (H1N1) 2009. It is 
important to understand how countriesÕ PPA supported the pandemic 
response as this will guide and strengthen the preparedness planning 
component of the further response of the Member States to pandemic (H1N1) 
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2009, as well as to other future health emergencies. This will also inform 
further WHO EURO activities and guidance in the area of preparedness 
planning. This study will not evaluate the actual response to pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009, nor the effectiveness of implementation of individual 
measures. 
Aim and objectives 
The aim of this evaluation is to identify how pandemic preparedness activities 
aided the response to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in order to identify good 
practices for future pandemic planning. 
The main objectives of the evaluation will be to: 
¥ Describe the process of pandemic planning and how it aided the 
response. 
¥ Describe how well pandemic preparedness activities were translated 
into action during the response; and identify difficulties faced by 
member states. 
¥ Identify what could have been done differently in pandemic 
preparedness to improve the usefulness of these activities during the 
response. 
Methodology  
The evaluation will be conducted through country visits carried out by a 
WHO team of four pandemic preparedness experts. The team will interview 
relevant stakeholders at different administrative levels and from different 
sectors. The proposed timetable for the visit can be found at the end of this 
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document. The interviews will take place in one city (the capital) and if 
stakeholders from local/regional level need to travel to reach the place of 
interview, WHO will cover the costs.  
Prior to the visits, the country focal point will be asked to provide relevant 
documents developed as part of PPA as well as any new documents 
developed after the start of the pandemic to WHO. The stakeholders to be 
interviewed will receive examples of interview questions. 
Stakeholders to be interviewed 
Interviews will be conducted with stakeholders from the central and 
regional/local government, public health authorities and healthcare system. 
Each stakeholder will be asked to include 2-4 key persons who will be 
interviewed together.  
Stakeholders to be interviewed should be involved in pandemic preparedness 
and response activities and be representatives from:  
1. The Ministry of Health  
2. A key ministry responsible for civil response and involved in pandemic 
preparedness and response, e.g. Ministry of Interior or Ministry of 
Emergency.  
3. The public health authority  
4. Local or regional tier  
5. Secondary health care staff (preferably medical front line doctors from 
hospitals from different regions with responsibility for the clinical 
management of pandemic H1N1 patients).  
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6. Primary health care staff (looked after pandemic patients - preferably from 
different regions)  
Preferably, the above stakeholder groups should together be able to cover the 
following areas of pandemic preparedness and response: command and 
control, business continuity planning, surveillance, non-pharmaceutical public 
health measures, clinical management, antiviral drugs, vaccine, 
communication and legal and ethical aspects. 
Debriefing 
Preliminary findings will be presented during a debriefing on the last day of 
the mission. It is preferable to have as many stakeholders as possible present 
during both the briefing at the start of the mission and the debriefing on the 
last day.  
Expected outputs 
Following the six country visits, all participating countries will be invited to 
take part in a workshop where findings will be discussed, and a report 
containing a set of recommendations will be prepared. It is the intention that 
these recommendations should form the basis for future WHO guidance on 
pandemic preparedness activities. 
Expected outcome 
Improvements in Member States of the WHO European Region in pandemic 
preparedness, reflected in national pandemic plan revisions, as well as the 
ability to respond to potential future waves of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and 
other emerging pandemic viruses. 
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Appendix B Interview guides 
Guide for National tier (MOH and NPHA) 
 
Section A: The planning process (25 minutes) 
1) Describe how the pandemic plan was developed (in brief), including:  
a. persons involved in the actual writing process 
b. When activities were initiated/ finalized? 
c. Ways of working: frequency of meetings etc.? 
d. Lead institution and person 
e. Necessary finances to implement plan identified 
2) Was guidance sought from international organizations (WHO guidance 
documents) or neighbouring countries? 
3) What was the approval process of the plan? Status of plan as of March 
2009? 
4) Has the plan been revised/evaluated before the pandemic? What were 
triggers for revision of the plan? 
5) Was a specific scenario used as basis for the pandemic plan? 
6) To which stakeholders was the plan disseminated (actively)?  
7) Which factors were important for developing the national pandemic plan? 
8) Did you give input or support to development of the non-health plan/BCP 
and regional plans? If yes, what support was given? 
Section B: Implementation of plan before the pandemic (25 minutes) 
9)  Did the plan identify specific actions that required putting in place before 
the pandemic? 
a.  Which were they? What got implemented? What specifically facilitated 
their implementation? 
b. Were things implemented before the pandemic that with hindsight need 
not have been implemented? 
10)  Were there things needed/implemented in the response that should have 
been implemented beforehand? What were they? Why were they not 
implemented before the pandemic? 
11) Was the pandemic plan tested in exercises? 
a. Which elements were tested? 
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b. At which level was the plan tested (national, local/regional, hospitals)? 
c. How were lessons learned incorporated into the pandemic plan/pandemic 
preparedness activities? 
Section C: Use of the plan in the response to the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
(40 minutes) 
12) Did you use the plan you had written in the response to the pandemic? 
Did you use other documents? Which? 
13) At the start of the pandemic, what was the trigger to activate the plan? 
What exactly did you do to activate the plan? 
a. Which parts of the plan were used? 
b. What did you disseminate and to whom?  
14) If the plan, or components of the plan, were not used, why not?  
a. What was implemented instead?  
b. What could have been in the plan to make it useful?  
15) Did you need to develop any new documents or response strategies that 
were not envisaged in the plan? How were they disseminated?  
16)  Did your plan include triggers for action and/or de-escalation? 
a. What were the triggers based on? Were they used during the pandemic?  
b. If no triggers in plan, what was the basis for deciding on actions?  
c. Where did you obtain information from on triggers? How did you distil all 
the available information?  Where you able to make timely decisions? 
17) Were there communication channels that did not work? Were there 
communication channels that were not anticipated but that proved important? 
18) What were the main things that were done differently in the response 
than envisaged in the planning process? 
Section D: Reflection on what could have been done differently in the 
planning phase (30 minutes) 
19) Which pandemic preparedness activities were the most useful to your 
response to the pandemic? Why? 
20) Which pandemic preparedness activities were the least useful your 
response to the pandemic? Why? 
21) If you had to start again, what would your plan/ pandemic 
preparedness activities? include/look like? Who would you engage 
with/involve? 
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22) What are your next steps (evaluation, revision of plan)? 
23) What do you expect from WHO for future pandemic preparedness 
activities? 
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Guide for Civil Emergency response (CER) 
 
Section A: The planning process (25 minutes) 
1) Was a pandemic specific or generic business continuity or civil response 
plan developed prior to the pandemic (H1N1) 2009?  
2) If yes, describe how the plan* was developed (in brief), including: 
a. persons involved in the actual writing process 
b. When activities were initiated/finalized? 
c. Ways of working: frequency of meetings etc.? 
d. Lead institution and person 
e. Necessary finances to implement plan identified 
3) Did MOH or the public health authority or the regional tier give input to 
the development of the civil response plan/BCP? If yes, what support was 
given? 
4) What was the approval process of the plan? 
5) Did you support businesses (public and private) in developing BCPÕs? 
6) Was guidance sought from international organizations (WHO guidance 
documents) or neighbouring countries for development of the plan?  
7) Has the plan been revised/evaluated before the pandemic? What were 
triggers for revision of the plan?  
8) Was a specific scenario used as basis for the plan? 
9) To which stakeholders was the plan disseminated (actively)? 
10) Which factors were important for developing the BCP/civil response 
plan? 
11) Were you involved in the development of the plan? If yes, what was your 
role? 
Section B: Implementation of plan before the pandemic (25 minutes) 
12)  Did the plan identify actions that required putting in place before the 
pandemic?  
a. Which were they?  What got implemented? What specifically facilitated 
their implementation?  
b. Were things implemented before the pandemic that with hindsight need 
not have been implemented? 
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13)  Were there things needed/implemented in the response that should have 
been implemented beforehand? What were they? Why were they not 
implemented before the pandemic? 
14)  Was the civil response plan tested in exercises? 
a. Which elements were tested? 
b. How were lessons learned incorporated into the plan/ pandemic planning 
activities? 
15) Were you involved in exercises at national level? If yes, what was tested? 
 
Section C: Use of the plan in the response to the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
(40 minutes) 
16) Did you use the plan in the response to the pandemic? Did you use 
other documents? 
17) What was the role of your ministry in the response to the 
pandemic? Was this similar to what was envisaged in the planning process? 
18) At the start of the pandemic, what was the trigger to activate the 
plan? What exactly did you do to activate the plan?  
a. Which parts of the plan were used? 
b. What did you receive from MOH?  
c. What did you disseminate and to whom?  
19) If the plan, or components of the plan, were not used, why not?  
a. What was implemented instead?  
b. What could have been in the plan to make it useful?  
20) Did you need to develop any new documents or response strategies?  
21) Which services proved to be essential/ critical in the response to the 
pandemic? Was this similar to what was anticipated?  
22) Did your civil response plan include triggers for action and/or de-
escalation?  
a. What were the triggers based on? Were they used during the   pandemic?  
b. If no triggers in plan, based on what were actions taken?  
c. Where did you obtain information from? How did you distil the available 
information?   
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23) Were there communication channels that did not work? Were there 
communication channels that were not anticipated but that proved important?  
24) What were the main things that were done differently in the response 
than what was envisaged in the planning process? 
 
 
Section D: Reflection on what could have been done differently in the 
planning phase (30 minutes) 
25) Which civil response planning activities were the most useful? Why? 
26) Which civil response planning activities were the least useful? Why? 
27) If you had to start again, what would your plan/pandemic planning 
activities include/look like? Who would you engage with/involve? 
28) What are your next steps (evaluation, revision of plan)? 
29) What do you expect from WHO for future pandemic preparedness 
activities? 
 
Guide for sub-national government authority (SNGA) 
Section A: The planning process (25 minutes) 
1) Was a regional pandemic plan developed prior to the pandemic (H1N1) 
2009?  
2) If yes, describe how the regional pandemic plan was developed (in brief), 
including: 
a) persons involved in the actual writing process 
b) When activities were initiated/finalized? 
c) Ways of working: frequency of meetings etc 
d) Lead institution and person 
e) Necessary finances to implement plan identified 
3) Did MOH give input to the development of the regional plan? If yes, what 
support was given? 
4) Did MOH keep track/follow up on the development of the regional plan? 
5) Was guidance sought from international organizations (WHO guidance 
documents)  
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6) Did you coordinate or collaborate with other regions and/or neighbouring 
countries for development of the regional plan?  
7) What was the approval process of the plan? What was the status as of 
March 2009? 
8) Has the plan been revised/evaluated before the pandemic? What were 
triggers for revision of the plan?  
9) Was a specific scenario used as basis for the pandemic plan?  
10)  To which stakeholders was the plan disseminated (actively)? 
11)  What was important for developing the regional plan? 
12) Were you involved in the national planning process? If yes, to what 
extent? 
Section B: Implementation of plan before the pandemic (25 minutes) 
13)   Did the plan identify specific actions that required putting in place 
before the pandemic at regional level?  
a) Which were they?  What got implemented and what specifically facilitated 
their implementation?  
b) Were things implemented before the pandemic that with hindsight need 
not have been implemented? 
14)  Were there things needed/implemented in the response that should have 
been implemented beforehand? What were they? Why were they not 
implemented before the pandemic? 
15)  Was the regional pandemic plan tested in exercises? 
a. Which elements were tested? 
b. How were lessons learned incorporated into the pandemic plan/ pandemic 
preparedness activities?? 
16)  Were you involved in exercises at national level? If yes, what was 
tested? 
Section C: Use of the plan in the response to the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
(40 minutes) 
17) Did you use the regional and/ or national plan in the response to the 
pandemic? Did you use other documents? Which? 
18) At the start of the pandemic, what was the trigger to activate the plan? 
What exactly did you do to activate the plan?  
a. Which parts of the plan were used? 
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b. What guidance/ documents did you receive from the central government?  
c. What did you disseminate from the regional level and to whom?  
19) If the plan, or components of the plan, were not used, why not?  
a. What was implemented instead?  
b. What could have been in the plan to make it useful?  
20) Did you need to develop any new documents or response strategies 
during the pandemic? How were they disseminated?  
21) What information or support did you need from national level during the 
pandemic? Did you get it? 
22) Did your regional plan include triggers for action and/or de-escalation? 
a. What were the triggers based on? Were they used during the pandemic?  
b. If no triggers in plan, what was the basis for deciding on actions to be 
taken?  
c. Where did you obtain information from? How did you distil all the 
available information?  Were you able to make timely decisions? 
Was it clear from the national plan what was expected of you at regional level 
during the pandemic? 
23) Were there communication channels that did not work? Were there 
communication channels that were not anticipated but that proved important?  
24) What were the main things that were done differently in the response 
than what was envisaged in the planning process? 
Section D: Reflection on what could have been done differently in the 
planning phase (30 minutes) 
25) Which regional or national pandemic planning activities were the most 
useful? Why? 
26) Which regional or national pandemic planning activities were the least 
useful? Why? 
27)  If you had to start again, what would your plan/pandemic planning 
activities include/look like. Who would you engage with/involve? 
28) What are your next steps (evaluation, revision of plan)? 
29) Is there anything specific that the regional level would expect from 
WHO for future pandemic preparedness activities. 
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Guide for primary and secondary Healthcare workers (HCWs) 
Section A: The planning process (25 minutes) 
1) Were you familiar with the national/regional pandemic plan before the 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009? 
2) How were you informed about national or regional pandemic planning? 
3) How did you prepare for a pandemic at hospital level? Was a pandemic 
plan for the hospital developed? What was important for developing the 
pandemic plan at hospital level? 
4) Was the hospital plan developed unilaterally or in response to a request 
from regional/national level? 
5) Where you involved in the development of the national/regional/hospital 
plan? If yes, what was your role? 
6) What information did you receive from national or regional level during 
the planning process? 
7) Were you familiar with the planning assumptions on which the pandemic 
plan was based?  
Section B: Implementation of plan before the pandemic (25 minutes) 
8) Did the plan identify actions that required putting in place before the 
pandemic in secondary healthcare setting? 
a. Which were they? What got implemented? What specifically facilitated 
their implementation?  
b. Were things implemented before the pandemic that with hindsight need 
not have been implemented?  
9) Were there things needed/implemented in the response that should have 
been implemented beforehand? What were they? Why were they not 
implemented before the pandemic? 
10) Were you involved in pandemic exercises at hospital/regional/national 
level? 
a. Which parts were tested? 
b. How were lessons learned incorporated into the pandemic plan/pandemic 
planning activities? 
Section C: Use of the plan in the response to the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
(40 minutes) 
11)  At the start of the pandemic, what was the trigger to activate the hospital 
plan?  
a. Which parts of the plan were used? Was national/regional plan used? 
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b. What did you receive from MOH/regional level? Did you use this? 
 
12) If the plan, or components of the plan, were not used, why not?  
a. What was implemented instead? Which new documents developed? 
b. What could have been in the plan to make it more useful?  
13) What information or support did you need from national/regional level 
during the pandemic that you did not get? 
14) Where did your information come from? How well did you distil the 
available information?  Where you able to make timely decisions? 
15)  Were triggers for action/de-escalation during the pandemic clear to 
you?  
16) Was it clear what was expected from you at different stages of the 
pandemic?  
17) Were there communication channels that did not work? Were there 
communication channels that were not anticipated but that proved important? 
18) Were there mechanisms in place that allowed you to feed back 
problems from the front line to relevant authorities at regional/national level? 
19) What were the main things that were done differently in the response 
than what was planned? 
20) Thinking about your expected role during a pandemic, how did your 
actual role play out in comparison?  
Section D: Reflection on what could have been done differently in the 
planning phase (30 minutes) 
21) Which regional or national pandemic planning activities were most 
useful at secondary health care level? Why were they useful? 
22) Which regional or national pandemic planning activities were least 
useful? Why? 
23) If you had to start again, what would your plan/pandemic planning 
activities include/look like? Who would you engage with/involve? 
24) What are your next steps (evaluation, revision of plan)? 
25) What do you expect from WHO for future pandemic preparedness 
activities? 
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Appendix C Invitation letter to participate in the study 
 
 
 
Date: 08 March 2010 
WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION 
REGIONAL OFFICE 
FOR EUROPE 
BUREAU RGIONAL 
DE LÕEUROPE 
REGIONALBRO FR 
EUROPA 
ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЕ 
РЕГИОНАЛЬНОЕ 
БЮРО 
Head office: 
8, Scherfigsvej, DK-2100 
Copenhagen ¯, Denmark 
Telephone: +45 39 17 17 
17; Fax: +45 39 17 18 18;  
E-mail: 
postmaster@euro.who.int 
Web site: 
 
 
Dear Sir,     
Evaluation of how pandemic preparedness activities aided the response 
to the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in countries of the WHO European Region 
The World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe is organizing a 
study of how pandemic preparedness activities aided the response to the 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009. The study will be conducted through interviews with 
relevant stakeholders involved in pandemic preparedness and response 
activities in six selected countries. This initiative is a continuation of the 
efforts of the Regional Office for Europe to support Member States in 
strengthening their pandemic preparedness for future waves of the pandemic 
and for other possible outbreaks of infectious diseases. The initiative is being 
coordinated with other ongoing evaluations in Europe.  
I have the pleasure of inviting your country to participate in the study since 
your country has been randomly chosen to be included in the study. 
Additional information about the study can be found in the enclosed scope 
and purpose. If you agree to participate in the study, we will provide further 
information to the focal point for this activity in your country, which we 
kindly ask you to nominate.  
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We would appreciate your confirmation of your countryÕs participation in the 
above by 26 March 2010. If we do not hear from you by this date we will 
assume that you are not interested in participating and will proceed with 
contacting alternative countries. At the same time, we would appreciate to 
receive the name and contact details of the focal point.  
Ms Michala Hegermann-Lindencrone, Technical Officer, Communicable 
Diseases Surveillance and Response, is the WHO Technical Officer 
responsible for this activity and it would be appreciated if you would address 
your reply to her (fax + 45 39 17 18 69, e-mail: mhl@euro.who.int ). 
 
     Nedret 
Emiroglu, M.D., Ph.D. 
 Director a.i. 
 Division of Health Programmes 
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Appendix D Scope and purpose of the evaluation workshop 
 
Evaluation of how pandemic preparedness 
activities aided the response to pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 in countries in the WHO 
European Region 
 
 100717 
Workshop on 20-22 October 2010 14 July 2010 
 Original: 
English 
 
Scope and purpose 
 
The World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe is organizing a 
workshop to discuss the findings from the evaluation of how pandemic 
preparedness activities aided the response to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in 
countries in the WHO European Region. The workshop will take place from 
20-22 October in Copenhagen.  
 
Four persons from each country visited during the evaluation will be invited 
(one representative each from the Ministry of Health and/or the Public health 
authority, regional authority, secondary health care and primary health care). 
In addition consultants and external experts who took part in the evaluation 
visits will be invited.  The objective of the workshop will be for participating 
countries to agree on the content of the aggregated evaluation report and its 
publication and to provide input on how to improve future WHO pandemic 
preparedness guidance.  
 
WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION 
REGIONAL 
OFFICE FOR 
EUROPE 
 
WELTGESUNDHEI
TSORGANISATIO
N 
REGIONALBRO 
FR EUROPA 
 ORGANISATION 
MONDIALE 
DE LA SANTE 
BUREAU REGIONAL 
DE L'EUROPE 
 
ВСЕМИРНАЯ 
ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ 
ЗДРАВООХРАНЕНИЯ 
ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЕ 
РЕГИОНАЛЬНОЕ 
БЮРО 
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The content of workshop will be:  
 
Day 1: Presentation of aggregated findings from country visits: to agree on 
good practices and gaps identified and conclusions  
 
Day 2: Discuss solutions to the issues identified by means of case studies. 
This work will be conducted in smaller groups the composition of which will 
be determined according to the specific issues.  
 
Day 3: Based on the findings from country visits and conclusions from the 
break-out sessions, the content of current and future WHO guidance will be 
discussed. 
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Appendix E Interview Standard Operating Procedure  
 
 
Preparation before the interview 
1. Interview teams will comprise of a minimum of 2 individuals. 
2. Allocate roles for ÔinterviewerÕ and ÔscribeÕ in advance Ð these roles may 
be alternated after each section of the interview. 
3. The interviewer follows Form A and works through the questions, whilst 
the Scribe annotates the answers given onto Form B. 
4.  Scribes must write legibly in English. 
5. Dress code is Ôbusiness formalÕ unless the host institute specifies or invites 
otherwise. 
6. Prepare a digital voice recorder to assist the note taking. 
7. There will be a briefing session prior to the interview when the team lead 
will address the key points about the project. This will be presented by the 
team lead at the start of each mission which will address the following: 
a. Introduce members of the team to the hosting institute  
b. Background information  
c. Aim and objectives of the study 
d. Methodology 
e. Confidentiality 
f. Funding 
g. Expected outcome 
h. Interview rules (as per next section) 
i. Future workshop 
j. facts (we are not evaluating the response but we are evaluating how did 
planning match the response, it is a piece of academic research which will 
lead to a PhD degree, etc) 
 The Interview 
1. Interviewers must begin by addressing terms of confidentiality. 
2. Role profile from will be distributed at the start of the interview. 
3. Provide contact details of the interviewers. 
4. Allow interviewees to clarify any doubts about the interview. 
5. ÔInterviewerÕ needs to explain the format of the interviews: four sections 
and how much time is dedicated to each one. 
6. ÔInterviewerÕ needs to ask one question at a time (do not combine) and 
provide transition between major sections. 
7. When answering ask the group for one reply from the person best placed to 
answer the question; after he/she finishes ask other interviewees if they agree 
or disagree. 
8. Scribes can interfere in the following situations: 
a. If he/she thinks that the respondent deviates from the topic asked. 
b. Clarification/checking/hearing.  
c. Additional questions may not be asked until the end of the Interview. 
9.  Scribe is also responsible for time management throughout the interview. 
10. Translation will be consecutive not continues   
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After the interview 
1. Verify if the tape recorder worked throughout the interview. 
2. Make any notes on your written notes. 
3. Write down any observations made during the interview. 
4. De-brief together and check both interviewers have a showed sense of: 
a. how it went.  
b. the main messages  
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Appendix F Role Profile Form 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Role Profile Form 
We would appreciate if you would fill in this form. It helps us describe 
who we interviewed for the project. However please be assured that 
this information will be held in confidence. No individual persons and 
no individual countries will be identified in the final report  
 
1. Full Name: 
 
2. Gender: 
 
3. Age: 
 
4. Job title: 
 
5. Department: 
 
6. Role played in pandemic planning: 
 
7. Role played in pandemic response: 
 
8. Work phone: 
 
9. E-mail: 
                                                                  
 Signature 
                                      
Date   
 
R
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